Hazard Reduction Precedence

It is not, however, always called the safety precedence sequence. It is also known as the system safety precedence, the hazard reduction precedence sequence, the hazard control precedence sequence, fhe risk control sequence, and several other names. The fifth step (accept residual risks) is not always included. 

The prioritized list of controls for hazards may be called the safety precedence sequence, the hazard reduction precedence, the hazard control sequence, the system safety sequence, or any of several other terms. The only real difference between an operating hazard analysis (OHA) and an operating and support hazard analysis (O SHA) is the name. 

Another means of improving overall system reliability is by application of the system safety precedence (or safety precedence sequence or hazard reduction precedence sequence). 

Hazard levels The hazard level assigned to the identified hazard prior to applying the hazard reduction precedence sequence (HRPS) corrective action. Include hazard carried over for tracing from previous phases ... 

Recommended actions to efmnate or control the hazard NOTE Use the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence... 

The central concept in system safety is the definition of a hazard. It is important to spend some time nnderstanding what appears intnitive to all of ns. For snccess, a design or production engineer has to be able to identify and correct or control these hazards. Once a hazard is defined, the system safety process can start to unfold and make sense. The hazard reduction precedence is the philosophical basis for most safety control systans across industry. And finally, engineering standards are part of the structure that ensures that all technological systans have some level of safety. System safety optimizes the safety process. 

Hazard Reduction Precedence Hazard Inspection and Abatement Hazard Resolution Process Closed-loop Hazard Tracking Safety Assessment... 

This is the heart of the SSPP and what really makes the SMS tick. The System Safety Methodology is very important. This is where the company lays out the specifics of what constitutes a hazard, how it is identified and controlled, and how residual risks are mitigated. As shown in Chapter 2, the Hazard Reduction Precedence should be described in detail, explaining how the company applies that philosophy. Hazard inspections and control are also described. 

This risk ranking is then used to decide whether the hazard risk should be accepted or not. This disposition or resolving of hazards requires the acceptance of the risk or implementation of a corrective action system to eliminate or control the hazard. The hazard reduction precedence described in Chapter 2 is then applied to determine how best to eliminate or control the hazard. It is imperative to validate that the control is adequate—that is, it actually does control the hazard—and to verify that the control is physically in place. 

The facility hazard analysis follows the same path and sequence of order as the hazard analysis process (review Figure 5.2 to refresh your memory). As mentioned in Section 2.6, the safety managanent system in a facility should also use the hazard reduction precedence design out the hazard, use safety devices, use warning devices, and finally, use special procedures and training. 

If human error can affect a significant hazard, look for ways to control the hazard using the hazard reduction precedence. 

If changes are made to the system, they must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate engineering disciplines. And lastly, the company must follow up on the changes to verify that the hazard control is implemented and adequate. Remember that when thinking about changes to the system, use the hazard reduction precedence described in Chapter 2 as your guide. 

The figure shows that if you can prevent one of these conditions, then you can prevent the accident. Of course, it may not be so easy to ensure that the one that you choose actually holds up. The figure implies that the human operator committed an unsafe act (an active failure or action), which caused the accident. In reality, there were a number of other latent conditions that could have also contributed to a particular accident. These latent conditions may have existed for months or even years. When you investigate an accident, it is important to go down to the root causes, and not just the symptoms or what appears obvious, to ensure that all the accident mechanisms have been identified. Again, refer to the hazard reduction precedence in Chapter 2 on the hierarchy of hazard controls. 

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