Statutory interpretation

Macey, J. (1986), Promoting public-regarding legislation through statutory interpretation An interest-group model, Columbia Law Review 86, 223-68. 

The following sections include the relevant sections of the complete Act and indicate those parts of the legislation within the different plant categories to which the inspections provided by the independent engineering inspection companies will conform. It should, however, be appreciated that while the inspections provided will fulfill the statutory requirements for inspection, the actual responsibilities under the various Acts to conform remains the responsibility of the plant owner/user. It must be appreciated that the interpretation of any Act is a matter for the local Health and Safety Inspectorate, who should be consulted at all times if doubt exists as to whether any item of machinery and plant requires inspection to comply with a statutory provision. 

The second approach is addressed to elaborate methods able to derive from accurate calculations the points of interest for the interpretation The strategy, in general, consists in the adoption of a simpler model (the mathematical aspects of the model are again concerned) and the task consists in reducing the information coming from the full in-depth calculation (not the the numerical values of observables and other statutory quantities alone) to the level of the simpler model. For example accurate calculations may be reduced at the level of a simple VB theory (Robb, Hiberty) or of a simple MO perturbation scheme (Bernardi) making more transparent the interpretation. 

Due to the peculiar wording of the statute, 256 has been interpreted as applying a different standard of correction depending on whether the situation is one of misjoinder or nonjoinder. In the case of misjoinder ( through error a person is named in an issued patent ), the correction may be made even when there was deceptive intent on the part of the misjoined party (the improperly listed inventor).15 In its statutory construction of 256, the Court in Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc. held ... 

This interpretation of the NCP as being limited to government-financed clean-up is completely at odds with the statutory framework. Section 5 itself states its unqualified applicability to "the response to. .. hazardous substance releases." Both Sections 104 and 106 involve the NCP as the reference point for response or clean-up. Sections 104, 105 and 106 all work together, with Section 105 giving the framework for determining priorities and extent of clean-up. 

In all instances other than these two exceptions, safety/risk standards have uniformly been interpreted to incorporate a standard of relative safety/risk under actual conditions of use. Nowhere is this clearer than in the statutory requirement that all new drugs be proved "safe," a requirement that has existed from 1938 to this day. 

The definitive interpretation of these various safety/risk standards was established by the Supreme Court in the 1914 Lexington Mill decision. ( ) FDA contended that the "injurious to health" standard required the Agency only to show that a food ingredient was not harmless per se. Industry contended, in contrast, that FDA must show actual deleterious effects in humans before the statutory standard was met. The Supreme Court agreed with neither party. 

Federal health and safety regulatory statutes have been interpreted and applied in highly flexible and common sense ways largely because of the existence of a number of important rules of statutory construction. These rules have been created by the judiciary over many decades, and in some instances centuries, as part of our unwritten common law. They do not depend on the words of a particular statute, or the intent of... 

Contaminated land is defined for the purposes of Part IIA by section 78A(2). This definition is then amplified by the statutory guidance in Chapter A of Circular 2/2000, which covers both the manner in which individual local authorities determine whether any land meets this definition and the interpretation of the concepts of significant harm and the significant possibility of significant harm. (These are explored in more detail later in this chapter.)... 

In the 20-year history of the FHSA, there has been no litigation requiring judicial interpretation of the if clause. Judicial discussion of the definition of hazardous substance , however, has consistently included both aspects of the statutory standard. See, e.g.. Springs Mills, Inc. v. CPSC, 434 F. Supp. 416 (D.S. Car. 1977) United States v. Chalaire, 316 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. La. 1970) United States v. 7 Cases. . . Clacker Balls, 253 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Tex. 1966). 

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