Operational sequence diagram , described

This approach is based on six function testing and inspection tasks (i) scheduling (ii) preparation, execution, and restoration (iii) failure reporting (iv) failure analysis (v) implementation and (vi) validation and continuous improvements. Thus, the approach is composed of six tasks based on checklists and analytical methods, such as influence diagrams, cause-defense matrices, and operational sequence diagrams (OSD). The six tasks are described as follows [11] ... 

The implementation of calendar A keeps a separate unordered vector of events for each instmctor in a hashtable, keyed by the instmctor. The calendar s internal interactions are described in the sequence diagram in Figure 3.7, with each arrow indicating an operation request. Upon receiving an addEvent request, the calendar first creates a new event object. It then looks up the event vector for the current instmctor in its hashtable, creating a new vector if none exists. The new event is added to this vector, and the hashtable is updated. The Java code for this design is shown on the next two pages. 

When a tunnel user observes any irregularity inside a road tunnel, it is necessary to inform the tunnel operator of the situation. For this action to be helpful, there are specific requirements and priorities that the tunnel user should follow. The sequence diagram that describes the use case of communication with tunnel operator (Fig. 4), is presenting the course of actions that comply with those requirements. 

The sequence of operations in the CA is straightforward and is described by the flow diagram in Figure 6.4. 

Figure 23-1 shows the hazards identification and risk assessment procedure. The procedure begins with a complete description of the process. This includes detailed PFD and P I diagrams, complete specifications on all equipment, maintenance records, operating procedures, and so forth. A hazard identification procedure is then selected (see Haz-ard Analysis subsection) to identify the hazards and their nature. This is followed by identification of all potential event sequences and potential incidents (scenarios) that can result in loss of control of energy or material. Next is an evaluation of both the consequences and the probability. The consequences are estimated by using source models (to describe the... 

A Catalysis collaboration diagram shows object and action types it does not indicate what sequence of these internal actions realizes the specified effect of a cut. An interaction diagram (Figure 4.14) describes the sequence of actions between related objects that is triggered by a cut operation. It can be drawn in two forms. 

A schematic diagram of a heart-cut LC-LC system is depicted in Figure 5.4. The column switching technique was developed by employing two high-pressure four-way pneumatic valves inserted before and after the precolumn (39). The front-cut and the end-cut of the sample eluted from the first column were vented to waste. The valves were manipulated to transfer only the heart-cut of the analyte of interest to the analytical column. The detailed operational conditions for the four-step sequence of this system can be described as follows ... 

A schematic diagram of the spectrometer is shown in figure 10.16 its successfid operation depends critically upon the ability to achieve accurate timing for a sequence of several events. First, a short pulse of gas is produced from a pulsed-nozzle source, the gas travelling in a direction perpendicular to the axis of an evacuated Fabry Perot cavity, described later. This gas pulse lasts for about 1 ms, and the expansion in the cavity is in an essentially collision-free environment... 

In building a PN-based system model for hazard analysis, the component models should be constructed and validated first and then connected in sequence from top to bottom level according to the piping and instrumentation diagram. The connection between two adjacent component models can be described with Fig. 10. Basically, the output conditions and, in some cases, the equipment states of a downstream component are controlled by the output conditions of an up-stream component. However, if the equipment states of a third-level component are time-variant, the transient behaviors of these states may also be affected by its operation mode, which is uniquely defined by the equipment states of one or more level-2 component. 

Although sequencing of pretreatment technologies is always site specific, there are some generalizations that can be made. Figure 8.21 shows a typical process flow diagram that includes many of the pre- treatment technologies described above. Note that most RO systems will not include all of these unit operations. 

Figure 12 (A) INEPT pulse sequence. (B) DEPT pulse sequence. The article on product operator formalism describes the behaviour of the DEPT sequence while the texts by Harris and GOnther (see Further reading section) describe the behaviour of INEPT in terms of vector diagrams and energy levels.

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