Control systems shutdown

WeU control systems Shutdown systems Detection systems... 

The next step is to apply a number of loss control credit factors such as process control (emergency power, cooling, explosion control, emergency shutdown, computer control, inert gas, operating procedures, reactive chemical reviews), material isolation (remote control valves, blowdown, drainage, interlocks) and fire protection (leak detection, buried tanks, fire water supply, sprinkler systems, water curtains, foam, cable protection). The credit factors are combined and appHed to the fire and explosion index value to result in a net index. 

The fact that batch processes are not carried out at steady state conditions imposes broad demands on the control system. The instrumentation and control system have to be selected to provide adequate control for a wide variety of operating conditions and a wide variety of processes. In addition, basic process control and shutdown systems have to deal with sequencing issues. This chapter presents issues and concerns related to safety of instrumentation and control in batch reaction systems, and provides potential solutions. 

Basic process control system (BPCS) loops are needed to control operating parameters like reactor temperature and pressure. This involves monitoring and manipulation of process variables. The batch process, however, is discontinuous. This adds a new dimension to batch control because of frequent start-ups and shutdowns. During these transient states, control-tuning parameters such as controller gain may have to be adjusted for optimum dynamic response. 

Emergency Shutdown System The safety control system that overrides the action of the basic control system and shuts down the process when predetermined conditions are violated. 

Safety systems are typically divided into emergency trip/shutdown functions, controlled (slow) shutdown, alarm activation, or startup annunciation of auxiliary equipment such as oil pumps. 

As a result of these poorly designed control systems, users experience significant operational problems, including machine and process shutdowns. As with any process plant, the first objective is to achieve reliable production from the FCCU. Only with reliable production will operators start optimizing the unit. Users, therefore, are not using the... 

Historical data management—This includes the data acquisition and storage capabilities. Present-day prices of storage mediums have been dropping rapidly, and systems with 80 gigabyte hard disks are available. These disks could store a minimum of five years of one-minute data for most plants. One-minute data is adequate for most steady state operation, while start-ups and shutdowns or other non steady state operation should be monitored and stored at an interval of one second. To achieve these time rates, data for steady state operation can be obtained from most plant-wide D-CS systems, and for unsteady state conditions, data can be obtained from control systems. 

There are few chemical plants that are so forgiving that a control system or a safety interlock system is not required. Process engineers provide controls to assure product yield and quality and maintain safe operating conditions. This type of control system is a BPCS. The BPCS acts to alarm and moderate a high or low operating condition specified by the normal operating limits within the never exceed critical limits. The SIS is provided to shut down or otherwise place the process in a safe state if the BPCS fails to maintain safe operating conditions. A BPCS should not be used as the sole source of a process safety shutdown. 

As long as pressure, level, and temperature control devices are operating correctly, the safety system is not needed. If the control system malfunctions, then pressure, level, and temperature safety switches sense the problem so the inflow can be shut off. If the control system fails and the safety switches don t work, then relief valves are needed to protect against overpressure. Relief valves are essential because safety switches do fail or can be bypassed for operational reasons. Also, even when safety switches operate correctly, shutdown valves take time to operate, and there may be pressure stored in upstream vessels that can overpressure downstream equipment while the system is shutting down. Relief valves are an essential element in the facility safety system. 

Generally, electrical control systems are designed Fail-Safe. If power is temporarily lost, unnecessary shutdown of the process may occur. Thus, most safety systems such as fire and gas detectors, Nav-Aids, communications, and emergency lighting require standby D.C. power. 

Due to the nature of the SMB process, in-process samples of the unwanted enantiomer and the enantiopure drug substance can be sampled at controlled times during the continuous process to assess the enantiomeric and chemical purity. One can monitor the process without system shutdown by diverting either the extract or the raffinate streams. Further monitoring of the receiving tanks can also be accomplished. 

Arrangement of the semicommercial pilot plants permitted supervision and operation of the plant from a central control panel. The installed safety control system was tested successfully during several emergency shutdowns with no effect on reactor material and catalyst. 

Control systems will play a key role in future distributed plants ]139,145]. As a rule of thumb, plants will be smaller and simpler, but the control systems will be much more advanced, of a standard not known today. Plant personnel for operation and managing will ultimately no longer be required, except for start-up, shutdown, and services. This is a shift from a regulatory to a servo role, supported by a sophisticated sequence control. Control is needed for safety issues, operability, and product quality control. Sensors have a central role to provide the information needed for control and modeling and simulation is needed for process models. 

In general, the safety of a process relies on multiple layers of protection. The first layer of protection is the process design features. Subsequent layers include control systems, interlocks, safety shutdown systems, protective systems, alarms, and emergency response plans. Inherent safety is a part of all layers of protection however, it is especially directed toward process design features. The best approach to prevent accidents is to add process design features to prevent hazardous situations. An inherently safer plant is more tolerant of operator errors and abnormal conditions. 

Introduction The chemical processing industry relies on many types of instrumented systems, e.g., the basic process control systems (BPCSs) and safety instrumented system (SIS). The BPCS controls the process on a continuous basis to maintain it within prescribed control limits. Operators supervise the process and, when necessary, take action on the process through the BPCS or other independent operator interface. The SIS detects the existence of unacceptable process conditions and takes action on the process to bring it to a safe state. In the past, these systems have also been called emergency shutdown systems, safety interlock systems, and safety critical systems. 

Area 300 is controlled using a distributed control system (DCS). The DCS monitors and controls all aspects of the SCWO process, including the ignition system, the reactor pressure, the pressure drop across the transpiring wall, the reactor axial temperature profile, the effluent system, and the evaporation/crystallization system. Each of these control functions is accomplished using a network of pressure, flow, temperature, and analytical sensors linked to control valves through DCS control loops. The measurements of reactor pressure and the pressure differential across the reactor liner are especially important since they determine when shutdowns are needed. Reactor pressure and temperature measurements are important because they can indicate unstable operation that causes incomplete reaction. 

The distributed control system (DCS) hardware areas are often referred to as "process computer rooms." I/O Rooms contain the incoming and outgoing wiring, cables and data highway links, and often small transformers and other related electrical equipment. Often, additional space is needed for a master process engineering computer terminal/work station for process control system changes and for critical safety instrumented systems (SIS) for interlocks and emergency shutdowns. 

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