Readiness for Gas Warfare

There is no easy measurement for CWS overseas accomplishments in gas warfare preparedness since plans, men, and materials were not put to the test. It is possible to assess the factors upon which chemical officers during World War II believed preparedness depended. The first of these factors was an administrative and organizational pattern which would have permitted chemical officers to function in all their areas of interest from tactical and strategic advice to decontamination service in the field. 

Administratively and organizationally the CWS was only partially prepared for gas warfare. In Europe, while the chief chemical officer held a staff position under the theater commander, he did not have a position in the supreme tactical and strategic headquarters, SHAEF. Colonel St. John s presence in SHAEF would have helped so far as the function of providing advice is concerned, but his lack of a direct and formal channel to the chief chemical officer might have proved a handicap. The informal relationship which existed between Rowan and the air chemical officers and between Rowan and the United States Navy officers with interests in the chemical field would probably have served as a basis for co-operative effort among the U.S. forces. 

General Shadle, from his position in the combined headquarters, AFHQ, would have been able to co-ordinate both Allied and American gas warfare activities in the Mediterranean area. Colonel Copthorne in SWPA would undoubtedly have had a tough problem in making the necessary expansion into USAFFE and GHQ since he lacked the required staff and since his relationships with the Allies and even 

Colonel Unmacht, enjoying the confidence and support of his Army commander, and from 1943 as ofScial co-ordinator of POA chemical planning for all forces, would have been in as good a position as Shadle s. Unmacht s drawback would have been his lack of stafF officers. 

The second factor regarded by chemical officers as basic in gas warfare preparedness— training—was from the CWS point of view the least difficult preparedness activity to handle. The theater school in Europe, the area CWS school in SWPA, the army schools in the Mediterranean area, and Unmacht s series of courses in POA provided chemical training for thousands of soldiers. Most of these trainees would have required refresher courses were it not for the fact that, as a senior technical services officer told a chemical officer in Europe, soldiers learn fast and remember well when their lives depend on learning. These area schools and combat and service organization schools could have been quickly expanded with a minimum of effort. 

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Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, app B. 

The strategic planning question was to be answered through the co-ordination of the Pacific area plans by the United States Chemical Warfare Committee. In General Porter s opinion the CWS would have been ready for gas warfare in the Pacific had it broken out in 1944 or 1945 No new duties were indicated for the CWS POA by the strategic plans. Unmacht continued his emphasis on gas warfare... 

The European ratio was determined by comparing 1943 mask authorization (Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in the Theaters of Operations) with theater projected strength (Ruppenthal, Loghficai Support of the Annies, I, 128-29). 

On a broader scale the USCWC prepared information for the use of U.S. and British agencies in the form of reports of readiness for gas warfare. These reports provided periodic information on intelligence, production, training, research, supply, and many other items of interest. 

Warfare Service, for comment and recommendation. Porter s reply concurred in the views and apprehensions expressed by Mr. McCloy and summarized certain specific steps considered necessary by way of preparation for gas warfare by the United Nations. Some of these measures were already under study by WPD. Porter now advanced a proposal that the chemical warfare needs of all the United Nations be surveyed to determine what assistance the United States should and could provide. "In most of our military preparations, he said, "we shall, for some time to come, be forced to follow a pacemaker. With the vast chemical industry of the United States and the highly trained scientific and technical men connected with it, we should be able to be ready for all-out gas warfare, if required, in a relatively short time, and in this particular do the pacemaking ourselves. As a result of the McCloy memorandum and General Porter s recommendations, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, were directed to determine the requirements in chemical weapons and ammunition adequate to meet the needs of the United Nations in the event of gas warfare. In addition, the Under Secretary of War, Mr. Robert P. Patterson, was requested to investigate current British and American production plans to learn what increase should be provided to meet the possible needs of the United Nations. ... 

Beginning in January 1943 the committee obtained information on the state of readiness of the Navy and the British. The USCWC then worked on the computation of logistical requirements for gas warfare, including the necessary reserves as well as the production capacity for key items. A full analysis was received from the British in April and the committee s first estimate appeared on 14 July. Not until March 1944, however, did the USCWC publish its first full-scale report that covered the gas warfare situation as of i January 1944. ... 

FIGURE 1.4 German trench with a gas cylinder ready for discharge Army War College (1918), Gas Warfare, Part I, German Methods of Offense. 

Fig 2-3. A typical German chemical cylinder set up and ready for discharge. The discharge from thousands of cylinders created the gas cloud. Reprinted from Army War College. German Methods of Offense. Vol 1. In Gas Warfare. Washington, DC War Department 1918 14. 

General Porter got the same impression that Prentiss did when he arrived in the European theater shortly before the cross-Channel attack. He inspected gas warfare readiness in both ground and service commands. He found no reluctance to acknowledge Rowan as the theater chief chemical officer and he found theater forces well prepared, from a C WS point of view, for the operation they were about to undertake. ... 

While the total quantity of British chemical warfare materials furnished the United States Forces was small, and while only token deliveries were made in 1942, awareness of British capability and British reserves was nearly the only reassuring gleam in the dark chemical supply picture from July 1942 to July 1943. The entire gas warfare retaliatory potential depended on British resources for most of that period. CWS ETO officers measured the British contribution as much or more in terms of their willingness to co-operate and their readiness to provide technical and operating experience data as they did in their provision of supplies under reverse lend-lease. ... 

The answer to the basic tactical question from the American point of view was to mount an overwhelmingly superior force, which would mean using all the men in every combat-ready unit which could be assembled in the United Kingdom and which could be provided with transport to the Continent, The technical services in turn would have to accumulate sufficient materiel to support such a force. The CWS ETO portion of the materiel project involved three basic categories of supply (i) individual and collective gas warfare protective and decontaminating items for the entire force (2) weapons and ammunition for chemical mortar units plus flame and smoke weapons and equipment for all combat forces (3) and special operational requirements such as smoke protection for the beachhead. The first job was... 

The needs of gas warfare readiness, therefore, set the pattern for prewar CWS planning for service units. The prescribed standard for a wartime situation, in which the existence or at least the imminence of gas warfare was taken for granted, called for the assignment of a chemical depot company, decontamination company, laboratory company, impregnating company (as the processing company was then called), and maintenance company to each field army, with additional... 

The mission of the Chemical Warfare Service with respect to its principal preoccupation, gas warfare, was therefore somewhat complex. Primarily the CWS was expected to provide insurance for American military forces against the shock of sudden gas attack. Hand in hand with this mission went responsibility for maintaining a state of readiness for quick retaliation. These two constituted explicit responsibilities. In a broader sense, an implicit function of the CWS was to provide military support for a national policy, that of dissuading others from resorting to the gas weapon. This was accomplished, as matters turned out, more by the strength of U.S. preparedness for toxic warfare than by the cogency of political agreements. 

As the theaters reported their chemical warfare status and plans to the Chemical Warfare Service, it became more and more apparent that American forces overseas were unprepared for powerful retaliation should the enemy initiate gas warfare. The USCWC used these theater plans to prepare logistical studies of gas warfare readiness and included much of the information in the USCWC semiannual reports of readiness. 

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