Terrorist attacks potential targets

Importation of large amounts of LNG would require major investments to provide LNG marine terminals and related infrastructure. These would be potential targets for terrorist attacks, which would threaten the security of LNG supplies. 

There have always been fears that terrorists might be tempted to acquire and use chemical weapons particularly nerve agents. The world received a shocking reminder of the potential impact of terrorist use of chemical weapons when the Aum-Shinrikyo sect used the nerve gas Sarin to attack civilian targets in Japan during 1994 and 1995. 

The case studies presented here showcase a selection of hazardous chemicals that potentially threaten public safety and security by posing a viable target for terrorist attack and unintended accidents, but that have been reduced or replaced by less hazardous alternatives in the situations profiled here. When available and relevant, details of each innovation, its methods, and benefits have been provided. 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, federal, state, local, and tribal governments, aided by the private sector, have undertaken an unprecedented review of the nation s infrastructure to determine potential targets for future terrorist attacks. At the national level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has divided the nation s infrastructure into 17 categories of critical infrastructures and key resources, one of which is the chemical industry and hazardous materials sector. 

It should be noted that by enlarging the set of available transportation modes the MTSTR.AC model could be generalized and extended to other supply chains which are used for non chemical products that might be a potential target for terrorists-attackers. 

The second factor to be considered is the target attractiveness. Terrorists tend to consider national monuments, major cultural, political, and sporting events, and the financial sector to be particularly attractive, as an attack on such a target is viewed as an attack on their enemy s entire way of life. Likewise, key infrastructure components such as key bridges, tunnels, highways, and railways are more attractive. Finally, the public s fear of chemical and petroleum facilities may make these more attractive targets, more so if materials in the facility have potential off-site consequences if released. 

The reason for this increased focus on transportation security is the fear that hazardous materials could be attractive terrorist targets due to the potential consequences resulting from an intentional release, contamination of the material in transit, or theft of the material for nse as a weapon against another target. Since the chemical indnstiy is critical to the global economy, any snccessftd attack. 

Possible applications of the M2STTLAL model pertain to the anticipation of potential attacks to a targeted chemical supply chain and the limitation of the consequences of these attacks thanks to an appropriate evaluation of terrorist threats. Additionally, the MXSTRAJl model can lead to a better definition and allocation of the security countermeasures for both intra-modal and inter-modal levels. 

As a tool of paramilitary or terrorist force, suicide bombing has much to offer. With it, very confined spaces and therefore high-density targets can be attacked. Often there is far better potential to conceal such a weapon and there is no complex trigger system required. Teams can be kept very small for laimching the attacks as there is no exfUtration or rescue required. The kUl ratio is enormous for one life sacrificed, 100 can easily be taken in the right environment. Done correctly, there is also no perpetrator to be questioned and compromise their units. 

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