Railway Inspectorate approach

Thanks must go to the numerous individuals within British Railways and also the Railway Inspectorate, who supported the research and gave up their time to be interviewed. Obviously this study could not have been undertaken without the co-operation of staff across British Railways, and it could not have proved such a rich source of data without the frankness and honesty with which they approached the interviews. The Directors of British Railways and the unions should also be thanked for exposing themselves to such scrutiny. I am very grateful to them and sincerely hope that this work has already helped to improve occupational health and safety on the railways and that it will contribute to future improvements in this and other industries. 

A track patrolman was struck by a train from behind as he was walking alongside a bidirectional hne. The locomotive s warning hom had been sounded as the train approached and the patrolman had apparently acknowledged the warning. .. he appears to have been so preoccupied with his duties that he failed to assimilate the warning sounded from the train. He also failed to keep a good lookout or to keep himself in a place of safety. (Railway Inspectorate Report)... 

Routine inspections comprised the major part of the work of railway employment inspectors. The Railway Inspectorate did not operate a formal inspection programme rather railway employment inspectors were given the discretion to decide how frequently and when to visit each area in their jurisdiction. They took account of such considerations as the accident rate associated with a particular area or activity and the degree of confidence they applied to the management and workforce. In essence this was a risk-based approach, albeit an informal one which had not been systematized by the Inspectorate. Central guidance was given on particular problems that inspectors should be... 

Consistent with its general approach to regulation the Railway Inspectorate did not have an antagonistic relationship with the railway companies. At one level this is not surprising as in the broad spectrum of economic life BR represented a company which had high regulatory capacity in terms of resources. 

There are a number of important features of the relationship between the Railway Inspectorate and BR which help us to understand the Inspectorate s interpretative framework. The population regulated by the Inspectorate was very closely defined. At the time of this research it comprised BR as the company holding the monopoly of the overwhelming majority of the railway network in Britain. Apart from this, there were a number of locally based railway systems such as the London Underground and the minor railways, many of which were run by volunteer railway enthusiasts. A very large proportion of the Inspectorate s time was therefore spent with BR officials and this had a number of significant implications for the way in which the Inspectorate approached its work and interpreted the action (or lack of action) of the regulated population. The most obvious implication is that the Inspectorate knew some members of BR very well and that this was socially structured as they tended to have most contact with those in more senior positions (Hutter, 1993). 

Managers, supervisors, and safety representatives were asked if they would approach inspectors for advice on health and safety matters. Of these 74 per cent (52/70) would consider this option, with 78 per cent (25/32) of managers, 52 per cent (12/23) of supervisors, and 100 per cent of safety representatives (15/15) being so inclined. One supervisor and six safety representatives said that they had approached the Railway Inspectorate with problems but just three of the safety representatives considered that an improvement had been effected as a result. The two reasons for consulting railway inspectors were for advice and where the usual internal BR channels had failed to effect a solution. Staff were more willing to consult railway employment inspectors informally I d phone X up—maybe cos I know him. I think if it was someone I didn t know and hadn t met I wouldn t do it (manager, interviewee 110). 

The Railway Inspectorate was similarly affected. HSE s internal inquiry following the Ladbroke Grove accident identified a Railway Inspectorate under very heavy pressure. It was explained that Railtrack sought to revise many of the 6,000 Railway Group Standards it inherited from BR and that privatization was accompanied by a dramatic increase in approvals of new work, a rise from 275 in 1993 to 6,000 in 1999 (HSE, 2000h). Moreover the level of complaints also increased, thus posing additional burdens on the Inspectorate. This led the Inspectorate to adopt a more selective approach to its approval procedures than it would normally have adopted (ibid.). 

The Railway Inspectorate has also been criticized for its use of risk assessment. The main criticism was an insufficient emphasis upon risk assessment procedures, for example, in its data collection and analysis and also in its approach to safety cases (HSE, 2000 t). The validity of this criticism is borne out by recent events. The Southall and Ladbroke Grove accidents demonstrate how cautiously we should approach railway statistics because of their vulnerability to major disasters. Related to this should be some caution in basing future predictions on past performance and most particularly in using this as a basis for arguing against effecting improvements. So it is important that these analyses... 

Helene Cecilie Blakstad is Senior Safety and Quality Advisor in the Norwegian National Rail Administration. From 2006 until 2012, she worked as a Senior Scientist at SINTEF Technology and Society, Department of Safety Research. Earlier, she worked within occupational health services and with the Norwegian Labour Inspectorate. She has a PhD on adapting hierarchical and risk-based approaches to safety rule modifications in the Norwegian railway system. 

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