Aum Shinrikyo sarin attacks

Aum Shrinrikyo s sarin nerve gas attack against Tokyo commuters led to a significant, and understandable, concern that terrorists might, from now onwards, use unconventional weapons. Certainly, if a tactic attracts widespread attention, other terrorists will usually want to imitate it.40 Three questions immediately present themselves then. Why would terrorists replicate Aum Shinrikyo s attack Who, among the spectrum of terrorist groups, would be the most likely to copy such an attack Why has the Aum Shinrikyo attack not been duplicated ... 

Chemical warfare nerve agents pose a potential threat to the general public as well as the military, as evidenced by several incidents. Between 1980 and 1988, sarin (GB) was used by Iraq in the war with Iran, with the most notable incident occurring in 1988 when a Kurdish city in northern Iraq was bombarded with chemicals, possibly including GB, tabun (GA) and 0-ethyl 5-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] methylphosphonothioate (VX). In 1994 and 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo sect attacked subways in Matsumoto and Tokyo with GB, and also attacked individuals with VX in Osaka and Tokyo. One of these individual attacks resulted in the death of the intended victim. The victim had VX deposited on his neck and exhibited symptoms typical of organo-phosphate poisoning, but confirmation of the nerve agent used could only be achieved after his death with the testimony from one of the suspected attackers and detection of VX metabolites [ethyl methylphosphonic acid (EMPA) and 2-(diisopropylamino-ethyl)methyl sulfide (DAEMS)] in a blood sample taken approximately 1 h after the attack. 

In the early 1990s, leaders of Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious cult that in 1995 attacked riders on the Tokyo subway with a sarin nerve agent, made numerous trips to Russia.The group s leader in charge of weapons procurement made 21 trips to Russia between 1992 and 1995. Group leaders frequently met with senior government officials, such as the secretary of Russian Security Council, the Parliament speaker, and vice... 

Seto, Y., Tsunoda, N., Kataoka, M., Tsuge, K., Nagano, T. (2000). Toxicological analysis of victim s blood and crime scene evidence samples in the sarin gas attack caused by Aum Shinrikyo. National Research Institute of Police Science, Chiba, Japan. Unpublished manuscript. 

In June 1994 and again in May 1995 the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo created much havoc when they released the deadly nerve agent sarin in two Japanese cities. In the first attack in Matsumoto, Japan, sarin vapor was released in a residential area where judges unfriendly to the cult resided. Seven people died as a consequence of this nerve agent exposure, and 500 people were injured. The 1995 attack occurred in the Tokyo subway system. Several coordinated releases of this potentially deadly vapor resulted in more than 5,000 visits to local emergency departments. Fortunately, the vast majority of exposed victims had few if any symptoms and there were only a handful of fatalities (Tucker, 2006 for further discussion, see chapter 19—Biological and Chemical Terrorism A Unique Threat). 

Terrorists have expressed an interest in nerve agents and have deployed them in attacks on unprotected civilians (Rotenberg and Newmark, 2003). A Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo, independently manufactured numerous chemical and biological agents. The first such attack with sarin occurred in Matsumoto in 1994 and the Tokyo subway in 1995. Thousands of people were affected and dozens of people died (Nagao et al, 1997 Ohtomi et al, 1996 Okumura et al, 1998 Yokoyama et al, 1998). In... 

Members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attack a hotel in Matsumoto, Japan, with sarin gas, and succeed in killing a targeted judge (among others). 

Sarin was released in commuter trains on three different Tokyo subway lines by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995. Sarin was concealed in lunch boxes and soft-drink containers and placed on subway train floors. It was released as terrorists punctured the containers with umbrellas before leaving the trains. The incident was timed to coincide with rush hour, when trains were packed with commuters. Over 5,500 people were injured in the attack. 

A more elaborate and deadly attack, this time a chemical terrorism attack by members of the Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese apocalyptic cult, was carried out in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 (Olson 1999). It was suspected by international intelligence agencies that Aum Shinrikyo was working to develop biological and chemical weapons, but not until they killed 12 and severely injured thousands more by releasing sarin gas were they taken seriously. 

Although the police investigation collected enough evidence to prove that sarin was used by AUM Shinrikyo terrorists in Tokyo, the final scientific proof came this summer, when two laboratories independently determined sarin metabolites in blood and urine samples drawn from Tokyo subway attack victims. The Holland group of investigators liberated them from plasma butyrylcholineste-rases [14], while the Japanese group used urine instead [30],... 

Security aspect. This review of AUM Shinrikyo s terrorist activity reveals a new threat to stability of democratic societies - chemical terrorism. Especially terrifying dimension of the problem is the fact that members of this fanatic cult used nerve gases three times against civilian population - sarin in Matsumoto and Tokyo in June, 1994 and in March, 1995, respectively, and VX in Tokyo in January, 1995. The two sarin attacks were especially dangerous, because they threatened the lives of hundreds of citizens. 

There have always been fears that terrorists might be tempted to acquire and use chemical weapons particularly nerve agents. The world received a shocking reminder of the potential impact of terrorist use of chemical weapons when the Aum-Shinrikyo sect used the nerve gas Sarin to attack civilian targets in Japan during 1994 and 1995. 

The release of the nerve gas sarin by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Matsumoto and Tokyo - in June 1994 and March 1995, respectively (see Chapter 13) - alerted the world to the very real chemical threat from terrorist groups. The determination and sophistication of subsequent terrorist attacks, the access such groups seem to have to the necessary funds, expertise and materials and their avowed intent to cause mass casualties and fatalities all emphasise that the possibility of a deliberate chemical release in a civilian setting can no longer be ignored. 

In more recent times, the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult used sarin in two terrorist attacks in Japan. At Matsumoto, in 1994, overall 600 individuals reported acute signs and symptoms, 58 were admitted to hospital and seven people died (Morita et al., 1995). Following the release of sarin on the Tokyo underground in 1995, approximately 1000 individuals exhibited signs and symptoms and twelve people died (Nagao et al., 1997 IoM, 2000) (see Chapter 13). Not only were substantial numbers of members of the public directly affected, but in both situations, first responders and medical staff were also exposed to sarin as they attended those exhibiting marked... 

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