Accidents cultural factors

Helmieich s (1994) comprehensive analysis of the AV052 accident thoroughly addresses the role of cultural factors. His contention is that... 

ABSTRACT Four hundred and sixty seven coal gas explosion accidents that occurred in China between the years of 1950 and 2000 were investigated through statistical methods so as to review the overall situation and provide quantitative information on coal gas explosion accidents. Statistical characteristics about accident-related factors such as space, time, gas accumulation reasons, gas grade, ignition sources, accidents categories, and accident economic loss were analyzed. Some special conclusions have been achieved. For example, most gas explosion accidents were found to have concentricity on the space-time and hazard characteristics. Such results may be helpful to prevent coal gas explosion accidents. Moreover, comments were made on APS (Accident Prevention System) and safety culture. In conclusion, countermeasures were proposed in accordance with the results of statistical studies, including the change of safety check time. 

Lund, J and Aaro L. E. 2004 Accident prevention. Presentation of a model placing emphasis on human, structural and cultural factors Safety Science Volume 42, Issue 4, pp. 271-324. 

NASA convened the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). It looked at many aspects of this mission and its flight. It considered other organizational and cultural factors. 

The first area focuses on the cultural and organizational factors that will have a major influence on the effectiveness of a human error data collection system and how well the information derived from such a system is translated into successful error reduction strategies. Regardless of how effectively the technical issues are dealt with, the system will not be successful imless there is a culture in the organization which provides support for the data gathering process. No data collection system aimed at identifying human error causes of accidents will be workable without the active cooperation of the workforce. 

With regard to evaluating these factors, it is recommended that structured checklists be used, such as those provided by the HFAM method described in Chapter 2. These checklists provide an explicit link between the direct causal factors and management policies. Figure 2.12 shows how these checklists could be used to investigate possible procedures deficiencies, and the policies that led to the deficiencies, as part of the incident investigation. Similar checklists can be used to investigate possible culture problems (e.g., inappropriate trade-offs between safety and production) that could have been implicated in an accident. 

While management contemplates important issues such as safety investment and safety culture on organizational accidents, the results of this paper suggest that they should also consider the size and life cycle of the companies. Where the size do not favor workplace safety, managers should consider substitutes for these factors through networks or other forms of organization. 

Event-based models are limited in their ability to represent accidents as complex processes, particularly at representing systemic accident factors such as structural deficiencies in the organization, management deficiencies, and flaws in the safety culture of the company or industry. We need to understand how the whole system, including the organizational and social components, operating together, led to the loss. While some extensions to event-chain models have been proposed, all are unsatisfactory in important ways. 

It was notoriously difficult, however, to link HSE culture to major accident risks and process safety in any clearly communicated manner. In the fall of 2004, a serious gas blowout occurred on Statoil s Snorre Alpha platform. A catastrophic outcome was avoided only by chance, and by a hazardous rescue operation by the remaining crew. Poor HSE culture appeared as an important contributing factor in several post-event accounts, including a thorough investigation report commissioned by Statoil, as well... 

A dynamic safety culture recognizes these near-miss incidents as warnings as well as opportunities, and encourages employees to report them so that action can be taken on the warnings before they recur, perhaps with disastrous results. Not only will an organization be addressing what are in many instances accident precursors, but it will also create a communication network from employees directly to the chief executive officer. This communication channel, in many cases anonymous, is one of the key factors in forging a positive safety culture. 

One of the biggest obstacles to safety efforts, the prevention of accidents, and change interventions is the fear factor that snrrounds all aspects of safety at the workplace. Unless this fear factor is identified and the root canses of it eliminated by changing the safety philosophies of the organization, all efforts to introduce a positive safety culture will fail. 

Because of the safety fear factor there is almost invariably a cover-up after an accident. This most certainly happens after a fatal accident, where employees are terrified of becoming involved in the investigation, especially if legal agencies are involved. This cover-up is another spin-off of the fear factor in industry that hampers the process of creating a positive safety culture. It is a result of years and years of blaming the worker for accidents and will not be changed in a hurry. 

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