Industrial Infrastructure

Plastics China Technologies, Markets and Growth Strategies to 2008 85 

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The Chemical Process Industries Infrastructure Function and Economics, James R. Couper, O. Thomas Beasley, and W. Roy Penney... 

What does all this information about PSM/RMP have to do with protecting chemical industry infrastructure Good question. For those already familiar with the tenets of these important regulations, the answer is obvious. That is, in combination, these regulations set the basis, became the vital foundation for subsequent directives related to post-9/11 Homeland Security and protection of vital infrastructure, including chemical industry infrastructure, from terrorism—homegrown or otherwise. 

Chemical and hazardous materials industry infrastructure includes substantial facility and equipment investment it is highly capital intensive. Most chemical industry facilities contain very specialized process equipment that would be difficult to replace quickly. A good example is an oil refinery plant, where if the cracking facilities were destroyed they could not be replaced anytime soon. It is interesting to note that some chemical industry facilities (e.g., oil refineries) require large amounts of land (have a large footprint) but are typically staffed with few employees relative to on-site land requirements. 

Again, when it comes to the security of chemical industry infrastructure (and the rest... 

Ideally, in a perfect world, all chemical facilities would be secured in a layered fashion (aka the barrier approach). Layered security systems are vital. Using the protection in-depth principle, requiring that an adversary defeat several protective barriers or security layers to accomplish its goal, chemical industry infrastructure can be made more secure. Protection in depth is a term commonly used by the military to describe security measures that reinforce one another, masking the defense mechanisms from the view of intruders, and allowing the defender time to respond to intrusion or attack. 

In chemical industry infrastructure security, protection in depth is used to describe a layered security approach. A protection-in-depth strategy uses several forms of security techniques and/or devices against an intruder and does not rely on one single defensive mechanism to protect infrastructure. By implementing multiple layers of security, a hole or flaw in one layer is covered by the other layers. An intruder will have to intrude through each layer without being detected in the process—the layered approach implies that no matter how an intruder attempts to accomplish his goal, he will encounter effective elements of the physical protection system. 

In the discussion above, conditions described referred to perfect world conditions—that is, to those conditions that we would want (i.e., the security manager s proverbial wish list) to be incorporated into the design and installation of new chemical industry infrastructure. Post-9/11, in a not-so-perfect world, however, many of the peripheral (fence line) measures described above are more difficult to incorporate into chemical industry site infrastructure. This is not to say that industrial chemical facilities do not have fence lines or fences most of them do. These fences are designed to keep vandals, thieves, and trespassers out. The problem is that many of these facilities were constructed several years ago, before urban encroachment literally encircled the sites—allowing, at present, little room for security stand-backs or setbacks to be incorporated into plants or critical equipment locations. Based on personal observation, many of these fences face busy city streets or closely abut structures outside the fence line. The point is that when one sits down to plan a security upgrade, these factors must be taken into account. 

Infrastructure. These recommendations advise utilities to address security in all elements of chemical industry infrastructure—from source chemical to transportation and through processing and product delivery. 

Feature 6. Establish physical and procedural controls to restrict access to chemical industrial infrastructure to only those conducting authorized, official business and to detect unauthorized physical intrusions. 

Increased use of information technology, such as remote electronic data entry and electronic diaries, creates the further need for additional data integrity controls and audit trails, plus the support of this whole industry infrastructure. 

Couper, J. R., O. T. Beasley, and W. R. Penney. 2001. The Chemical Processing Industries Infrastructure. New York Marcel Dekker. 

Abstract The article addresses the existing gas industry infrastructure of Azerbaijan,... 

Stephen B. Dobbs, Pres., Industrial, Infrastructure, Gov t Global Jeff L. Faulk, Pres., Energy, Chemicals Power Garry Flowers, Sr. VP-Health, Safety Environment Wendy Hallgren, VP-Corp. Compliance Alan L. Boeckmann, Chmn. 

A strong oil industry infrastructure meeting all international standards has been created in Azerbaijan over the last years. 50 million tons of oil will be produced in the republic by 2010. However, as the number of oil contracts increases, so increases the concern about environmental protection. 

In healthcare there is a corresponding great divide and per capita investment in countries in the North compared with those in the South is a well-known example. For example, annual per capita expenditures on overall healthcare in the USA was 6,094 in 2007, whereas it is 2,560 in the UK, 1,135 in Korea and 21 in Ethiopia.21 At the same time, very few countries in the South have an industrial infrastructure that can support the discovery and development of medicinal agents—be they synthetic or derived from plant, microbial or marine biomaterials. Consequently, these countries are substantially reliant on imported drugs for primary healthcare—if governments or local residents are able to afford them. 

It has been estimated that the time needed for a country with the appropriate industrial infrastructure and pre-assembly activities to convert a significant quantity of fissionable material into a nuclear explosive device is ... 

The contemporary observation of the full sky with at least two neutrino telescopes in opposite Earth Hemispheres is an important issue for the study of transient phenomena. Moreover v events detection from the Northern Hemisphere is required to observe the Galactic Centre region (not seen by ICECUBE), already observed by HESS as an intense TeV gamma source. In the Norther Hemisphere a favourable region is offered by the Mediterranean Sea, where several abyssal sites (> 3000 m) close to the coast are present and where it is possible to install the detector near scientific and industrial infrastructures. 

Enhanced standard of living—geothermal systems can be installed at remote locations without requiring other industrial infrastructure. The region can grow without pollution. 

Chapter 10 provides another remarkable story, the commercialization of the new science of biotechnology, which required the building of a new basic industrial infrastructure. This process began in the 1970s and continues today. 

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