System Safety Assessment process conducting

A scientific approach to safety assessment, such as the one presented in this chapter, does have proponents and adherents. Such an approach requires those involved in both the management and conduct of the safety assessment process to continually question (and test) both the efficacy and the validity of their evaluation systems and processes. More to the point, it requires recognition of the fact that we have always done it this way is not a reason for continuing to do so. This approach asks first what is the objective behind the testing, and then it asks how well our testing is meeting this objective. 

ARP4761 - Guidelines and methods for conducting the safety assessment process on civil airborne systems and equipment - 1996 - 4.2 and annex G... 

SAE ARP4761, 1996. Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment. 

SAE/ARP-4761, Guidehnes and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment, Appendix A—Functional Flazard Assessment, 1996, is a useful reference on FHA that is recommended by the FAA for use on civil aircraft systems. 

Having identified the appropriate risks with respect to the design under consideration, each risk should be the subject of a specific study to examine and document the simultaneous or cascading effect(s) of each risk. The objective is to ensure that any SR effects are either eliminated or the risk is shown to be acceptable. A particular risk assessment is required for aircraft airworthiness certification by the FAA the process is documented in SAE/ARP-4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment, 1996. 

Rationale. The analysis process is conducted during development of the system to establish safety requirements. The safety assessment process is used to demonstrate that these requirements are met. 

Note that the process is iterative as it is conducted at each system development level (refer Figs 1.1 and 1.3) above that of component/item (for which an FMEA is a more appropriate safety assessment tool). 

After assembling the PHR committee, the goal should be to review the hazards of a process in its entirety and provide written documentation of the review including what elements of the system were evaluated, how the assessment was conducted, and most importantly, corrective action that needs to be taken to correct deficiencies. The committee should function as a team and include expertise in engineering, safety, and other diseiplines as required. Elements of the OSHA standard whieh should be ineluded in any hazard analysis include ... 

The first four factors appear to be relatively universal, being similar to the results of other attempts to identify the critical components of the management system. Table 8.5 depicts our factors along with the factors derived from three other sources (1) our own factor analysis of a database from the application of a safety perception survey entitled the Safety Barometer developed by the National Safety Council (2) a factor analysis conducted by Coyle et al. (1995) on data from a safety survey that he developed and (3) the factors identified by a group of managers at Dow Chemical in the 1980s that formed the basis for the company s self assessment process. 

An external assessment was conducted of the (Site Name) from (Dates). The assessment team conducted a conq)Feheiisive review of the site s higher risk process safety programs, including in-depth reviews to verify the system effectiveness. 

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