Treaty system effects

F. Orrego Vicuna, in Governing the Antarctic. The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, O. S. Stokke D. Vidas (Eds.), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1996, 174. 

Europe s carbon market is growing quickly after the introduction of tradable annual allowances for greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto treaty that went into effect in 2005. In this new market-based emissiontrading system, light polluters can sell some of their surplus allowances to heavier polluters. This can result in a reduction of emissions at a lower cost than if each installation had been obliged to meet an individual target but the allowances to produce one kilowatt-hour of coal-fired power can cost more than the coal itself. 

Effective environmental management and decision making. Discuss how scientists and decision makers can best develop risk assessment, risk management and risk communication systems to achieve environmental goals. Use the POPs treaty and Chinese obligations under the treaty as an example for which effective management systems can be developed. 

In this context, one needs to recall the objectives of the multilateral verification system. Traditionally, two aspects were emphasized confidence-building and deterrence of treaty violation. In the CWC case, confidence-building relates to the confirmation (a) that the declared CW stockpiles and production capabilities are actually being destroyed, and (b) that chemical activities in those facilities inspected under Article VI are legitimate. The deterrence effect of the CWC verification system relies essentially on two interconnected factors the probability that an Article VI inspection can actually detect a violation (and, relatedly, that the inspection system is optimized in such a way that it induces compliance and maximizes the selection of relevant facilities ), and the confidence of States Parties in the OPCW s ability to conduct an effective and conclusive challenge inspection should it be requested to do so. 

The XV ATCM (1989, Paris) represented a real turning point for the protection of the Antarctic environment. The parties, in Recommendation XV. 1 prompted their governments to undertake as a priority objective the further elaboration, maintenance and effective implementation of a comprehensive system for the protection of the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems aimed at ensuring that human activity does not have an adverse impact on the Antarctic environment and its dependent or associated ecosystems or compromise the scientific, aesthetic or wilderness values of Antarctica . The parties asked that a Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting be held in 1990 to explore and discuss proposals relating to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment. 

Prior to entry into the area, intelligence assets shall provide the NATO operational and local commanders with suspected areas that contain TICs. The intelligence community shall endeavor to obtain all pertinent information involving production and storage facilities of TICs. At a minimum the type of TICs and quantities at each location shall be provided to the Commander. Additionally, there is a need for Commanders to be informed on the specific risk (fire, explosion, toxicity, corrosive effects, and persistency of gas) as well as the efficiency of collective and individual protection systems. Intelligence assets should query the appropriate scientific, civilian industrial and chemical warfare treaty experts in order to gather all applicable information. When possible, local industrial site survey forms shall be obtained for all identified sites. 

Plasma arc technology has been used successfully in Europe to destroy chemical warfare material but has not been permitted in the United States. Currendy, PMCD is optimistic that it will have little difficulty in obtaining a permit. They have identified several plasma arc firms in this country that have operational units, but none has destroyed a CW-related waste stream. If the ACWA program does not develop a continuous SCWO system that is cost-effective for use on the quantities of materiel to be destroyed in the nonstockpile program and if a permit for the plasma arc technology cannot be obtained in time, the Army may be forced to incinerate its waste streams to comply with the CWC treaty deadline of April 2007... 

Asada has pointed out, for instance, that no treaties can obligate States to establish such a national export control system so extensively, so quickly and so effectively, see Asada 2008, p. 318. 

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