Operational forces threats

In developing strategies to address the CW or BW threat, it is important to understand that the threat will present itself differently to different parts of the naval force. Ships operating in deep water face one set of risks. Ships operating close to shore face another. Ports, shore installations, and bases have their own vulnerabilities, both outside and within the continental United States. The logistics infrastructure presents its own problems in the face of CW or BW threats. And Marine operations have their own special vulnerabilities, as do activities associated with special operations forces. 

Security breach. Physical security breaches, such as unsecured doors, open hatches, and unlocked/forced gates, are probably the most common threat warnings. In most cases, the security breach is likely related to lax operations or typical criminal activity such as trespassing, vandalism, and theft. However, it may be prudent to assess any security breach with respect to the possibility of attack. 

It is the policy of the United States to develop and maintain a defensive chemical and biological capability so that United States military forces can operate for some period of time in a toxic environment if necessary to develop and maintain a limited offensive capability in order to deter all use of chemical... weapons by the threat of retaliation in kind and to continue a programme of research and development in this area to minimise the possibility of technological surprise.13... 

On a letter dated June 28, 2001, to the president of the National Academy of Sciences, the CNO wrote I am especially pleased that the [Naval Studies] Board is now about to initiate a study of naval force defense capabilities against chemical and biological warfare threats. Recent world events demonstrate that forward-deployed naval forces are constantly at risk even in today s relatively peaceful world. I look forward to supporting this study and receiving the conclusions on issues with direct operational implications such as developing concepts of naval operations to deal with emerging terrorist threats. ... 

To set the context for the findings, conclusions, and recommendations presented in Chapters 2 through 5, the committee first evaluates the present and projected threat of chemical and biological weapons to naval force operations in littoral and open-ocean regions. 

Manage to risk, not to threat alone. There should be use of risk assessments that combine a broad view of adversary intent and force vulnerabilities with an analysis of the operational consequences of adversary actions and defensive countermeasures to these (passive and active), to understand the impact on accomplishing a mission and on overall campaign success. 

The U.S. Air Force has used risk-based analyses to develop innovative approaches to sustaining air operations in a chemical or biological threat environment, offering another useful model, as presented above. Of special note is the Air Force s ability to quantify the relationship between sortie generation rates and improved technical chemical and biological defense capabilities and CONOPS for contaminated battle environments. 

Fleet operators in the commercial world and emergency response personnel in the civil sector, who face hazardous risks not unlike the chemical and biological threat to naval forces, have developed and implemented an effective risk management capability, which can also serve as a useful qualitative, if not quantitative, model.30... 

The Marine Corps s Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force is a unique institutional resource that should prove extremely helpful in developing operational mastery of the chemical and biological threat. Naval leadership should understand the full importance and promise of CBIRF. 

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