Secondary market

The majority of these RMs are available from the issuing organizations several older materials may not be available from primary sources but may still be available in the secondary market (e.g. from existing stock in laboratories). 

The NAACP argued that federal data showed—and manufacturers knew— that a disproportionate number of guns were getting into criminal hands in minority communities. The defendants argued that manufacturers were not liable for criminals obtaining and misusing their product, and that they had no control over the secondary market in guns. 

By far the largest sector of the battery industry worldwide is based on the lead-acid aqueous cell whose dominance is due to a combination of low cost, versatility and the excellent reversibility of the electrochemical system, Lead-acid cells have extensive use both as portable power sources for vehicle service and traction, and in stationary applications ranging from small emergency supplies to load levelling systems. In terms of sales, the lead-acid battery occupies over 50% of the entire primary and secondary market, with an estimated value of 100 billion per annum before retail mark-up. 

Capacity rights acquired in the primary market may be transferred by agreement in the secondary market.22... 

The requirements in the primary market appertaining to natural gas undertakings or eligible customers, and the duly substantiated reasonable need, apply correspondingly for transactions in the secondary market. 

Transactions in the secondary market can take place either bilaterally or through a market place established and operated by the operator of the upstream network. The price in the secondary market is the market-clearing price and it is initially not subject to control from the Ministry. 

The secondary capacity market encompasses both the marketplace for transactions of capacity as facilitated by Gassco and the market for bilateral transactions between shippers. Several rules are developed for the use of secondary capacity rights. The core principle is that qualified shippers with existing capacity rights secured in the primary or secondary market can sell this capacity to qualified shippers. Bids and offers are posted on the marketplace and they are valid until acceptance or withdrawal. Invoicing between buyer and seller is done directly on a net price basis where the net price is the agreed price less the primary market tariff. 

As was clarified in Section 3, the Norwegian regime provides the possibility of requiring capacity in two markets, the primary and the secondary market. In the primary market long term, medium term and shortterm rights are traded. In the primary market capacity rights are traded at tariffs determined and published by Norwegian authorities. Tariffs in the primary market are fixed for each individual and predefined zone of the transportation system. 

Unused capacity rights bought in the primary market shall, under given conditions, be released to the secondary market. In the secondary market transportation rights may be traded at any price at the marketplace. The marketplace is facilitated by Gassco or by bilateral agreements. 

Although, the regulation implies that the tariff is rigid downwards (fixed), a tariff almost equal to short run marginal cost is possible if one or several shippers first buy transportation rights in the primary market and thereafter find that the booked capacity will not be utilized and release the rights to the secondary market when, at the same time, pipeline capacity is not scarce. 

If capacity is still scarce after this first round of allocation amongst owners, capacity is allocated by the Capacity Allocation Key (CAK). CAK is not intended to allocate capacity according to willingness to pay 53. However, the possibility of releasing the assigned capacity to the secondary market will have an effect. The price for released capacity will constitute the shipper s opportunity cost and capacity may be reallocated according to willingness to pay. 

Owners finding the CAK favorable, may in a game theoretic perspective consider it wise not to cash in by releasing capacity to the secondary market, but rather use the rights even when such use is not optimal in the short run. 

However, the Capacity Allocation Key (CAK) allocates capacity to a number of participants (owners). Hence, supply in the secondary market will be more atomistic than in the usual textbook monopoly situation. As actors may make different judgments, capacity may be released and thus initiate the secondary market. It is however, too early to tell how well this secondary market will function. 

As tariffs in the secondary market are market clearing, the owners also collect the full scarcity payments. Hence, the investment incentives should be better than under a marginal cost-pricing regime. The owners rights are pursued, as they are given priority when capacity is scarce, nor are they being inadequately compensated by low tariffs. 

The Norwegian regulation ensures third parties access to the transportation system by requiring capacity by means of a primary and a secondary market. The authorities publish the tariff for the primary market. In the secondary market, the tariffs are not regulated and they are thus market-cleared. Based on this the authors will indicate that the secondary market, in theory, will provide some degree of rationing efficiency. 

The need for timely and profitable exits for buyout firms has given rise to a growing secondary market for buyout transactions. Although they are historically less lucrative than both IPOs and trade sales, secondary buyouts have increased in importance and acceptance in recent years (Davison, C.). For example, Ripple-wood sold Kraton Polymers to the Texas Pacific Group in 2003 for USD 770 million and in 2004 Borden Chemical, held for nine years by KKR, scrapped its IPO plans and was sold instead to Apollo for USD 1.2 billion. 

Nevertheless, only one of the four governments that auctioned in phase I opened the auction to all EU bidders. Given that allowances are readily tradable, national or sectoral bidders will only benefit from restrictions on participation if auction prices are significantly lower than those in the secondary market. Despite the arbitrage possibility, prices at auction may be lower than on the secondary market if poor auction design facilitates non-competitive or collusive behaviour by bidders. The net result would be a reduction in revenue and an implicit subsidy for bidders.31... 

One option is to allow current dealers on the ETS secondary market to become primary dealers who can bid on their own account or on behalf of clients. Because these dealers would participate more regularly than individual buyers, some transaction costs could be avoided. Small buyers might even be encouraged to participate via a dealer when they would not be willing or able to do so directly. 

Smaller and more frequent auctions are likely to encourage participation by smaller bidders. For example, firms who wish to purchase at auction rather than on the secondary market may not have a large enough line of credit to purchase 5 years worth of permits in advance. This is a substantial asset to hold on the balance sheet and one-off auctions might deter small bidders without deep pockets . These bidders would still trade on the secondary market, but the auctions themselves would be less competitive. 

The ideal trade-off between ensuring a competitive auction with low transactions costs and providing steady liquidity is difficult to judge before we have gained more experience with allowance auctions. If auctions were to be based on experience with electricity markets, then a frequent uniform price auction (e.g. weekly), would allow small participants to directly acquire the allowances they need to cover their emissions in the auction.34 High frequency would ensure that bidders pay a price close to the price on the secondary market at the time of emission, thus limiting risk exposure. In electricity markets this approach has been successfully implemented with low transaction costs (various pool type market designs). 

One possible problem is the winner s curse . The value of winning a tradable allowance is similar for bidders because they will all face the same resale price on the secondary market. In this kind of common value auction, the bidders estimate what this price will be and bid accordingly. However the most likely to win is also the most likely to have overestimated the price, and bidders need to shade their bids to account for this. 

Auctioning permits all at once would increase liquidity in the secondary market. However, since only 10% of allowances will be sold at auction, this is unlikely to be a major concern. 

An AFV program must be viewed as a system in order to succeed. Equal attention must be paid to the development and deployment of the vehicles, production and distribution of the fuel, and consideration for customer demands, whether they be range, behavioral changes, secondary markets, or safety, to name a few. 

These provisions were referred to as file Small Business Loan Securitization and Secondary Market Enhancement Act of 1993, S. 384,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 

The fact that France over the last 20 years failed to achieve lull employment and saw its unemployed population grow is very well documented. Hence, governments were confronted with the employer of last resort question, the state being expected to provide temporary (or secondary market ) jobs when the market failed to deliver them. As a result, a significant proportion of GDP - although never reaching levels observable in Sweden and Denmark -has been constantly devoted to employment expenditure (Barbier and Gautie 1998). 

In the secondary market, freed of direct responsibility to the pipeline company to underwrite the pipeline venture, firm capacity contracts come in any variety of time periods, configurations and prices. No matter, the primary capacity holder is obligated to the pipeline company through the underlying long-term, multi-year contracts that support pipeline financing. 

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