Accident proactive

Safety is traditionally taken seriously, but only for a short period of time after an accident. Proactive safety is when serious attempts are made to predict when the next accident may happen by identifying and reducing risks and fixing things before the event may occur. Near miss incidents offer such an opportunity and will involve a change in safety culture. 

The third category of methods addressed in this chapter are error analysis and reduction methodologies. Error analysis techniques can either be applied in a proactive or retrospective mode. In the proactive mode they are used to predict possible errors when tasks are being analyzed during chemical process quantitative risk assessment and design evaluations. When applied retrospectively, they are used to identify the underlying causes of errors giving rise to accidents. Very often the distinction between task analysis and error analysis is blurred, since the process of error analysis always has to proceed from a comprehensive description of a task, usually derived from a task analysis. 

The focus of this chapter has been on proactive application of these analytical methods such as safety audits, development of procedures, training needs analysis, and equipment design. However, many of these methods can also be used in a retrospective mode, and this issue deserves further attention in its own right. Chapter 6 describes analytical methods for accident investigations and data collection. 

The function of this section is to provide an overall framework within which to describe the important aspects of data collection systems in the CPI. As mentioned in the introduction, the emphasis in this chapter will be on methods for identifying the causes of errors that have led to accidents or significant near misses. This information is used to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents, and to identify the underlying causes that may give rise to new types of accidents in the future. Data collection thus has a proactive accident prevention function, even though it is retrospective in the sense that it is usually carried out after an accident or near miss has already occurred. 

The number of Sis, present in today s chemical process industry is overwhelming as discussed by Tixier (Tixier et al., 2002). These indicators are categorized in several ways in literature, for example pro-active versus reactive indicators. Many of these categories are not unambiguous. Some authors, like Kletz (Kletz, 1998) define proactive as prior to the operational phase of an installation while other authors, like Rasmussen et al. (Rasmussen et al., 2000), define pro-active as prior to an accident. In this thesis two categories of indicators are used, i.e. pro-active and reactive indicators. Here the definition of Rasmussen (Rasmussen et al., 2000) is adopted, who defined pro-active indicators as indicators before an accident and reactive indicators as indicators after an accident. Moreover, the pro-active indicators are divided into predictive and monitoring indicators. The monitoring indicators use actual events as a measure for the likelihood, while the predictive indicators predict the likelihood. 

Lessons-learned programs are not the only way of capturing deviant conditions and potential solutions. Accident and incident reports are useful in themselves even though many form the basis for lessons learned. They alert people to potential safety issues so that the same adverse event is not repeated inadvertently. Near-miss reporting systems can be even more proactive as they allow personnel to avoid potential events as well as actual events. 

Knowledge of how and why accidents happen can, therefore, raise generic principles related to safe practice in the outdoors and provides an effective basis for modifications to practice that should minimise the occurrence of injury. Similarly, understanding the factors contributing to accidents allows them to be foreseen and anticipated, so that the focus is proactive and preventative rather than reactive. 

The value of having a coherent set of safety performance indicators is that it enables regulators and industry to detect problematic operatious aud iudustrywide or systemic risks and proactively address these vulnerabilities instead of waiting for the next big accident. A good example is provided by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), which continuously collects, reviews, aud reports on performance of operations in its sector of the North Sea and works with industry and labor on improvements, as discussed in several other chapters. ... 

The understanding that both management and employees are partners in accident prevention and risk management, and that together they can create and maintain a safe workplace with a proactive safety culture, is needed to change the workplace safety culture. 

Upstream activities are those activities that are part of the safety system before there is a loss as a result of an accident. They are also referred to as precontact activities. This is proactive safety. 

Safety culture is about the reduction of risk on an ongoing basis so that loss is prevented. Fewer accidents are experienced, and events with severe consequences are less likely to occur in a workplace that has a proactive safety culture. 

Accidents and near-miss incidents are always a result of multiple causes, normally a combination of high-risk conditions and practices, and seldom, if ever, is an accident or a near-miss incident attributable to a single cause. Proactive safety cultures endeavor to determine all the contributing causes of an accident and do not dwell on the behavior only. This practice is termed looking beyond the injured. 

A positive, proactive safety culture recognizes the fact that accidents and other downgrading events are caused by a sequence of events that can be interrupted and the accident prevented. Risk assessment will help predict potential loss events. This requires a culture wherein high-risk workplace conditions are not tolerated and high-risk behaviors are not condoned or accepted. This, after all, should be the object of a positive safety culture—safe working conditions and safe work behaviors. 

Suggested proactive indicators to be used in oil and gas industry based on a survey of accidents in the industry... 

We have performed a survey of accidents in the oil and gas industry in Norway from the period 2002 to 2006. Based on the root causes identified in the reports, we are suggesting indicators that may have mitigated the accidents by enabling us to react at an early stage. An indicator that enables us to foresee and avoid incidents or accidents is called a proactive indicator. 

The research question has been What are the main root causes behind the documented accidents and What is possible proactive indicators to avoid or mitigate the root causes behind these accidents ... 

There was no explicit assessment of safety culture, in combination with a quantitative evaluation of the HSE environment in the accident reports. Such an assessment could be used to get a collective measure or temperarnre of the priority of safety in the organization, related to best practice . In Itho (2004) there is shown a correlation between the level of safety culture and quantitative incidents/acddents thus safety culture could be used as an indicator of the holes in harriers or the level of erosion of barriers, in combination with quantitative HSE data. A more specific measure tan culture is described by Rundmo (1997) i.e. when an employee in the Norwegian oil and gas industry feels at risk he/she is at risk. A proactive indicator could thus be a workplace survey, measuring risk perceptions or performing a more broadly based assessment of safety culture in combination with other local quantitative indicators such as gas emissions, injuries compared with best practice in the industry. 

Based on the identified common causes found in our exploration, we have tried to identify proactive indicators. The proactive indicators have been based on a theoretical understanding of the common causes and possibilities of identifying the causes prior to an accident by an indicator. We are trying to avoid serious HSE issues. Some of the key issues in the oil and gas industry are of course emissions of oil and gas or process upsets, which could lead to fire or explosions. A key indicator is thus the level of gas and/or oil emissions and process upsets. This is seen as a reactive indicator, and is not discussed further in this paper. 

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