Zone of Interior

Rowan s problems were many in molding his staff to constant liaison with the British, with the ground and air forces, and with the zone of interior. In addition he possessed SOS supply and liaison duties which would normally have devolved upon a communications zone chemical officer. He still lacked officers in sufficient numbers and with sufficient rank to handle all liaison and operating duties. 

For discussion of the spare parts situation in the zone of interior, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, Chapter XIII. 

After the completion of the Edgewood tests, the CWS felt better prepared to provide technical supervision of smoke installations in the zone of interior, which the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, was finding difficult to establish because of shortages of... 

Concern for this serious situation in the theater naturally extended to the Office of the Chief, CWS, in Washington. The few zone of interior malfunctions had been thoroughly investigated and were found to have been caused in practically every case by a faulty fuze. The increase of misfires overseas prompted General Porter in January 1945 to send to Europe an investigating mission headed by General Bullene. A definite correlation between extreme cold weather and... 

The elements of Reckless Task Force had chemical mortar support for the Hollandia operation, but this support came from a rather odd source. Because of a shortage of mortar units in the zone of interior the War Department in February 1944 authorized the SWPA to convert a tank destroyer battalion to a chemical mortar battalion at the earliest practicable date. Almost immediately the theater reorganized the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion which, after a brief period of training, participated in the Hollandia operation, under command of Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin. But redesignation waited until Jime 1944, producing the anomalous situation of a so-called tank destroyer unit firing 4.2-inch chemical mortars. ... 

After the experience at Tarawa, General Richardson, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, asked the War Department if mechanized flame throwers were available in the zone of interior. Upon receiving a favorable reply, Richardson requisitioned... 

The Luzon fighting saw the arrival of both auxiliary and main armament flame throwers from the zone of interior. The XIV Corps included a tank battalion, equipped with bow gun flame throwers, that was employed in the house-to-house fighting in Manila. In one instance a flame tank neutralized in a few minutes a barricaded building which had defied the infantry for two days. Twenty-five more bow gun flame throwers reached the Sixth Army in mid-April. ... 

For the Kyushu operation (Olympic) over twice as many main armament flame tanks per division were to be used as had been employed on Okinawa. A tank battalion was to be attached to each assault division and Sixth Army requested sufficient main armament flame throwers to equip one company in each of these battalions. At this time the Sixth Army understood that some 600 main armament flame throwers were being manufactured in the zone of interior, but that only 40 of these would be available in time for Olympic. Therefore, the plan called for the distribution of armored flame throwers in equal lots to each tank battalion as soon as the weapons arrived in the theater. Some 56 additional main armament flame throwers of the POA model were to be obtained from Hawaii. Thus a total of 96 main armament... 

The main armament model from the zone of interior was the Eia-yRi. 

In the zone of interior the Armored Force Board had never been enthusiastic about any flame-throwing tank that was a special-purpose weapon, that Is, if it had the flame thrower as its main armament, or if it had a distinguishing silhouette. The British Crocodile met the first requirement, but its fuel-carrying trailer certainly made it readily identifiable. In any event, the board urged the Chemical Warfare Service to concentrate its efforts on the auxiliary model, one that main- tained the normal armament of the vehicle, which was then under development. The result was an auxiliary flame thrower which was interchangeable with the bow machine gun of either the light or medium tank. 

The CWS in World War II had mixed success with flame throwers, the portable as well as the mechanized. With regard to the mechanized model there was some indecision on the part of the using arm as to the characteristics, indeed as to the very necessity, for such a specialized vehicle. Moreover, in no other field of CWS endeavor was there so little liaison between the users in the field and the developers in the zone of interior. Because of this lack of liaison and because of available facilities and vigorous CWS people in Hawaii, the mechanized flame thrower support in at least one Pacific area came principally from local sources, not from the United States. And this support resulted in the most effective combat employment of the mechanized flame thrower in the war. 

Despite a measure of War Department standardization during World War II, little consistency was found in the zone of interior or theater of operations records relating to the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II. Sources of great importance for one overseas area would prove useless or nonexistent for another. Consequently, while administration and organization records proved most fruitful, portions of this work depend heavily on historical reports, monographs, studies, secondary works, and interviews. 

In July 1941 the Chief, CWS, took action to get the question of weapons for chemical units settled. This he did by formally recommending to the Chief of Staff that the two active chemical weapons companies in the zone of interior be expanded to battalions and equipped with the 4.2-inch mortar. The Chief, CWS, encountered some difficulty with this suggestion in the General Staff, but General George C. Marshall decided the issue by directing that General Porter s proposal be carried out. ... 

A good many chemical warfare officers were assigned or attached in the zone of interior to the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces. Chart lo) ... 

The J series led to the inauguration of training programs on a large scale throughout the ASF. Those programs expanded far beyond the "J series and were aimed at meeting the particular needs of zone of interior installations. 

Memo, Ex O OC CWS for Dir Pers ASF, 15 Jan 44, sub Work Simplification Indices and Pers Requirements for Zone of Interior Establishments of Tech Servs. CWS 200.3. 

Although this report was made primarily with a view to determining policy as to protection of military installations in the zone of interior, its application to civilian defense was clear. The hazard of enemy gas attack against American cities had diminished to the point of negligibility. 

During their operation a total of 274 classes were conducted with an average attendance of 37.7 trainees. Graduates included men and women from every state in the Union as well as from Canada and Mexico. Over one fifth of the 10,328 enrolled students were Army and Navy officers, some of whom were trained for civilian protection duty in the zone of interior, others in the theaters of operation. 

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