Causation causal processes

To obtain the mass emissions of pollutants from e-waste recycling processes, it is essential that the inputs of pollutants are truly e-waste related. To fulfill this requirement, a causal analysis is desirable. However, the concept of causation is rather problematic because causal mechanisms are complex [26]. Nonetheless, we are compelled to identify causes, in an attempt to minimize the uncertainties associated with our estimates. In this chapter, the strict empiricist, David Hume s empirical criterion, was adopted. This approach requires only a combination of (1) e-waste processing and environmental pollution are associated in space and time (contiguity) (2) e-waste processing precede to environmental pollution (temporal succession) and (3) e-waste processing is always conjoined with environmental pollution (consistent conjunction). These are always the cases judged from a number of previous studies [6, 27-35]. 

Analysis, that can assist with the identihcation of causal factors. The concepts of incident causation encompassed in these tools are fundamental to the majority of investigation methodologies. (See Chapter 3 for information about the Domino Theory, System Theory, and HBT Theory.) The simplest approach involves reviewing each unplanned, unintended, or adverse item (negative event or undesirable condition) on the timeline and asking, Would the incident have been prevented or mitigated if the item had not existed If the answer is yes, then the item is a causal factor. Generally, process safety incidents involve multiple causal factors. 

The design of most process plants relies on redundant safety features or layers of protection, such that multiple layers must fail before a serious incident occurs. Barrier analysis ) (also called Hazard-Barrier-Target Analysis, HBTA) can assist the identification of causal factors by identifying which safety feature(s) failed to function as desired and allowed the sequence of events to occur. These safety features or barriers are anything that is used to protect a system or person from a hazard including both physical and administrative layers of protection. The concepts of the hazard-barrier-target theory of incident causation are encompassed in this tool. (See Chapter 3.)... 

A probabilistic approach may be used to differentiate the two. This approach is particularly useful in ruling out potential risk factors with low probabilities of occurrence. It is important for the risk assessors to observe the impacts, list the potential stressors, identify exposure pathways, and review the evidence that a particular stressor can cause the observed effect. The causality criteria set in the previous section can be useful in this process the more criteria are met, the more likely the causation. The output is the probability of a particular stressor and its source being the causative agent for the observed or predicted impact. Multiple stressors might have similar probabilities due to uncertainties from the understanding of the exposure-effects link. 

The first proposition, "conscious processes are subserved by neural activity", is in logical contradiction to the second, "conscious processes play causal roles", if the first proposition is taken to mean that for every conscious process that may be defined or intuited to exist, then there is necessarily a real, durational, and logical sequence of neurological operations in the brain which precedes and causes the conscious activity (causation must have duration and precede the effect which results), then the conscious process of the second proposition must be included it must also be caused by neurological activity, and so its apparent causative power is only a reaction to previous neurological causation. As i stated above, the mind, or consciousness, is thus reduced to having no actual causative power at all, it becomes an inoperative concept. 

The goal of STAMP is to assist in understanding why accidents occur and to use that understanding to create new and better ways to prevent losses. This chapter and several of the appendices provide examples of how STAMP can be used to analyze and understand accident causation. The particular examples were selected to demonstrate the applicability of STAMP to very different types of systems and industries. A process, called CAST (Causal Analysis based on STAMP) is described in chapter 11 to assist in performing the analysis. 

If several safety professionals investigate a given hazards-related incident, they should identify the same causal factors, with minimum variation. That is unlikely if the thought processes they use have greatly different foundations. At least 25 causation models have been published. Since many of them conflict, all of them cannot be valid. A review of some of them is followed by a discussion of principles that should be contained in a causation model. 

This chapter addresses the need for safety professionals to adopt an incident causation model, a thought process based on a sound understanding of the hazards-related incident phenomenon and which, when applied, identifies the reality of the causal factors in the incident process. 

Safety professionals apply differing and contradictory incident causation models, and the work of some of them is misdirected and ineffective. Professional safety practice requires that the advice given to avoid, eliminate, or control hazards be based on a sound incident causation model, a thought process, so that, through the application of that model, the desired risk reduction is attained. That will not occur if the causation model used does not require identifying the actual causal factors. 

As used in this treatise, causation means the act or agency of causing or producing an effect. Causal factors include all of the elements — the events, the characteristics of things, and the actions or inactions of persons— that contribute to the incident process. A model is to represent the theoretical ideal for the process through which hazards-related incidents occur, a process that requires determining when the phenomenon begins and ends. 

Strong emphasis is given in this causation model to the causal factors that arise out of less than adequate design management practices. As the term is used here, design encompasses aU processes applied in devising a system to achieve results. 

Application of an incident causation model that properly balances causal factors deriving from less than adequate policies, standards, or procedures that impact on the design process, operations management, and task performance... 

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