Sabotage Safety

Introduction Priorto September 11, 2001, known as 9/11, chemical process safety activities primarily focused on accidental release risks and excluded most considerations of intentional releases. Security was provided mostly for lesser threats than such extreme acts of violence, and terrorism was generally not provided for except in high-security areas of the world. Exceptions to this included general concerns for sabotage. This was due to a perception that these risks were managed adequately, and that the threat of a terrorist attack, particularly on U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities or transportation system, was remote. 

Regular safety and routine physical security activities will continue to protect personnel, facilities, and materiel from pilferage, unauthorized use, sabotage, and violation of community rules and regulations by any source, internal or external (U.S. Army, 1995, 2000f). Conceivably, the island could be the target of unauthorized entry and trespassing from the air or sea. Thus, a security presence appears to be warranted until final ownership of the island is established. 

As pipelines per se are fairly vulnerable to sabotage and terrorist actions, the social and political stability in the involved countries are of greatest importance for the security of natural gas supply. This especially applies to transit countries that - per definition - are not part of the gas supply contracts. It is therefore mandatory that transit countries are enabled to make use of their compensation in a prosperous manner for the sake of improving the social stability. It is assumed that this in the next run will increase the safety of energy supply that is crucial to all parties. 

Safety first has always been and continues to be the basic policy of the nuclear industry. This includes reactor safety by design as well as activities to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent sabotage of nuclear facilities. This policy has been successful the chance of death from a nuclear accident is over a million times less than death... 

The committee also found that the QRAs provide a valuable framework for managing the risk from chemical events, including events arising from sabotage, terrorism, and war, by placing events in the context of their impact on safety. 

Incidents created by malicious acts (hacking, sabotage, virus infections). E.g. someone hacking into the Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), taking control of the production and doing harm. 

This was a tragic incident. The politics and passion suirounding this event blur the presentation of facts. Fnrthermoie, I am unsure we have the correct shading of all of the facts in some of the reports. There is at least two different views the immediate primary canse (sabotage or inadeqnate maintenance). It is a shame that there is not an independent board within Veneznela that could bring all of the facts forward like a US Chemical Safety Board or the British HSL. Feel free to check any of the references or other reports to draw yonr own conclusions. To me, the reconunendations of the COENER investigation seem to be comprehensive and credible. 

Generic Safety Issue (GSI) A-29 in NUREG-0933 (Reference 1), addresses the susceptibility of nuclear power plants to industrial sabotage, the resulting risk to plant safety, and the countermeasures to assure an acceptable level of protection. 

New design features (e.g., relocating emergency feedwater tanks to protected areas, increasing the monitoring, separation and independence of plant protection systems, providing additional back-up sources of power) which provide countermeasures to sabotage must be consistent with plant safety requirements. 

Specifically, plant safety-related systems and components required for the safe operation and shutdown of the plant shall be designed for protection against and mitigation of sabotage. 

Designing the Nuplex 80+ instrumentation and controls to provide channel separation for many systems including separate equipment rooms for each safety channel. With adequate access control to each channel, this design increases the difficulty in equipment sabotage. 

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