Bhopal disaster

In Delaware, the Regulation for the Management of Extremely Ha2ardous Substances Act, developed in response to the Bhopal disaster and several chemical-release incidents in Delaware, became effective in 1989 (27,28). The regulations Hst 88 toxic substances, 32 flammable substances, and 50 explosive substances. A sufficient quantity is specified for each of these materials, based on potential for a catastrophic event at a distance of 100 m from a potential source of a 1-h release. 

Protection of Employees. In 1986, shortly after the Bhopal disaster, OSHA contracted to develop a federal standard on process ha2ards management. A proposed standard was issued in 1990, and the Process Safety Management of Highly Ha2ardous Chemicals standard was issued and implemented in 1992 (36). 

A plant team working with the Pampa fire department brought the fire under control. The Chemical Manufacturers Association s Community Awareness Emergency Response Program (CARE), developed after the Bhopal disaster was credited with effectiveness of their efforts in putting out the fire. 

Make a list of factors that contributed to Uie Bhopal disaster. 

D. Mackenzie, "Design Failures tliat Caused Bhopal Disaster," New Sci., p. 

Ronald J. Willey, The Bhopal Disaster (New York American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1998). 

Bezold—Br eke effect, 7 308 B-form oligonucleotides, 17 606 BHK cell based products, 5 35 It Bhopal disaster, 21 829, 830 BHS-Fest pressure filter, 11 378-379 Bi2223 magnets, refrigerator-cooled,... 

Buffer zones separating relatively hazardous operations from neighboring residential, commercial, or industrial properties also are important. The human toll in the Bhopal disaster was magnified by the fact that a town had been allowed to grow up at the plant s boundary. 

From Plant Saponins to 16 -Methyl Intermediates. With the Bhopal disaster in India in mind, the initial program of work with our colleagues in Mexico City was directed at reexamining an alternative process to the existing process using diazomethane as a reagent for the introduction of the 16 p -methyl group (Scheme 9, Routes B and A, respectively). 

Although methylhydrazine has a higher boiling point than methyl isocyanate (88°C versus 39°C), and would therefore be expected to be easier to contain, it is a toxic and hazardous compound (rocket fuel). However, methylhydrazine does not have the emotive baggage associated with the Bhopal disaster caused by methyl isocyanate. On these grounds, work to determine the feasibility of Scheme 20 was considered a worthwhile objective. 

The Bhopal Disaster of 1984 was caused by the accidental release of 40 tonnes of methyl isocyanate (MIC) from a pesticide plant of Union Carbide India, Limited (UCIL) located in the heart of the city of Bhopal, India. A total number of victims is estimated as many as 600,0003. The plant was abandoned and remaining toxic chemicals at the site are still discharging into the environment. 

The Bhopal disaster was a watershed in the area of environmental policy and legislation worldwide. Suddenly the horror of the industrial model of development became very stark and real. How and where industries were sited and how they dealt with the dangers that they posed to the communities around them became real questions. After the Love Canal saga (see the case study later in this chapter), Bhopal was the one incident that led to worldwide regulation on chemicals and toxicity. Intertwined with all the information was the fact that communities be given information and be included as participants in industry decision making. 

Studies in animals revealed that methylisocyanate, by reacting with and changing proteins in the body which would then be recognized as foreign by the immune system, caused antibodies to be produced to the altered proteins. This was also found in the human victims of the Bhopal disaster. ... 

An examination of the causes of the Bhopal disaster clearly indicates that the accident would not have occurred if all necessary precautions had been taken in the maintenance and operation of the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant. This required continued and apt maintenance, regular inspection by independent authorities, sufficiently well-trained staff, and location of the plant far away from residential areas and not just within 1 km of the railway station and within 3 km of two major hospitals, as was the case in Bhopal. 

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