Chemical weapons Party

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature 13th January 1993. Entry into Force was after the ratification of 65 signatory states on 29th April 1997. To date there are 167 ratified States Parties and 20 Signatory States which are yet to ratify. There are 16 Non signatory States which have yet to accede to the convention. 

In this context, the Convention requires that States Parties cooperate with the OPCW in facilitating the coordination and delivery of assistance and protection to minimise the consequences of a chemical weapons attack, in countering the threat of use of chemical weapons, and in eliminating the threats posed by activities prohibited under Article I of the Convention. Article X stipulates that each State Party has the right to request and to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. 

To provide States Parties with information about a variety of protective measures against chemical weapons, as well as to receive such information as may be provided by States Parties ... 

To provide expert advice, and to assist a State Party, when requested, in identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against chemical weapons can be implemented3 ... 

In the event of (a) the use of chemical weapons or riot control agents as a method of warfare, and/or (b) the threat of the use of chemical weapons, and/or (c) the threat of actions or activities prohibited for States Parties by Article I ... 

Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 

The States Parties to the CWC have established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW www.opcw.org) to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties (SPs). All SPs to the CWC... 

In conformity with the relevant provisions in the Confidentiality Annex the inspected State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to chemical weapons. Such measures may include, inter alia . .. 

Sampling and analysis (S A) during inspections is one of the verification tools provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). Chemical analysis of a sample is the only direct and scientific (and not only circumstantial) tool to confirm the presence of a chemical substance. The presence of a declared chemical in a declared place at a declared time and in declared quantities confirms the declaration provided by a State Party to the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). The actual or past presence of a chemical, which should not be at the inspected site according to the declarations, or, which has... 

The OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) is compiled and maintained by the OPCW Laboratory and contains analytical data of the chemicals that fall under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). States Parties (SPs) of the CWC and the OPCW (Organization for Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons) Laboratory submit analytical data for inclusion to the OCAD. These analytical data are peer reviewed by experts. Before the analytical data are included into the OCAD, they undergo a technical and political approval process. 

Seventeen States Parties (SP) have volunteered to provide services of their high-level chemical analytical laboratories to the Organization for prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW). From these SPs, 18 laboratories (2004) have been designated by the Director-General (DG) of the OPCW to perform analyses as part of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). For the purpose of effective implementation, for example, analysis of samples taken during inspections or... 

States Parties are required to designate or establish a National Authority to ensure the effective implementation of the CWC. The National Authority makes the initial and subsequent annual declaration on chemical weapon stocks or facilities, coordinates and participates in the receipt of OPCW inspections of industrial and military sites, participates in assisting and protecting member states under threat or actual chemical attack, and promotes the peaceful use of chemicals. The National Authority is thus the focal point in a country s interaction with other countries and the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW helps in the provision of advice, assistance and capacity development of relevant skills and expertise in the staff of national authorities. The secretariat also hosts and coordinates regular meetings of the national authorities from all over the world. 

Combined with the general undertakings of the States Parties under Article I in respect to chemical weapons (not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or stockpile, not to transfer directly or indirectly to anyone, and not to use), which are preceded by the words never under any circumstances , a comprehensive and long-lasting safeguard was provided. This included chemical compounds not known at the time. 

The CWC provides essentially two types of provision in respect to a possible attempt by a State Party to break out of the regime or to threats emanating from the absence of states with CW capabilities from the regime clarification and fact-finding provisions in conjunction with the provisions to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions (these have already been discussed above) and provision for assistance and protection against chemical weapons. 

It is noteworthy that the assistance and protection provisions in Article X provide for a variety of mechanisms to deal with possible future CW threats, no matter how they might come about. The CWC not only establishes the right of States Parties to protect themselves against chemical weapons but calls for enhanced cooperation between the parties in the area of exchanging equipment, material and information needed for protective purposes and requires the Organisation as a whole to help States Parties improve their protective capacity and to provide assistance to those States Parties that are not in a position to acquire protection for themselves, by the coordination and delivery of such protection under procedures of the Organisation. ... 

The destruction of these declared stockpiles has made considerable progress. There have been difficulties and delays, but there is no doubting the full commitment of all possessor States Parties to complete the destruction of all their chemical weapons within the time frames established by the Convention. Furthermore, facilities that were used in the past to produce chemical weapons are being destroyed or converted for legitimate purposes. Destruction as well as conversion operations are subject to systematic verification by the OPCW, which has conducted more than 1,800 inspections, in 65 States Parties, since the beginning of inspections in 1997. More than 1,000 of these inspections were conducted at CW facilities (CW storage facilities, former CW production facilities, destruction operations, and locations where old and/or abandoned chemical weapons are being recovered and destroyed). Some... 

Adherence by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the other difficult nut to crack. The current multilateral (six-party) process does of course focus on the nuclear issue. Concerns about chemical weapons are frequently raised in the North Asian context, but there does not appear at this moment to be a regional process that addresses these... 

On the preventive side, there is first the need to make the regime against chemical weapons truly universal. This has two aspects the need to attract all states into the CWC regime, and the need to ensure that all States Parties fully implement the treaty. Of particular importance is that States Parties enact and enforce the prohibition of chemical weapons in their penal codes so as to ensure that the international ban on chemical weapons finds expression in national laws and that any violator can be apprehended, prosecuted and punished no matter where an offence is committed. This important relationship between quantitative and qualitative factors in relation to universahty was clearly recognized by the First Review Conference, which called for two Action Plans one on universality and one to ensure full national implementation of the Convention by aU States Parties. ... 

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