System safety tasks hazard identification

Safety and reliability of chemical process plants are such important issues, they deserve the best techniques to prevent problems occurring. To minimize risks resulted from operating problems and hazardous events, process system safety and reliability analysis is often employed. This is a rigorous approach undertaken to improve system reliability and safety. The approach consists of three main tasks hazard identification, risk estimation, and risk control. 

The first task, hazard identification, is crucial in process system safety analysis, because the effectiveness of the other two tasks depends on it. The traditional methods for identifying hazards during the 1960 s (including process reviews , codes of practice , checklists , and safety audit ) were no longer considered adequate in the 1970 s. There was a need for a technique which could anticipate hazardous problems, particularly in areas of novelty and new technology where past experience was limited. 

A typical system safety task for hazard identification would be the preparation of a preliminary hazard list (PHL). Hazard identification or discovery is accomplished by reviewing lessons learned, accident reports, and other historical data. A PHL may be prepared through an informal conference, the use of checklists, and occasionally other techniques such as energy trace and barrier analysis (ETBA). 

The job safety analysis (JSA) [also referred to as the job hazard analysis (JHA)], which is a more simplified form of task analysis, has been a longstanding tool for task and function analysis. JSA has been available and utilized in general industry for many years by the industrial safety community. However, many practitioners do not understand or are simply unfamiliar with the connection between the JSA and the system safety tasks of hazard identification and analysis. It has even been suggested by some in the profession that the JSA itself is a type of oversimplified system safety analysis and, if performed earlier in the job development phase, could be used as the basis of a preliminary hazard analysis for a specific task or set of tasks. However, because JSA is often (if improperly) used to analyze a function only after it has been implemented, much of the data is not factored into the system safety process. The primary purpose of the JSA is to uncover inherent or potential hazards that may be encountered in the work environment. This basic definition is not unlike that previously discussed regarding the various system safety analyses. The primary difference between the two is subtle but important and is found in the end-use purpose of the JSA. Once the job or task is completed, the JSA is usually used as an effective tool for training and orienting the new employee into the work environment. The JSA presents a verbal picture of a specific job. 

In order to assist NPCA member companies in communicating such health and safety information to their workers. NPCA through the Occupational Health and Safety Task Force (and in conjunction with the Canadian Paint and Coatings Association—CPCA) has developed a Hazardous Materials Identification System (HMIS) for use by the paint manufacturers. The system allows the paint manufacturing industry to quickly and concisely inform their employees about the variety of hazards presented by the large number of raw materials in the plant. 

The safety community provides expertise in hazard identification, analysis, and control techniques. TTie safety representative may serve as the primary advisor to the chairperson in articulating system safety goals, tasks, and responsibilities. The safety representative frequently has the job of writing or drafting documents generated by the SSWG. 

The system safety discipline will require the timely identification and subsequent evaluation of the hazards associated with this operation, before losses occur. The hazards must then be either eliminated or controlled to an acceptable level of risk in order to accomplish the goal of relocating the hazardous chemicals. In short, the system safety process will identify any corrective actions that must be implemented before the task is permitted to proceed. The fly-fix-fiy approach discussed earlier has also been described as an after the fact attempt to improve operational safety performance. In contrast, the system safety concept requires before the fact control of system hazards. 

Safety forecasting is the activity a manager carries out to estimate the probability, frequency, and severity of accidents that may occur in a future time span. Safety forecasting is risk assessment. This is usually done by means of physical risk assessment, critical task identification, and task risk assessment. It also entails estimating the effects of risk reduction brought about by a stable safety management system. Hazard and operability studies are part of this function. 

To allow cross-acceptance of railway systems between EU member states, the methods used for the identification and the management of system hazards and risks need to be harmonised within the EU. In order to promote and improve the compatibility and competitiveness of railways in the EU, the European Railway Agency (ERA) was formed, with defined tasks for interoperability and safety. ERA will develop measures that concern common safety methods and... 

A CTA can concentrate initially on the identification and analysis of the relationships between system hazards and safety-related operational tasks. This analysis will enable both the PHA and TAs to be checked for consistency, providing confidence in subsequent safety assurance claims. Any deficiencies -such as hazards with no related operational tasks or operational tasks (deemed as safety-related by subject matter experts) with no relationship to identified hazards -can be highlighted. 

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