Arsenic Contamination Cleanup

This section illustrates the value of knowing what munitions constituents to consider. We list a great many CWM formulas and compounds in chapter 5. The purpose of this is to allow the regulators to know what agents and breakdown products to test for once the historical research is complete. The fate and transport of constituents is important but knowing what constituents were likely to have been on a site is the beginning point. 

Our knowledge of chemical weapons, historical knowledge of the site, and knowledge of chemistry allowed us to make an educated guess that arsenic would have remained. It is important for the reader to understand that our site already had a no further action decision before we became involved. Whereas it would still be nice to sample for all the constituents known to have been on the site—or at least the major ones— we had to get our nose in the tent first. We chose the one contaminant we knew would be at the most places and present an undeniable health threat. 

From this gambit, the investigation was expanded once, as the author predicted, arsenic was found. Obviously, because the site tested shells the presence of arsenic mandated a geophysical survey of the property before a backhoe could be used to remove the arsenic contamination. This led to the discovery of still more burial areas and individual shells. 

Because approximately 150 lots had elevated arsenic levels, the Corps developed an arsenic cleanup prioritization that was based upon the average of the arsenic grid sample results. Thus, if a property had one very high grid of arsenic but the rest of the property was low, that property would be cleaned up several years later. 

It was the District s belief that we needed to consider where the excessively high arsenic grids were on a given lot and, if the high arsenic grids were in an area frequented by the residents, they should be cleaned up more quickly. They developed the chart shown in Table 15.1. 

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This project was followed by an actual cleanup of an arsenic contaminated site in Loppersum in 1989, which was a partial success with three-fourths of the total soil volume remediated. Here, the presence of uncovered metallic objects inhibited the process. These metallic objects served as a path for the electric current and delayed the movement of metallic contaminants in the area. 

Due to a lack of expertise, the Army and the ERA spent 20 million studying the site and issued a no further action decision in 1995. The author wrote an extensive report, excerpts of which are contained in Ch. 10. This report was critical of the Army s expertise and required more work to be done on the Spring Valley site. The Army orally and in its written response denied that it lacked such experience. Now that it was forced to reopen the site and excavate several more burial sites containing chemical weapons and material, it has posted a website acknowledging that this was the first such site it had ever cleaned up. It seems that the Army did not even know that it did not have experience in this area. Another 80 million has since been spent, and 650 more shells and 350 bottles of CWM and other reagents have been found to date in the second effort. Arsenic contamination on 10% of the properties needed to be cleaned up and now the parties agree that cleanup is just beginning. Clearly, a lack of environmental experience was responsible for the premature closure of the site. 

At the Coast Wood Preserving, Inc., Superfund site (Ukiah, California), the technology was used to remove metal contamination to comply with both state and federal cleanup standards [50 parts per billion (ppb) arsenic, 50 ppb chromium, and 1 ppm copper]. The estimated total cost for the source control component of the remedy was 1,000,000, and the estimated total operational and maintenance costs was estimated to be 19,500 for a 20-year period (D16888B, p. 3, Report Documentation p. 2). 

Actual cleanup of the site to remove arsenic from contaminated heavy clay soil... 

The Board is responsible for an independent oversight of all activities affecting nuclear safety within DOE s nuclear weapons complex. Prior to the end of the nuclear arms race, the nuclear weapons complex concentrated on the design, manufacture, test, and maintenance of the nation s nuclear arsenal. The complex is now engaged in the cleanup of contaminated sites and facilities, disassembly of nuclear weapons to achieve arms control objectives, maintenance of the smaller stockpile, and storage and disposition of excess fissionable materials. All of these hazardous activities must be carried out in the strict observance of health and safety requirements. 

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