Moderator Storage Areas

Moderator Storage Areas. The contaminated moderator will continue to be stored in the storage tanks and stainless eel drums however, in some cases the moderator will be stored in new locations. The contaminated moderator will continue to be processed in the same manner as before. The next phase of moderator consolidation will move the moderator present stored in the C-, L-, and P-Reactor storage tanks to the K-Reactor Moderator Storage. Areas. Miscellweous irradiated and uniiradiated components (e.g., bCron carbide safety rods, instrument rods, spaijets, and other stainless steel and aluminum reactor components) may continue to be stor in the Process Room the Reactor Tank), thou none of the reactor ... 

Disassmbty Basins. These documents are listed and discussed in Section 4.0 of this BIO and in the BIOS for the Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas (Ret 1-6,1-7). This BIO biin the authorization basis docum its together by reference in one document... 

Radiological hazards of cons uence have been identified in the following K-Reactor areas Moderator Storage Areas, Assembly Area, Disassembly Area, and Purification Area. The hazards associated with the K-Reactor Moderator Storage Areas and Assembly Area have previously been evaluated in their BIOs f 2-2. 2-3). The following is a summary of the radiological hazards identified in the BIOs for the Moderator Storage Areas and Assembfy Area ... 

Moderator Storage Areas provide storage of up to approximatdy 230,500 gallons of... 

The steam astern is required for the moderator recovery and rework in the Purification Area (apprommatefy three years) ahd freeze protection due to moderator bang stored in K>Reactor Moderator Storage Areas e 2-2). 

K-REACTFOR MODERATOR STORAGE AREAS BASIS FOR INTERBf OPERATION... 

The fissile materials to be stored in the K-Reactor Moderator Storage Areas are contained in the form of trace amounts of phitonhim in the dnims and tanks of moderator. Criticality is not possible in the K-Reactor Moderator Storage Areas because the trace amount of plutonium is well below the theoretical minimum critical mass (Ref 6-16). 

There were no restricdons on operation found to be necessary to preserve the validity of the anafyses assumptions in the PHA (Ref 7>6) for K Rsactor in Cold Standby or in the PHA (Ref 7-9) for the L- and P-Reactor Disassonbfy Basins or to ensure that K-Reactor and the L-and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins are operated within the required conditions badditional restrictions on operation required to preserve the validity of the Assembty Area and Moderator Storage Areas PHAs (Ref 7-7,7-8) are provided in Section 7.3 of the BIOS for these areas (EleC 7-1,7-2). 

Hazards assessments for K-Reactor in Cold Standby have been performed to determine the overall hazard categorization (Ref. 8-2, 8-3, 8-4). Radiological hazards of consequence have been identified in the following K-Reactor major areas IMsassembly Basin, Purification Area, Assembly Area, and Moderator Storage Areas. The overall categorization is based on the. consequences of a postulated radionuclide and/or chemical rdease firom K-Reactor, as wdl as the potent for a criticality event... 

In addition to the chemical hazards assessment discussed in. the HAD for K-Reac br in Cold Standby (Ref 8-2) and the HADs for L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins (Ref 8-5, 8-6), additional chemical hazards assessments were performed separately for the Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas of K-Reactor (Ref 8-3, 8-4). There were no hazardous chemicals identified in these areas except for asbestos in the walls of the Assembly Area. The HAD for the Assembly Area (Ref 8-3) assessed the asbestos in the walls of the Assembly Area aiul concluded that the probability of the walls constituting a di cal hazard is judged not credible. Therefore the probabihty of exposure of personnd to asbestos fibers during hi h- iergy events is judged to be ne gible. 

The total consequences of the very conservative maximum postulated release of 4650 drums worth of contaminated moderator by a ground release from the K>Reactor Moderator Storage Areas was calculated to be (Re 8-S8) ... 

Using the Reforence 8 58 results for the K Reactor Moderator Storage Area% the consequences for the rdease of contaminated moderator from the Purification Area during a DBE can be derived as follows ... 

The PHA for K-Reactor in Cold Standby (Re 8-17), PHA for the L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins (Ref 8-51), and the PHAs previously peifonned foe the K-Reactor Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas (Ref 8-18, 8-19) serve as the basis for detenmning the impact of both normal operations and poshilated accidents on the public, workers, and environment. The impact of normal operations and postulated aeddents is presented in the following sections. 

As stated in Section 7.0 of this BIO, hazardous chemicals and e lostve and potentially explosive materials are not permitted in K-Reactor or the L- or P-Reactor Disassembfy Basins. As discussed in Section 8.2 above and in the PHAs (Ref 8-18, 8-19) for the Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas, there are no non-radiologicai hazardous chemicals identified in sufScient quantities in K-Reactor during Cold Standby to pose a hazard to the cility workers, co-located workers, public, or the environment. 

The radiological hazards associated with the normal operations of K-Reactor (including the Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas) and L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins have been evaluated in the PHAs (Rrf 8-17,8-18,8-19,8-51). The radiolopcal hazards in K-Reactor,... 

P Reactor Disassqnbty Basins. This condition is based on the restrictions that no radioactive material are allowed except those irradiated reactor components in the K, L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins, unirradiated Mark 22 fuel assemblies in the K-Reactor Assembfy Area, and contaminated moderator in the KrReactor Moderator Storage Areas and Purification Area. This is based also on the nature of the fuel and sealed drums aiKi tanks and the precautionary measures taken to prevent the release of hazardous and radioactive material. The impa of normal operatiotu on the fkdlity worker, co-located worker, public, and the environnient is therefore-insigmficant. RC HP personnel will be involved with the movement of irradiated reactor components, contaminated unirradiated fiiel assemblies, and contaminated moderator and will establish ALARA requirmoits for the focility workers as discussed in Section 6.0. 

The analyses of K-Reactor in Cold Standby and L- and P-Reactor Disassanbty Ba ns, which were not previously anafyzed m the PHAs for the Assembfy Area and Moderator Storage Areas, are discussed in Section 8.3 above. These analyses primarily involve scenarios associated with the K-, L> and P-Reactor IMsassenibly Baans but include areas such as the K-Reactor Purification Area. The- impact of postulated aeddents associated with the K-Reactor Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Ar are provided in the BIOs (Ref 8-64, 8-65) for these areas. 

The potential desjgn, procedure, and equipment vulnerabiliti associated with K-Reactor in Cold Stanly and the L- and F-Reactor Disass ly Basing which were not previously identified in the BIOS 8-64, 8-65) for the Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas, are discussed below. 

The structures, tystems, and components and operator actions for prevenfoig or mitigating some of the postulated acddent sceparios assodated with tiie Assembfy Area and Moderator Storage Areas are discussed in the BIOs of those areas 8-64,8-65). 

The results of the analyses for K-Reactor in Cold Standby were presented in Section 8.0 of tins BIO and in the BIOs for the Assend ly Area and Moderator Storage Areas (Ref 9-6,9-7). 

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