Probability of destruction

In Figure 10.30 the survival rate of the total sedimentary mass for the different Phanerozoic systems is plotted and compared with survival rates for the total carbonate and dolomite mass distribution. The difference between the two latter survival rates for each system is the mass of limestone surviving per unit of time. Equation 10.1 is the log linear relationship for the total sedimentary mass, and implies a 130 million year half-life for the post-Devonian mass, and for a constant sediment mass with a constant probability of destruction, a mean sedimentation rate since post-Devonian time of about 100 x 1014 g y 1. The modem global erosional flux is 200 x 1014 g y-1, of which about 15% is particulate and dissolved carbonate. Although the data are less reliable for the survival rate of Phanerozoic carbonate sediments than for the total sedimentary mass, a best log linear fit to the post-Permian preserved mass of carbonate rocks is... 

Uhlemann and Mori [93] described the calculation of the average particle velocity wp within the fluidized bed. The impact time of a particle can be calculated with the help of particle distance ap and average particle velocity. Analogous to the previous derivations, the probability of destruction Pq> of the wetted particles surface - and thus of the liquid film - can be calculated by the ratio of the wetted surface to the total surface of the particle. 

Surely, only irredundant information related to irreplaceable elements of the system is valuable. The redundant (replicated or duplicated) infor mation also is of vital importance to minimize the probability of destruct ing the valuable information as it is transferred. In this viewpoint, any aperiodic system contains a much larger number of irreplaceable units and, therefore, a greater quantity of irredundant information than a peri odic system of the same gross composition with the interchangeable elements (see Figure 6.1). 

The lifetime of free radicals in very low pressure systems, such as mass spectrometer ion sources, is determined principally by the probability of destruction of the radical by surface reactions. The relative ease with which CH3 radicals have been detected in conventional mass spectrometers and the corresponding difficulty in detecting O atoms are related to the speed of surface reactions, as shown by the following experiments. 

The polymer strength depends on both the probability of destruction of the polymer chains and the recombination of the free macroradicals formed. The potential barrier to restore a terminated chain increases the stress. A liquid with which the free radicals react without secondary chemical reactions further decreases the probability of the recombination of macroradicals. In this case one may consider the medium to be the catalyst of the pol5mier destruction process. 

The probability of destructive reactivity accidents is considered negligible, but an uncertainty remains for up to one hour between the melting of the control rods and the fuel melting in the core. The situation might be more critical for a BWR where the... 

Thus diffusion to the wall will control the rate of termination if the probability of destruction of active centers per collision with the wall is larger than the ratio of two characteristic dimensions the mean free path and the size of the reactor. 

Turbine over speed could result in a maj or turbine feilure that produces missiles these would pose an internal hazards threat (see APIOOO Internal Hazards Topic Report, Reference 6.3). The turbine stop valves and the reheat stop valves are all closed by actuation of the overspeed trip system, which is completely independent of the turbine control system (Sections 10.2.2.4.3 and 10.2.2.5.1 of Reference 6.1). The probability of destructive overspeed condition and missile generation, assuming the recommended inspection and test frequencies, is less than 1x10 per year. In addition, the orientation of the turbine-generator is such that a high-energy missile would be directed away from the nuclear island (Section 10.2.2 of Reference 6.1). 

PjJ irj )—probability of destruction (electric, lower the state of airworthiness) e present in the nth (e.g. ring) the effect of factor U ... 

Probable total destruction of buildings hetivy machines tools (7000 lb) moved and badly damaged, very heavy machine tooK 112 t rii i ihi survived... 

Probable total destruction of buildings heavy machine tools moved... 

I >10 (0.70) Probable total destruction of nonblast-resistant buildings Probable 100% fatalities... 

This reaction is very exothermic (A// —180 to —200kJ mol-1) and, therefore, seems to be very probable from the thermochemical point of estimation. The pre-exponential factor is expected to be low due to the concentration of the energy on three bonds at the moment of TS formation (see Chapter 3). To demonstrate that this reaction is responsible for the oxidative destruction of polymers, PP and PE were oxidized in chlorobenzene with an initiator and analyzed for the rates of oxidation, destruction (viscosimetrically), and double bond formation (by the reaction with ozone) [131]. It was found that (i) polymer degradation and formation of double bonds occur concurrently with oxidation (ii) the rates of all three processes are proportional to v 1/2, (iii) independent of p02, and (iv) vs = vdbf in PE and vs = 1.6vdbf in PP (vdbf is the rate of double bond formation). Thus, the rates of destruction and formation of double bonds, as well as the kinetic parameters of these reactions, are close, which corroborates with the proposed mechanism of polymer destruction. Therefore, the rate of peroxyl macromolecules degradation obeys the kinetic equation ... 

Bolton s opinion was bolstered in June 2005 by Senator Richard Lu-gar s survey of 85 non-proliferation and national security analysts from the United States and other nations. It was designed in part to characterize the risks related to the terrorist use of CBRN. The survey revealed that experts believe the probability of an attack somewhere in the world with a CBRN weapon was 50% over the next five years and 70% over the next ten. An attack with a radiological weapon was seen as the most probable with the likelihood of an attack with a nuclear or biological weapon considered about half as plausible [37]. The average probability of a nuclear attack in the next ten years was nearly 30%, with experts almost evenly divided between terrorist acquisitions of a working nuclear weapon versus self-construction [37]. The average risk estimate over ten years for major chemical and biological attacks was 20%. Senator Lu-gar concluded The bottom line is this for the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. ... 

On the other hand, while it is important to consider the range of possibilities associated with a particular threat, assessments are typically based on the probability of a particular occurrence. Determining probability is somewhat subjective, and is often based on intelligence and previous incidents. As mentioned, there are historical accounts of accidental incidents that have caused tremendous death and destruction. 

---