Human barrier analysis

When discussing physical barriers, the indication is that the absences of a physical barrier increase the likelihood of accidents. Therefore, pntting the appropriate physical barriers in place should reduce or prevent those kinds of accidents. 

When physical barriers are used, the physical environment in which the person works is changed. At times, there are some solutions that do not involve changing the physical environment. Those solutions involve doing something to the worker. When dealing with human barriers, try to change factors that directly impact the person, or try to change the way the person responds. 

In doing the HBA, there are three assumptions to make. First, there are logical, understandable reasons why people perform in ways that lead to an accident. Second, those reasons usually take the form of barriers that cause than to do things they should not do. Third, the reasons that cause than not to do things they should not do. Identifying and eliminating these barriers will increase the likelihood of performance that reduces the possibility of accidents and reduces the likelihood of the performance that causes accidents. 

These assumptions are fairly straightforward. There may be some question about the first one. Often, the performance of others is judged as illogical, incomprehensible, and sometimes stupid. When the analyst begins to look at performance from someone else s point of view and looks at it in more depth, it is found to be logical and understandable. The HBA helps to discover these reasons. To perform a human barrier analysis, the following are needed  

Familiarity with the practices, procedures, methods, and strategies of the operation you are analyzing 

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Analyze Barriers and Potential Human Performance Difficulties During this phase of the analysis process, the barriers that have been breached by the accident are identified. TTiese barriers could include existing safety systems, guards, containment, etc. This analysis is called barrier analysis. The causal factors from SORTM are also applied in more detail. 

Many hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques have been developed. These are just a few of the methodologies mentioned in the literature preliminary hazard analysis gross hazard analysis hazard criticality ranking catastrophe analysis change analysis energy flow/barrier analysis energy transfer analysis event tree analysis human factors review the hazard totem pole and double failure analysis. There are many other hazard analysis systems. 

A Fimctional Process Analysis (FRA) is first undertaken to identify hazards and their causes in terms of technical and human elements using plant diagrams, safety procedures, incident records and inter-views/observations of operational people. Bow-tie diagrams can be used to develop a graphical representation of hazards and potential barriers that can prevent or mitigate failure consequences. The next step involves the analysis of human-related barriers (e.g., operator visual checks, operator procedures etc) in Older to identify possible task deviations and human errors that may diminish the efficiency of barriers or make them fad. The analysis of human barriers and task deviations is done with the support of Task... 

The critical PSFs for the action were identified during the detailed barrier analysis from the human factors experts. They are presented in Table 1 and they refer to the field operators and field supervisor. Different human factor aspects were considered referring both to the operators characteristics (experience), the working... 

The HFACS method was initially developed to avoid mishaps in naval aviation, and has later been applied in several other domains similar to the space domain. Hence, it seems well suited to ESA. However, it should be adapted to the space environment. It consists of a comprehensive analysis of previous accidents, also identifying lacks in barriers that are more remote from the incident itself, as management or supervision or organisational causes Thus, taxonomy such as HFACS could be adapted and implemented in order to have an empirical background to implement and work with tools such as Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). 

On the other hand, some contemporary approaches to HRA such as A Technique for Human Error Analysis ATHEANA (Barriere et al. 2000), the Connectionism Assessment of Human Rehabihty (CAHR) based on Strater (2000) and the Cognitive Rehabihty and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) by HoUnagel (1998) were developed around the principle that the fundamental element is, in fact, the context in which the task is performed, reducing previous emphasis on the task characteristics per se and on a hypothetical inherent human error probabihty. 

Barriere, M., et al. 2000. NUREG-1624 Technical Basis and Implementation Guidelines for A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA). Washington, DC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Cooper, S.E., Ramey-Smith, A.M., Wreathall, X, Parry, G.W., Bley, DC. Luckas, W.J., Taylor, J.H., Barriere, M.T 1996. A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA)—Technical Basis and... 

Note that barrier analysis is a key step, because it fundamentally includes DiD, such as the those invoked against radioactivity release (fuel/primary system/contain-ment), and is an adaptation of the bow-tie methodology that was commonly utilized in and by the oil and gas industry. However, it is now known that such physical, procedural, administrative, and managerial layers may be breached, bypassed, or made ineffective or aggravated by human actions and subsequent loss of control, as exemplified by multiple SAs, such as the Three Mile Island loss of coolant, Davis-Besse head corrosion, Piikushima core melts and explosions, the Concorde and Air France AF447 aircraft crash, and the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil-spill events (Duffey, 2015). 

CRIOP Evaluate the contributions from human actions to the failures in barriers against major accidents Process plant Establish potentia accident scenarios Identify critical human actions Human-factor analysis of the actions Consequences of human errors ... 

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