Competency accident issues

In 1982, the European Union s Council Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities, also known as the Seveso Directive, was adopted. The Directive was mostly designed to promote information flow and created the requirement that each Member State (i.e., each country belonging to the European Union) appoint a Competent Authority to oversee safety issues. The Seveso Directive was amended twice, following major accidents at the Union Carbide chemical factory in Bhopal, India in 1984 (a leak of methyl isocyanate caused thousands of deaths), and at the Sandoz chemical warehouse in Basel, Switzerland in 1986 (fire-fighting water contaminated with mercury, organophosphate pesticides and other chemicals caused massive pollution of the Rhine River and the death of hundreds of thousands of fish). Both amendments, broadened the scope of the Directive, in particular to include the storage of dangerous substances. 

A closer look reveals, however, that technology alone will not suffice. Soft issues come into play as well, owing to the fact that the installations have to be constructed and operated by humans. This simple fact entails the need for adequate organisational structures, individual competence and adequate ad hoc discretionary decisions - all leading to safely as one of the end results. If these factors are disregarded, no technological achievement can guarantee that accidents are avoided. ... 

Risk analyses are often conducted in the design and development phase of a project. As most accidents tend to occur in the operational phase of the plant life cycle we will highlight some issues related to this phase. In the discussion about the LNG plant it has been put forward concern regarding the competence of Skangass (owned by Lyse and local investors) to operate and maintain the plant. Since Skangass is a company starting from scratch it is of importance that appropriate mechanisms are put in place to ensure safe operation of the plant. Experience has shown that inadequate of missing maintenance often is a direct... 

Many companies conduct accident investigations and keep accident records and other data on the company s safety and health initiatives. If a company has a sufficient number of accidents/incidents and enongh detail in their occupational injury/illness investigation data, the company can begin to examine trends or emerging issues relevant to their safety and health intervention/prevention efforts. The analysis of this data can be nsed to evaluate the effectiveness of safety and health at various workplaces, jobsites, or for groups of workers. The safety and health data can be used by a company to compare to that of other companies that perform similar work, employ a comparable workforce, or compete in the same kind and size of market on a state, regional, national, or international basis. 

A key issue for dutyholders to consider is the competence of sfaff in relation to the control of major accident hazards, and how this is identified, assessed and managed. Major accident hazard competency needs to be appropriately linked to the major accident hazard and risk analysis and key procedures. The aim is to assure competence in safety critical tasks, and associated roles and responsibilities. 

A man-made disaster The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the resnlt of collusion between the government, the regnlators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties.. .. Therefore, we con-clnde that the accident was clearly man-made. We believe that the root canses were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of any specific individual. 

During the debate within the EU it was decided that the Seveso directive would be an Environmental (DG XI) directive which would deal with the hazards for man and environment. Furthermore it was decided to establish a committee of technical experts from all member states chaired by the Commission. In this committee (Committee of Competent Authorities, CCA) proposals for the directive were discussed, and in a later phase, so were the implementation issues and monitoring of the state of play within the member states. Gradually this CCA has evolved to become an important forum where, besides the commission and EU member states, participants include the accession and pre-accession countries, the OECD, the Major Accident Hazards Bureau and the EU directorate responsible for research. The Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) is part of the EU Joint Research Centre and plays an important role with respect to providing scientific support. 

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