Servicing Flame Throwers

The job of the CWS did not end with the production of flame throwers. Weapons had to be serviced, fuels had to be mixed with thickeners, and compressed gas or air had to be supplied. The CWS rigged up an air compressor and mixing vat carried on a truck or trailer. With this equipment troops could mix the hundreds of gallons of thickened fuel used by flame tanks, and compress the large volume of air needed as a propellant.  

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The campaign demonstrated the validity of the new Sixth Army policy on tactical doctrine and servicing. Flame thrower operator casualties were light, malfunctions rare, and assault teams successful in the large majority of their missions. Japanese bimker, cave, and dug-out defenses on Leyte were elaborate and often ingenious. The success of the flame thrower pointed up the merits of the weapon and the training and skill of the operators. 

The Chemical Warfare Service was responsible for flame throwers and incendiary bombs, and NDRC Division 11 led in the development of these weapons. 

To return to the theater level, the respect for the service was increasing, and after the middle of 1944, Copthome again laid plans for co-ordinating the chemical warfare eflFort for the Pacific through the best means available to him—a service conference such as the one which had been so successful in 1943 The second theater CWS conference, held from 10-13 October at Oro Bay under the official direction of Maj. Gen. J. L. Frink, Commanding General, USASOS, was considerably more extensive in scope than the previous conference, but the theme was still the tactical employment of chemical warfare, including aerial and land smokes and incendiaries, the chemical mortar, and the flame thrower. ... 

As new campaigns began in early 1944, it became obvious that it was no longer possible to start from scratch. In order to keep supplies moving, the Sixth Army Chemical Section had to know what had been expended and what was on hand. Marriott and McKinney experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining expenditure and status reports from task forces in widely scattered locations. This failure was particularly frustrating since, at the expense of much effort, they had secured service detachments or at least junior officers to accompany those task forces without chemical sections. The primary duty of these detachments was flame thrower service, but the officers were also charged... 

The prototype for the portable flame thrower was devised by German engineers sometime between 1900 and 1910. Introduced in World War I against the French at Malencourt, it saw some service on the Western Front where it proved to be a startling, if unreliable, assault weapon. The British and French developed flame throwers of their own by 1916, but the weapon, because of its short range, vulnerability, and lack of tactical doctrine, had limited combat success. It was never used by American troops. ... 

During the interwar period the United States devoted little attention to flame thrower research and development. Miliary men considered it the least valuable incendiary munition and regarded its World War I performance as a total failure, a fact which led the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service to remark "In the Chemical Warfare Service it has been the habit for a long while not to mention the flame thrower at all, unless questions were asked about it. ... 

But if the flame thrower was too temperamental to rely on, it was potentially too useful to abandon. Back on New Guinea, Sergeant King made one last effort to make flame throwers serviceable. New weapons were flown in from Port Moresby, across the mountains, but these, too, were unfit for use. They were checked and serviced and... 

Standard i -inch rubber fire hose to a flame thrower tank and attained a range of 6o yards. Following a demonstration of the device in February 1945 Tenth Army ordered three sets of these hoses, all of which were to see service on Okinawa. ... 

Having resolved the question of tactical employment. Sixth Army turned to flame thrower servicing problems. It had always been difficult to refill fuel tanks, replace empty gas cylinders, and test and repair flame throwers rapidly and efficiently near the front lines. But as long as demands for the weapon were infrequent, speedy servicing had been a minor consideration. The difficulty reached critical proportions only on Biak, where for the first time flame throwers were in almost daily use. 

Units on Leyte for the most part adhered closely to Sixth Army flame thrower doctrine. Those who did not soon came to grief. Some unit commanders, for example, continued to use but one flame thrower in an assault party. By thus failing to allow for possible misfires or casualties they endangered the success of their mission. Moreover, despite repeated warnings, weapons were occasionally committed to action without sufficient servicing. The 3 2d Division, which arrived on Leyte on 14 November 1944, unloaded its flame throwers and sent them directly to the front line without a check. Misfires and malfunctions... 

The capture of Manila did not end the fighting on Luzon. There remained the task of clearing out the more remote mountainous regions of the island. In this type of action flame throwers were infrequently used. Units reported that the flame thrower was too heavy, making it difficult for one man to carry for prolonged periods, and, since few extra men were available to haul the weapons, they often were left behind. On several occasions I Corps resorted to Filipino carriers to transport the weapons from the service point to the line of departure, a distance of several thousand yards and at times over steep mountain trails. Under such conditions flame thrower employment was limited to reasonably accessible targets. ... 

American forces began the Philippine campaign only partially equipped with the new Mi—i flame thrower. As these weapons became available, and as stocks of the MrAi model were exhausted, the new weapons were issued to combat troops. Supplies of the Ma—2 flame thrower never were sufficient to enable the MiAi s to be completely withdrawn from service, but by V-J Day the newer type was in the hands of the majority of units operating in the Philippines. 

On 3 April 1945 the first and only main armament flame throwers from the United States to see action with Army troops overseas arrived on Luzon. These were four NDRC Q model (E7-7) flame throwers mounted in M5A1 light tanks and scheduled for service testing. The flame throwers and a service truck were assigned to the 13 th Armored... 

A plentiful supply of M2-2 portable flame throwers made possible these elaborate preparations—the battalion had 27 weapons or 243 for the division. A battalion usually assigned i flame thrower to each of its 9 rifle platoons, 9 to the battalion supply section, and the remaining 9 to the regimental service platoon. This arrangement insured the rapid replacement of lost or damaged weapons. It also made possible a reserve flame thrower for every one in use, a justifiable ratio because of the weapon s vulnerability to enemy fire and the fact that it was difficult to service. ... 

In the zone of interior the Armored Force Board had never been enthusiastic about any flame-throwing tank that was a special-purpose weapon, that Is, if it had the flame thrower as its main armament, or if it had a distinguishing silhouette. The British Crocodile met the first requirement, but its fuel-carrying trailer certainly made it readily identifiable. In any event, the board urged the Chemical Warfare Service to concentrate its efforts on the auxiliary model, one that main- tained the normal armament of the vehicle, which was then under development. The result was an auxiliary flame thrower which was interchangeable with the bow machine gun of either the light or medium tank. 

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