Risk-Based Process System Safety

THE 1990s—RISK-BASED PROCESS SYSTEM SAFETY 

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THE 1990s—RISK-BASED PROCESS SYSTEM SAFETY... 

The authors of the Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (KBPS) (CCPS, 2007a) described the need for constant vigilance as the price of maintaining an effective process safety management system. An operator not only must be vigilant (aware of both past and current performance), but must not assume that current performance will be maintained, much less improved, without intentional evaluation of critical parts of systems and their performance. Performance measurement and metrics are a critical part of the RBPS system. 

Periodic management review is a specific risk-based process safety (RBPS) element Providing regular checkups on the health of process safety management systems—including the metrics—will identify and correct any current or incipient deficiencies before they are revealed by an audit or incident. Such management reviews also demonstrate management interest and commitment to process safety and the metrics that describe the system. 

The ultimate goal in process system safety and risk analysis is to control the risks. This final task is carried out by comparing the risks calculated with risk criteria specified by an authority. The criteria can be subjectively determined, based on the past experience or the existing background risks. However, many companies (1,2) have established numerical targets for risks. Given calculated risks beyond the specified limit, decisions will be made to improve the design or operation and maintenance procedures to reduce the risks. 

The comprehensive book Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) [9] sponsored by the CCPS describes twelve features essential to implementing and nmturing safety culture fundamentals in an organization s PSM system. 

The review resnlts fall into three key areas organizational design and performance, safety processes and communications, and risk-based managanent system. 

The shift from a loss-based process using TCIR or other post-loss ratios to a risk-based process has been long advocated. TCIR can be a valuable measure but cannot be the only factor used to assess organizational safety performance. In order to develop a basic measuring system, the elements of the activity-based system as discussed in Chapter 11, Developing an Activity-Based System can be used. 

American Institute for Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Risk Based Process Safety Management (PSM) system... 

The EU Risk Assessment ( Council Regulation [EEC] 793/93 of 23 March 1993 )39 is well recognized as being the leading independent, transparent, and science-based system for assessing chemicals and substances in everyday use.40 The Consumer Products Safety Quality (CPS Q) Unit, formerly known as European Chemicals Bureau (ECB), is part of the Institute for Health and Consumer Protection (IHCP), which is one of the seven scientific institutes in the European Commission s Joint Research Center (JRC).41 The CPS Q is responsible for managing the risk assessment process. As will be discussed in further detail in Section 22.2.2.4.4, the EU Risk Assessment process was revoked on June 1, 2008 and replaced by the REACH Directive. 

The CCPS s process safety management system approach that uses risk-based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk-based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities. 

The safety case concept requires that operators demonstrate that the systems and processes they have adopted ensure that their facility is sufficiently safe for all those people who are possibly impacted by their activities (workers and contractors at their facility, passengers and customers, people who live and work in surrounding areas). Most safety case regulations require the demonstration to take the general form of showing that risk is as low as reasonably practicable, or ALARP (or that risk has been reduced so far as practicable - SFAP). Clearly, safety cases are an example of the broad trend towards risk-based regulation (Hood et al. 2004). 

To be in a position to anticipate hazards, one must be involved in the design process. To effectively participate in the design process, the safety professional must be skilled in hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques. Influencing the design process and using hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques to achieve acceptable risk levels are the bases upon which system safety is built. 

As discussed in Chapter 3, Subpart S of 30 CFR 250 requires the lessee to develop, implement, and maintain a SEMS for offshore oil and gas operations on the basis of API s RP 75. This goal-based SMS became effective on November 15,2011, and moved the regulations for offshore oil and gas operations from a primarily prescriptive system to a more risk-based system under which operators were required to demonstrate that the health and safety procedures described in the SEMS plan accomplished the stated goals. The shift away from a more prescriptive system was due in part to the inadequacy of an inspection process that encouraged compliance with checklists of potential incidents of noncompliance (PINCs) that tended to focus on preventing hardware-related mechanical failures. Previous reports indicated that most accidents occurring on the OCS were due to human factors or to not following proper procedures (Bea and Moore 1992 NRC 1990 TRB 2012). The rules in SEMS (for... 

Many process safety practices are combined into a safety management system, recently called Risk Based... 

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