Procedures Risk Based Process Safety

Demonstrating that the level of residual risk is acceptable will always be based on a degree of subjectivity. The safety case assessment procedures recognize the limitations of the risk analysis process and the problems associated with determination that risk has been reduced to as low as is reasonably practicable. This is achieved by focusing on the analysis of the operator s methodology in undertaking the risk analysis process. 

As discussed in Chapter 3, Subpart S of 30 CFR 250 requires the lessee to develop, implement, and maintain a SEMS for offshore oil and gas operations on the basis of API s RP 75. This goal-based SMS became effective on November 15,2011, and moved the regulations for offshore oil and gas operations from a primarily prescriptive system to a more risk-based system under which operators were required to demonstrate that the health and safety procedures described in the SEMS plan accomplished the stated goals. The shift away from a more prescriptive system was due in part to the inadequacy of an inspection process that encouraged compliance with checklists of potential incidents of noncompliance (PINCs) that tended to focus on preventing hardware-related mechanical failures. Previous reports indicated that most accidents occurring on the OCS were due to human factors or to not following proper procedures (Bea and Moore 1992 NRC 1990 TRB 2012). The rules in SEMS (for... 

Risk assessment procedures in health and safety are legal requirements in most countries and also essential elements of the safety management systems, being they certified or not. In formal risk assessments, the risks are fisted based on their priority in terms of severity and likelihood of the possible accident. In spite of the fact that there is a subjective element involved in such estimation, the process will yield a rational basis for decisions to act on hazards encountered. Further, the follow-up assessments are giving estimates of residual risks for those risks counteracted, to complete the prevention with additional measures where needed. 

Personal Mastery. Process safety is based on identifying process-related risks in advance and preventing accidents. Performance in this area is regularly reviewed using internal audits and official inspections. Technical safety systems and procedures, up-to-date protective equipment, and access to the appropriate safety data sheets are all used to ensure a high standard of health and safety ... 

The What-if method is the simplest method to assess chemical process safety risks and is based on questions such as What if the mechanical or electrical integrity of the process, the control systems and work procedures all fail,. .. what consequences could arise in the worst case While the potential consequences are largely determined by the inherent hazard of the material and the quantity involved, the reviewer is focused on safety concerns, e.g. those arising from fire, explosion, toxic gas release, and environmental protection. 

The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 mandated USA EPA to "upgrade its risk assessment process as part of the tolerance setting procedures" (3), The changes to risk assessment were based in part on recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences report (22), The act required an explicit determination that tolerances were safe to children. US EPA was required to use an extra 10-fold safety factor to take into account both pre-/post natal developmental toxicity and the completeness of the database, unless US EPA determined, based on reliable data, that a different margin would be safe. In addition, US EPA must consider available information on 1/ aggregate exposure from all non-occupational sources 2/ effects of cumulative exposure to the pesticide plus others with a common mechanism of toxicity 3/ effects of in utero exposure 4/ the potential for endocrine disrupting effects. 

The six key questions described in the cooling failure scenario allow us to identify and assess the thermal risks of a chemical process. The first steps allow building a failure scenario, which is easy to understand and serves as a base for the assessment The proposed procedure (Figure 3.6) is based on the separation of severity and probability, taking into account the economic aspects of data determination in a safety laboratory. In a second step, based on the scenario, the criticality index can be determined to help in the choice and design of risk-reducing measures. 

The ultimate goal in process system safety and risk analysis is to control the risks. This final task is carried out by comparing the risks calculated with risk criteria specified by an authority. The criteria can be subjectively determined, based on the past experience or the existing background risks. However, many companies (1,2) have established numerical targets for risks. Given calculated risks beyond the specified limit, decisions will be made to improve the design or operation and maintenance procedures to reduce the risks. 

One of the key objectives associated with providing risk and hazard information is to help set realistic safety expectations. That is, the provision of safety and hazard information can form a realistic safety preview. Chapter 3 describes four different types of job applicant and described how the four types vary in terms of safety expectations and previous job experience. Job applicants classified as school leaver or career transition applicants will have the least amount of relevant job experience and are likely to have the most unrealistic safety expectations. Clearly, safety expectation setting procedures will be of most benefit to those job applicants. However, it would be unwise to forgo the use of a realistic safety preview, based on the assumption that the job applicant, because of their previous experience, would not benefit from the process. Tables 3.1 and 3.2, in Chap. 3, show that there are safety risks associated with aU job applicants, including career-focused applicants, and these can be reduced by providing a realistic safety preview. Thus, it is... 

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