Asymmetric threat

Shore installations and bases. The committee believes that shore installations are at risk to a broad spectrum of asymmetric threats. They are both operational and symbolic targets, offering an adversary the opportunity to disrupt power projection operations while also punishing nations which host that presence and tarnishing the image of American power. 

The Navy has not effectively defined the chemical warfare (CW) or biological warfare (BW) defense operational requirements for mission success across its full mission space, most especially with the shift from Cold War to asymmetric threat environments. 

Non-Medical S T Finding Contamination Avoidance—A Limiting Philosophy Against Asymmetric Threats... 

Minimizing or avoiding contamination should certainly be part of the strategy, but it may not be pragmatic, or even feasible, to do so in an era of wide-ranging possible asymmetric threats. Broadening the focus to include decontamination and resumption of operations will drive much of the science and technology in the same direction toward which it is already headed, but with the benefit of... 

Navy Role in Homeland Defense Against Asymmetric Threats (2001). 

McKenzie K (2001). The Rise of Asymmetric Threats Priorities for Defense Planning, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Available http //www.ndu.edu/inss/ press/QDR 2001/sdcasch03.html. 

Both the chemical and the biological threats of today are characterized by wide availability of agents and a variety of delivery methods, from simple to complex. The threats posed by various agents and delivery methods are real today almost everywhere the Navy operates—on the open ocean and in the littorals, and especially in port and at shore installations. Because of the Navy s dependence on foreign ports and its growing emphasis on warfighting in the littorals, the committee believes that the Navy should, in fact, be more concerned about limited, asymmetric attacks in such environments than about more massive, open-ocean encounters on which its defensive posture has been historically based. 

Adversaries may well dismiss such U.S. threats as not being credible, given that their asymmetric tactics seem not to require retaliation with overwhelming force. 

The kinds of operational capabilities that the Navy needs in order to be able to carry out its missions in a chemical or biological threat environment appear within its reach. To attain the necessary capability and readiness, it should support and sustain improvements in passive defenses, training, and leadership awareness—but it should also do some major things quite differently. It should see the threat in an entirely new way. It should not rely solely on the notion that the mobility of ships at sea is adequate defense against this threat in the era of asymmetric conflict. The Navy should look well beyond passive defenses to understand the full contours of a CW or BW defense posture. It must plan on the basis of a risk-management approach and train and test to refine its TTPs.27... 

Several countries are currently developing and implementing new non-lethal capabilities. They do so in the belief that this will enable many emerging and non-traditional threats (which may appear in low intensity, asymmetric conflicts and non-combatant operations) to be countered with a progressive response. Non-lethal weapons are of interest to the military and to law enforcement agencies as, in many cases, the character of the scenarios is similar.61... 

An ideal countermeasure to a world of asymmetric or unknown bioenabled threats will prevent any impact to individuals. In one scenario, an infection can be detected and the causative agent or agents characterized prior to the onset of symptoms. In a different scenario, a new virus may be synthetically derived and therefore difficult to identify. The host s response to that novel microbe may indicate a course of treatment before the agent can be identified. 

The NRA is an asymmetrical representation of safety issues it looks only at threats. This unilateral approach is understandable, given that the exercise is concerned with social disruption (catastrophe potential). But the safety issues that are included in the NRA also offer opportunities. The risk involved in processing hazardous substances is balanced by the economic interests of the petro-chemical industry the uncertain health risks involved in intensive livestock farming are balanced by the economic interests of this sector and the risk of flooding is balanced by fertile soil and the enjoyment people get from living along a river or lake. If we look at the opportunities (in the NRA or complementary documents), we immediately face another question what share of the responsibility is borne by those who enjoy the benefits ... 

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