Chemical Weapons Convention change

The Army has a good understanding of miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel to be destroyed and has documented them by location, configuration, quantity, and type. However, changes are likely to occur as materiel is added or deleted as a result of the Chemical Weapons Convention verification process. The materiel is predominantly metal containers and munitions components. Some of the components contain explosive charges that may need to be extracted before disposal. 

The military use of CWAs is banned and nearly all nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, the use of CWAs in a war becomes very unlikely. However, the situation has changed with respect to asymmetric... 

It has to be emphasized, however, that these three Schedules are neither intended to serve as an alternative definition of a chemical weapon under the CWC, nor are the lists set in concrete. Rather, these lists are used for declarations by states parties and verification activities of the OPCW with respect to routine inspections and as such do not circumscribe the scope of the Convention. It follows from this that any chemical, whether listed under a Schedule or not, has to be considered a chemical weapon if it has been produced, stored or used for that purpose. 59 If required, Schedules can be updated more easily than the text of the Convention itself, in order to reflect changes in the S T environment.60... 

As Soviet intentions on the use of chemical weapons are not clearly and openly stated, these interpretations cannot be disproved. But their plausibility may be questioned, especially in view of America s limited offensive chemical capability which, whatever its merits or lack of them as a deterrent, cannot be considered as a first strike threat. Nor are America s allies in Western Europe, of whom only France possesses any offensive chemical warfare capability, able to pose a significant threat to Soviet forces. Nor are the risks of nuclear escalation in the wake of a chemical strike particularly credible, at least in an era of nuclear parity when NATO has every incentive to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible. On the contrary, the possibility or even strong probability that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conventional war must be taken seriously it reflects an apparent change in Soviet attitudes towards chemical weapons, a... 

If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level of destraction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this Convention and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposal. 

National implementation also contributes in an important manner to the Convention s ability to deal with changes in the security environment or in science and technology that may affect its operation. It contributes to meeting new challenges, including the threat or possible use of chemical weapons, as defined by the Convention, by non-state actors such as terrorists. 

In any event, participants concluded that the Convention will have to undergo a functional shift after the destmction of chemical weapons has been completed, thus requiring changes to the processes by which it is implemented. It was suggested that a governance approach might be adopted, but to follow such an approach, more stakeholders would need to be involved and allowed to actively participate in comprehensive implementation. 

It is cmcial that the OPCW be able to adapt to the changing reahties so that the verification and implementation regimes of the Convention can continue to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and the materials for making them, and in a manner that does not impede legitimate developments in the chemical industry. Non-State actors must not be allowed to gain access to toxic chemicals or to the means for producing them. 

Conventional, chemical explosives get their power from the rapid rearrangement of chemical bonds, the links between atoms made by sharing electrons. In chemical explosives, atoms dissociate from other atoms and form new associations this releases energy, but the atoms themselves do not change. Nuclear weapons are based on an entirely different principle. They derive their explosive power from changes in the structure of the atom itself, specifically, in the core of the atom, its nucleus. 

Notwithstanding these scientific developments and the SAB s conclusion that they do not significantly change the situation with respect to CW, it must also be noted that experience has shown that there is a possibility that less sophisticated CW may be opted for, with little regard to agent stability and shelf life (i.e. weapons filled for immediate use). In that context, even toxic chemicals (as well as precursor chemicals) that would not normally be considered to pose a risk to the Convention may be relevant. The same would apply to terrorists using toxic materials as weapons. 

In addition, the nature of war is changing. We no longer expect a war to last years, as World War II did, but rather days, as we saw with the Persian Gulf War. Worse, the weapons of war have also changed. Many countries do or could possess chemical and biological agents—bypassing the tremendous financial outlay required to acquire conventional weapons. 

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