THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREAT TO NAVAL FORCES

Over the course of this study, the committee discovered a considerable mismatch between its view of the chemical and biological warfare threat to naval forces and what should be done about it, compared with the view of the Navy on these same issues. The latter, in fact, presented itself in many different ways. These varying views within the Navy should be reconciled and the elements of a path forward should be defined at the outset. This introductory chapter attempts to lay groundwork for that process by describing both the problem and the principles of a solution. 

The committee found a more consistent and appropriately serious view of the threat among most organizations in the Marine Corps that were consulted during this study. As a result, the emphasis in this chapter and throughout the report tends to be on actions to be taken by the Navy, although areas for attention by the Marine Corps are noted when appropriate. 

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Fleet operators in the commercial world and emergency response personnel in the civil sector, who face hazardous risks not unlike the chemical and biological threat to naval forces, have developed and implemented an effective risk management capability, which can also serve as a useful qualitative, if not quantitative, model.30... 

To set the context for the findings, conclusions, and recommendations presented in Chapters 2 through 5, the committee first evaluates the present and projected threat of chemical and biological weapons to naval force operations in littoral and open-ocean regions. 

The committee discussed, but ultimately decided not to recommend, establishing a separate command to lead Navy warfighting efforts in chemical and biological threat environments. Unlike Navy mission areas (such as antisubmarine warfare), chemical or biological attack or the threat of such attack defines an environment in which all naval forces must be prepared to carry out their as-... 

Evaluate present and projected chemical and biological warfare threats to naval force operations in littoral regions and deep-ocean regions of the world. Explicit consideration should be given to potential adversaries capabilities to deliver chemical and biological weapons in littoral settings. 

The committee s first priority was to answer the request of the Chief of Naval Operations to address the operational implications for naval forces of dealing with chemical and biological threats. After an executive summary, the first three chapters of the report focus on these issues. Historical background, discussion of the nature and size of the threat, and arguments for and against how seriously it should... 

On a letter dated June 28, 2001, to the president of the National Academy of Sciences, the CNO wrote I am especially pleased that the [Naval Studies] Board is now about to initiate a study of naval force defense capabilities against chemical and biological warfare threats. Recent world events demonstrate that forward-deployed naval forces are constantly at risk even in today s relatively peaceful world. I look forward to supporting this study and receiving the conclusions on issues with direct operational implications such as developing concepts of naval operations to deal with emerging terrorist threats. ... 

In order to evaluate the utility to naval forces of non-medical science and technology that is current, in development, and proposed, the committee assessed naval issues from the five operational perspectives described in Chapter 3 (1) ships at sea, (2) ships in the littorals, (3) shore installations and bases, (4) commercial ports, and (5) logistics. Naval operations in these five environments can require different types of support and therefore lead to different priorities for science and technology, but a few general points can be extracted. As shown in Figure 4.2, the earlier a chemical or biological threat can be detected, the less complex the response required—if not to avoid contamination altogether, then to minimize the consequences and therefore the responses to an attack. 

At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council has conducted an assessment of naval forces defense capabilities against chemical and biological warfare threats. At issue for the Department of the Navy are these questions—to what extent are capabilities being developed that will enable the naval forces to quickly sense and analyze the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents (through effective protection or countermeasures), and deal with contamination under a broad spectrum of operational conditions and over what time frame will these capabilities be realized The tasks of this assessment were as follows ... 

As a first step to characterize risk, Tables 1.1 and 1.2 should be completed by the Navy in order to provide a notional comparative assessment of the vulnerability of different types of naval assets to attack with different types of weapons and the expected consequences. To help manage the situation requires that risk then, represents the combination of the threat, vulnerability, and consequence in the judgment of the decision maker. When completed, Table 1.1 would offer a summary of such risks to U.S. naval forces in time of war against a nation-state armed with chemical or biological weapons, and Table 1.2 would offer analogous risks... 

Advice to naval leadership on the chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) threat can be traced to the Cold War period. As the Navy undertook a major force buildup in the early 1980s, a memorandum from committee member Joshua Lederberg to the CNO, Admiral James Watkins, USN, was instrumental in precipitating the decision to equip some new vessels with collective protection capabilities and improved chemical weapons detectors.1... 

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