Safety committees review questions

As can be seen from the Global Reactive Chemicals Standard, all existing chemical processes will have a Reactive Chemicals/Process Hazard Analysis review on a predefined periodic basis. In addition, every new plant Production Leader should review their process with the Reactive Chemicals Committee within 90 days of assuming responsibility for a pilot or production plant. Prior to the review, the Leader should acquire training on the chemistry and processes that they are working with. This should include an evaluation of raw materials, processes, products and waste to understand any potential reactive chemical hazards. They should review and be prepared to answer questions from the completed and updated RC/PHA protocol questionnaire as well as other relevant materials in their plant Process Safety Folder, such as F EI, CEI, etc. The review should cover all auxiliary operations to the process such as raw material and product storage drum, tank car and truck loading. 

Unlike final analyses where most of the analyses are prespecified, the reporting statisticians should review their analyses with an eye toward questions that are likely to arise at the DMC meeting. They should prepare additional analyses in anticipation of such questions. Therefore, the analysis plan described in the DMC charter cannot be fixed but is simply a framework for initial reports the DMCs charter must allow the reporting statistician and DMC flexibility to modify the reports as needed to meet the committee s responsibility for monitoring patient safety. 

To oversee the safety programme, a Hazard Control and Review Committee was formed. This was chaired by the Safety Champion and contained representatives of the project sponsor, the managing consultant and the work stream managers. This committee reviewed all risk assessments, tasks and safety requirements. The hazard log was central to this process - a live connection to the log was projected in the meetings and the content reviewed directly. This enabled convenient navigation around the hazard log as questions arose. The review status of each entry was also recorded in the hazard log, simplifying the task of identifying which entries required review. 

With the exception of the PRDC case, in which intervention occurred prior to the mandatory-hearing requirement, all reactor applications between September 1957 and the summer of 1962 were uncontested by members of the public. T5q)ically, any differences on major technical issues between the applicant and the regulatory staff or the Safeguards Committee had been ironed out in the informal review performed before a case came before the hearing examiner. An applicant would not go to a hearing if any outstanding safety question had not been resolved by the previous technical reviews. In other words, the parties at an uncon-... 

The basic issue to be resolved boiled down to the question of how to combine due process with adequate technical review in a procedure that would meet safety concerns expeditiously. The Joint Committee particularly regarded this as a problem that would become more acute in the future as more reactor applications came before the AEC. The agency believed that the 1957 amendments left it little choice but to apply the mandatory-hearing requirement as it did. But it maintained that it could, through modification of the hearing format and procedures, streamline the process without further major legislation. And as it developed more technical standards and criteria, the Commission asserted that it could speed up the time to reach decisions. 

RDP 2.04, Section 4.1.2, requires that, upon initial appointment and on a biannual basis, the committee members read and review the ROSC procedure, review the Technical Specifications, and read and review other material designated by the ROSC chairman. Upon initial appointment, each member must successfully complete a course on the evaluation of Unreviewed Safety Questions. This section also requires that periodic presentations be made to the ROSC on internal and external events that have occurred since the last presentation, on lessons learned from those events, and on new technical developments and their relationships to reactor design and operation. 

The committee shall review applicable documents and programs to ensure that plant activities are conducted safely and do not constitute unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specification violations as defined in restart criteria Sections 5.2 and 11.2. 

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