K-Reactor Assembly Area

Basis for Interim Operation nBIO> for the K-Reactor Assembly Area OA. WSRC-TR-93>S00, Rev. 2, Westinghouse Savannah River Compai, Aiken, SC, Nforch 1994. 

The fissile material to be stored in the K-Reactor Assembly Area is contained in Mark 22 iiiel tubes and assemblies and calibration sources. The Mark 22 fuel is recdved, handled, transported, and stored in the Assembly Area. 

The primary safety concern in the K-Reactor Assembly Area is inadvertent criticality. Hangers (which protnde separation between foel assemblies) and borated concrete ston e racks are used to prevent criticaltty during movement and storage of Mark 22 fiid assemblies. Calculations and mtHtipUcation measurements of the fulfy loaded borated concrete storage racks confirmed subcriticality by a substantial amount (Ref 6-13, Section 9.1.1.2.2). 

In order to preveot a criticality event involving the handling of unirradiated fiiel assemblies in the K-Reactor Assembly Area during normal operations, the Tedmical Specifications (Ref 6-3), Limiting Conditions for Operations 3.9.3, impose restrictions for handling and storing fod assemblies in the Assembly Area. 

Although a criticality mddent would affect the personnel in the K-Reactor Assembly Area, there... 

The results of the analysts of each initiating event discussed in this BIO and the corresponding scenario are summarized in the risk matrix of Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2. The results of the analyses of the postulated events in the K-Reactor Assembly Area and Moderator Areas are provid in References 8-18 and 8-19, respective. 

The PHA for K-Reactor in Cold Standby (Re 8-17), PHA for the L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins (Ref 8-51), and the PHAs previously peifonned foe the K-Reactor Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Areas (Ref 8-18, 8-19) serve as the basis for detenmning the impact of both normal operations and poshilated accidents on the public, workers, and environment. The impact of normal operations and postulated aeddents is presented in the following sections. 

The analyses of K-Reactor in Cold Standby and L- and P-Reactor Disassanbty Ba ns, which were not previously anafyzed m the PHAs for the Assembfy Area and Moderator Storage Areas, are discussed in Section 8.3 above. These analyses primarily involve scenarios associated with the K-, L> and P-Reactor IMsassenibly Baans but include areas such as the K-Reactor Purification Area. The- impact of postulated aeddents associated with the K-Reactor Assembly Area and Moderator Storage Ar are provided in the BIOs (Ref 8-64, 8-65) for these areas. 

Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) for the K-Reactor Assembly Area (Ul. WSRC-TR-93-... 

Geaver, B. H. "Hazards Assessment Document for Fuel Storage in K-Reactor Assembly Area (U)," WSRC-TR-93-466, Rev. 1, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Aiken, SC, April 1994. 

---