Cost of Countermeasures

It should be noted that restoration was dominant in the case of disturbances because of lightning, whereas disturbances because of main-circuit switching often require a countermeasure because of the repetitive nature. 

Ratio of the third stage countermeasures to the number of disturbances. 

Manpower and material costs in utilities and manufacturer (A) utilities, (B) manufacturers, and (C) material costs. 

This section presents case studies on the disturbances experienced. 

Each case study is categorized by the cause and involves the following items  

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Climatic effects in the future depend on the volumes of greenhouse gases released from now on. Although there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding predictions, the cost of countermeasures and for damage repair may increase if countermeasures are delayed. 

Countermeasures An action taken or a physical capability provided whose principal purpose is to reduce or eliminate one or more vulnerabilities. The countermeasure may also affect the threat(s) (intent and/or capability) as well as the asset s value. The cost of a countermeasure may be monetary, but may also include nonmonetary costs such as reduced operational effectiveness, adverse publicity, unfavorable working conditions, and political consequences. 

Any countermeasure provides some degree of protection, which is proportional to the cost of its implementation. Because of this, the selection of countermeasures is always (not only in information systems security) made on the basis of the degree of protection that they offer, in relation to the reasonably likely risk factor. The risk factor is determined as a function of the value of the assets, of the likelihood that a threat will occur, of the degree of vulnerability of the system with respect to this threat, and of the seriousness of the impact that will occur if the threat succeeds. Therefore, we can formally state that R — f (A, T, V, I), where R is the risk factor, A is the asset value, T is a measure of the likelihood of a threat occurring, V is the degree of vulnerability of the system with respect to the particular threat, and / is some measure of the likely impact that the threat will bear upon the system if it succeeds. R is an increasing function in all its parameters. 

There is worldwide and increasingly the discharge of the sulfur dioxide with the use of fossil fuel. Especially, the discharge in the Asia r ion increases recently, but the environment countermeasure has been retarded for the problem of economical efficiency. Though in the advanced nation, the limestone gypsum method is mainly used as stack gas desulAirization facility, it is the method in which both cost of equipment and operational cost are expensive. 

Scott, R. D., II, Roberts, R. R. (2007). The attributable costs of resistant infections in hospital settings economic theory and application. In Antimicrobial resistance Problem pathogens and clinical countermeasures (pp. 1-24). 

What RHT does not say is that the target (i.e., accepted or tolerated) level of accident risk by road users is immutably fixed and invariable under all circumstances although this misquotation can be found in many lay and even academic and professional communications. Instead, what RHT does say is that the target level of risk depends on the balance of the expected benefits and costs of choosing risky versus cautious behaviour alternatives. This balance varies as a function of the state of the economy, and especially as a consequence of countermeasures that are intended to increase a greater desire for safety. 

Acceptable. Water source can be immediately exploited with implementation of countermeasures, if need be, on the basis of a statement and decision made by top-management of source operator. The benefit of measure should be higher than costs. 

Tolerable. The exploitation of water source is heavily limited. If water source is to be used for the emergency supply of population, it is necessary to implement countermeasures in order to reduce the risk on the acceptable level. The costs of reducing the risk have to be adequate for the value of protected source element and the social benefit. In this case it is recommended to apply the Cost-Benefit Analysis method, possibly a multi-criteria assessment, which will enable us to assess the effectiveness of particular countermeasures being taken. 

The different successful (and unsuccessfiil) strategies reviewed in this final chapter also make it clear that safety does not have to come at the cost of mobility and other values. There are many safety measures that have zero, or minimal, effects on mobility and other cherished values. Vehicle improvements in crashworthiness and passenger protection have increased safety at no cost to mobility or the pleasure of driving. Intelligent active crash prevention systems should also be effective crash countermeasures that do not reduce the fun of driving ... 

Itoh, H. and Kajibata, U., 1981, Countermeasures for Problems in NO, Removal Process for Coal-Fired Boilers, Joint EP/WEPRI Symposium on Stationary Combustion Control, May. (Taken from Technical Feasibility and Cost of Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) NO, Control, EPRI GS-7266, prepared by United Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (C. P. Robie and P. A. Ireland) for the Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, May, 1991.)... 

The Joint Committee heard testimony from witnesses whose scientific investigations and conclusions were similar to those of Harold Knapp. Charles W. Mays, a University of Utah nuclear physicist, estimated that Utah infants had received aimual doses of iodine 131 that exceeded Federal Radiation Council guidelines on several occasions between 1951 and 1962. He announced that since the population of Utah had "been exposed repeatedly in excess of present radiation protection guides," the state would take appropriate countermeasures in the future and "the AEC should not be surprised to receive bills for the cost of these measures." Eric Reiss, a professor of medicine at Washington University and spokesman for the Greater St. Louis Citizens Committee for Nuclear Information, criticized the AEC even more sharply. He contended that the agency had seriously underestimated fallout hazards firom its weapons tests and concluded that "in the period 1951-62, a number of local populations. . . scattered throughout the continental United States have been exposed to fallout so intense as to represent a medically unac-... 

The principal aims of security should be to forestall both organized and opportunist crime by cost-effective measures. While there is considerable variety in the type of criminal attack and skills involved, fortunately there is a tendency for them to act in a similar way, and this enables a common philosophy to be applied when determining countermeasures. 

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