Chemical industry infrastructure

What does all this information about PSM/RMP have to do with protecting chemical industry infrastructure Good question. For those already familiar with the tenets of these important regulations, the answer is obvious. That is, in combination, these regulations set the basis, became the vital foundation for subsequent directives related to post-9/11 Homeland Security and protection of vital infrastructure, including chemical industry infrastructure, from terrorism—homegrown or otherwise. 

Again, when it comes to the security of chemical industry infrastructure (and the rest... 

Ideally, in a perfect world, all chemical facilities would be secured in a layered fashion (aka the barrier approach). Layered security systems are vital. Using the protection in-depth principle, requiring that an adversary defeat several protective barriers or security layers to accomplish its goal, chemical industry infrastructure can be made more secure. Protection in depth is a term commonly used by the military to describe security measures that reinforce one another, masking the defense mechanisms from the view of intruders, and allowing the defender time to respond to intrusion or attack. 

In chemical industry infrastructure security, protection in depth is used to describe a layered security approach. A protection-in-depth strategy uses several forms of security techniques and/or devices against an intruder and does not rely on one single defensive mechanism to protect infrastructure. By implementing multiple layers of security, a hole or flaw in one layer is covered by the other layers. An intruder will have to intrude through each layer without being detected in the process—the layered approach implies that no matter how an intruder attempts to accomplish his goal, he will encounter effective elements of the physical protection system. 

In the discussion above, conditions described referred to perfect world conditions—that is, to those conditions that we would want (i.e., the security manager s proverbial wish list) to be incorporated into the design and installation of new chemical industry infrastructure. Post-9/11, in a not-so-perfect world, however, many of the peripheral (fence line) measures described above are more difficult to incorporate into chemical industry site infrastructure. This is not to say that industrial chemical facilities do not have fence lines or fences most of them do. These fences are designed to keep vandals, thieves, and trespassers out. The problem is that many of these facilities were constructed several years ago, before urban encroachment literally encircled the sites—allowing, at present, little room for security stand-backs or setbacks to be incorporated into plants or critical equipment locations. Based on personal observation, many of these fences face busy city streets or closely abut structures outside the fence line. The point is that when one sits down to plan a security upgrade, these factors must be taken into account. 

Infrastructure. These recommendations advise utilities to address security in all elements of chemical industry infrastructure—from source chemical to transportation and through processing and product delivery. 

Feature 6. Establish physical and procedural controls to restrict access to chemical industrial infrastructure to only those conducting authorized, official business and to detect unauthorized physical intrusions. 

The Chemical Process Industries Infrastructure Function and Economics, James R. Couper, O. Thomas Beasley, and W. Roy Penney... 

In 1948, three small oil fields produced 876,000 barrels per year, and in 1956, with the discovery of oil in Xinjiang, China s oil production rose to 22 million b/year. China was a net importer of oil until 1963. Her Chemical Industry did not really really take off until 1973, when oil from the fields in North China started to flow. China s Chemical Industry is still in the embryonic states. Given the present production level of 2.3 million barrels/day, China has finally entered the petrochemical era. She has developed a credible, if still thin, infrastructure, research backup, and downstream integration for its petrochemical industry. 

Here we are concerned with chemical industry (including hazardous materials) infrastructure, which we define as follows ... 

Chemical and hazardous materials industry infrastructure includes substantial facility and equipment investment it is highly capital intensive. Most chemical industry facilities contain very specialized process equipment that would be difficult to replace quickly. A good example is an oil refinery plant, where if the cracking facilities were destroyed they could not be replaced anytime soon. It is interesting to note that some chemical industry facilities (e.g., oil refineries) require large amounts of land (have a large footprint) but are typically staffed with few employees relative to on-site land requirements. 

We use sidebar 3.2, an outline of the major categories of the chemical industry, to identify the nation s vulnerabilities to terrorist attack on our chemical infrastructure. Virtually all chemical use, storage, and manufacturing in the United States fits into one of these categories. 

It is important to point out that post-9/11 the chemical industry sector has taken great strides to protect its critical infrastructure. For instance, government and industry have developed vulnerability assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure systems and trained thousands of auditors and others to conduct them. 

Those identifying security-sensitive information should consider all ways that facilities might use and make public information (e.g., many chemical industrial facilities may at times engage in competitive bidding processes for construction of new facilities or infrastructure). Finally, information critical to the continuity of day-to-day operations should be identified and backed up. 

Couper, J. R., O. T. Beasley, and W. R. Penney. 2001. The Chemical Processing Industries Infrastructure. New York Marcel Dekker. 

Rasch AA (2006) The Role of Site Services and Infrastructure for Productivity Management. In Budde F, Felcht U-H, Frankemolle H (eds) Value Creation Strategies for the Chemical Industry, 2nd edn. Wiley-VCH, Weinheim, pp 257-268... 

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