Quantitative risk assessment consequence evaluation

Recommendation 4. The quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for each chemical demilitarization site should be iterative. Actual chemical events should be used routinely to test the completeness of the QRA, which should be routinely utilized to hypothesize the frequency and consequences of chemical events. The Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command should use the QRAs to evaluate measures to control future chemical events. The Army should also consider using QRAs to examine scenarios associated with sabotage, terrorism, and war. 

Although this guidance focuses on the LOPA technique, other techniques such as fault tree analysis or detailed quantitative risk assessment, used separately, may be a more appropriate alternative under some circumstances. Quantified methods can also be used in support of data used in a LOPA study. It is common practice with many dutyholders to use detailed quantified risk assessment where multiple outcomes need to be evaluated to characterise the risk sufficiently, where there may be serious off-site consequences, where the Societal Risk of the site is to be evaluated, or where high levels of risk reduction are required. 

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

The terminology used varies considerably. Hazard identification and risk assessment are sometimes combined into a general category called hazard evaluation. Risk assessment is sometimes called hazard analysis. A risk assessment procedure that determines probabilities is frequently called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), whereas a procedure that determines probability and consequences is called quantitative risk analysis (QRA). 

HAZAN, on the other hand, is a process to assess the probability of occurrence of such accidents and to evaluate quantitatively the consequences of such happenings, together with value judgments, in order to decide the level of acceptable risk. HAZAN is also sometimes referred to as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and its study uses the well-established techniques of Fault Tree Analysis and/or Event Tree Analysis ... 

Abstract. Environmental risk assessment evaluates the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the environment, in order to highlight the risk on environment and human health due to the potential presence or use of specific pollutants. Risk is a probability of an adverse direct or indirect effect, on the environment or human health. It is a combination of the probability of occurrence of an event and the possible extent of that event s adverse effects and consequences, in terms of adverse effects on the ecosystem and human injury. Risk is defined as the probability of an event to occur, related to the seriousness and extent of its consequences. An environmental risk assessment should be conducted, by adopting a systematic approach, when it is determined that a management action may have consequences to either the state of the environment or human health or well-being. 

CPQRA A chemical process quantitative risk analysis is the process of hazard identification followed by numerical evaluation of incident consequences and frequencies, and their combination into an overall measure of risk when apphed to the chemical process industry. It is particularly applicable to episodic events. It differs from, but is related to, a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), a quantitative tool used in the nuclear industry. 

It is one of the aims of the lUPAC project to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the impact of altered pesticide use on GM crops. Furthermore, otho impacts will also be taken into account, which may include weed eeology and soil conservation. Finally a risk-benefit analysis of these impacts will be made by evaluating the various outcomes of our research, which may provide a tool for further polieies in the area of GM crop cultivation and pest management. This is an important endeavour given the public concerns regarding large scale cultivation of GM crops and its environmental consequences. 

Making an information system secure is a very hard work since 2006, more than 7000 vulnerabilities have been published every year. In front of such a danger, evaluating information system security appears to be necessary in order to analyse and prevent risks. Our approach focuses on this issue and aims at producing quantitative security measures to assess the level of risk faced by an operational system considering an evolving environment. To this purpose, we first identily environmental factors that have an influence on the system vulnerability exploitation process 1) the vulnerability life cycle events 2) the attacker population behaviour 3) the system administrator s behaviour. We study the evolution of these factors and model them and their interactions with the system, to evaluate their consequences on the system security. 

Nowadays, there is an increasing interest in system protection against intentional threats of physical nature [8,19]. On those regards, model-based vulnerability assessment is a crucial phase in the risk analysis of critical infrastructures. In fact, typical risk models include the computation of three logically sequential factors probability or frequency of threats (P) probability that threats are successful in their intent (i.e., vulnerability, V) consequences of successful threats (i.e., expected damage, D). Therefore, in order to evaluate infrastructure risks (R), it is essential to be able to compute the vulnerability of the system with respect to the threats [11]. One of the most widespread and intuitive model for the evaluation of the risk is [21] R = P V D. This model is based on a quantitative notion of vulnerability, different from other definitions also commonly used,... 

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