Training of CWS Personnel

One place where need for such training was apparent was in connection with OCS graduates slated for duty with Army Air Forces. Special instruction to qualify for air duty had been undertaken in a few OCS classes but it was impossible to cover this field adequately during officer candidate training. A better answer was the Air Forces Chemical Course, designed specifically to acquaint CWS officers with the problems they would encounter in service with air commands. This course was approved in February 1943 nineteen classes, graduating 1,022 students, were held during the next two years. 

Compared to the training of junior officers, the school instruction of field grade officers was relatively stabilized. The Advanced Course was not initiated until April 1943, but thereafter it was conducted continuously and with little change. Duration was four weeks. Probably the most important accomplishment of this course was the preparation of CWS officers to pursue the Command and General Staff School courses at Fort Leavenworth. By midsummer 1945, the Advanced Course had graduated 544 students in 22 classes. 

Although the number of chemical officers who received general training 

Of the specialist courses for enlisted men, only two were integrated with chemical unit training. The seven-week Laboratory Course was highly technical officers as well as enlisted men were trained for duty with chemical laboratory companies. The Special Mortar Operations Course trained small groups of enlisted specialists for assignment to the chemical battalions mobilized in 1943 and 1944. The remainder of the enlisted courses conducted at the Chemical Warfare School were primarily for the instruction of those outside the Chemical Warfare Service. 

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The role of the Chemical Warfare School, like that of all service schools, was to present essential instruction which could not be given advantageously within units or in local schools. The World War II military directive governing the school divided such instruction into two clearly defined categories (i) the training of CWS personnel for branch duties, and (2) the instruction of "officers of other arms and services of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in tactics and technique of chemical warfare and in protection against chemical attack. ... 

Before the war the Chemical Warfare School had not been actively engaged in the training of CWS personnel as such. As a result, when full mobilization began, the school had not developed and tested a series of courses for this purpose. More than two years elapsed after the declaration of war before a clear-cut solution to the problem of school training of CWS officers was reached. Meanwhile, many courses were instituted, employed for a time, and then discontinued. In this respect the experience of the Chemical Warfare School paralleled that of the newly established ground forces schools which, in contrast to the older schools of the statutory branches, offered a diversity of special courses. 

Although most CWS officers who filled tactical assignments during the war received some training at the Chemical Warfare School, those officers whose principal wartime duties were performed at CWS installations were in many cases not so fortunate. At best, the school training of CWS personnel was spotty. 

The importance of the Chemical Warfare School training of branch personnel was emphasized by the fact that chemical officers and enlisted men were, with few exceptions, widely scattered in such small elements as to preclude effective general training at local levels. Excellent schools were conducted at Camp Sibert and at the several CWS arsenals, yet this instruction was for the most part directly related to tasks immediately at hand. It remained for the Edgewood school to attend to the broader aspects of the individual s military education. 

Another function was to plan the use and allotment of chemical troop units, and in 1943 the scope of this planning was extended to the procurement and supervision of all CWS personnel in the theater. Performance under these functions was advisory since Shadle had no command responsibilities. The advisory capacity was severely limited by theater quotas on both personnel and units, and by the requests of individual field commanders for personnel and units—requests which usually overrode staff advice. Shadle s Chemical Section managed to get enough service units even when training in the United States could not keep pace with worldwide demand. Combat units were eventually obtained on about the same basis on which they were furnished other theaters, three battalions per authorized army during peak combat activity.With respect to officers, Shadle experienced difficulties similar to Rowan s—the theater received a number of CWS casual officers who frequently were badly handled by the replacement system. It was practically impossible to find vacancies for all arriving officers, and it was absolutely impossible to determine their qualifications so as to channel officers to duties for which they were fitted. ... 

Has the State Party s government provided, in the last year, training of foreign military or civilian personnel on protection from a possible CW attack ... 

In the spring of 1944 an audit team from the Office of the Secretary of War visited Huntsville and found defects in the methods of wage administration employed at the arsenal. This discovery led to a survey by the Personnel Division, OC CWS, which resulted in a number of suggestions not only on wage administration but also on the centralization of civilian personnel functions, the substitution of civilians for military as personnel officers, and the training of operating officials in sound personnel practices. From July to December 1944 those measures were largely carried out at Huntsville and resulted in a marked improvement in personnel administration. ... 

The Plant Protection, Safety, and Labor Branch, upon its inception, undertook a program aimed at educating arsenal and plant supervisory personnel on the importance of safety. The branch placed great emphasis on engineering improvements such as guarding and grounding machinery, and better ventilation. From early 1945 until the close of the war it stressed the safety training of all employees. The result of all this activity was remarkable the CWS, which in 1942 and 1943 had one of the worst safety records of any element of the War Department, improved until by 1945 it had one of the best records. ... 

The administration of CWS officer pools was complicated by the fact that the excessively populated pools were located in fifteen different places in the zone of interior. The maintenance of a centralized and uniform control of these groups presented serious difficulties which never were fully resolved. At Camp Sibert the operation of the local pool became a responsibility of the Unit Training Center. Some effort was made to centralize the administration of all pools from Sibert, although this scheme was later dropped and the co-ordination of pool activities was resumed by the office of the Chief, CWS. In these matters, both Personnel and Training Divisions were concerned. The responsibility of each organization was clear-cut Per-... 

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