Hazard analysis indirect causes

Software hazard analysis (SWHA) is a system safety analytical technique whose primary function is to systematically evaluate any potential faults in operating system and applications software requirements, codes, and programs as they may affect overall system operation. The purpose of the SWHA is to ensure that safety specifications and related operational requirements are accurately and consistently translated into computer software programs. In this regard, the analysis will verify that specific operational safety criteria, such as failsafe or fail-passive, have been properly assimilated into operational software. The SWHA will also identify and analyze those computer software programs, routines, or functions that may have direct control over or indirect influence on the safe operation of a given system. Also, in the operation of the computer software command function, there is a potential that the actual coded software may cause identified hazardous conditions to occur or inhibit a desired function, thereby creating additional hazard potential. 

Accidents are usually complex and are the result of multiple causes. A detailed analysis of an accident will normally reveal three cause levels basic, indirect, and direct. At the lowest level, an accident results only when a person or object receives the release of an amount of energy or exposure to hazardous material that cannot be absorbed safely. This energy or hazardous material is the direct cause of the accident. The second causal areas are usually the result of one or more unsafe acts or unsafe conditions, or both. Unsafe acts and conditions are the indirect causes or symptoms. In turn, indirect causes are usually traceable to poor management policies and decisions, or to personal or environmental factors. These are the basic causes. 

The risk analysis and evaluation will form the heart of the safety case. It is here where the argument and evidence is set out to justify the report s safety claims. This information is inextricably linked to the detail in the hazard register but in the safety case one has the opportunity for further explanation and elaboration. The hazard register typically has a formal structure to support cohesion and consistency between hazards. The fiee-form text of the safety case facilitates articulation and openness enabling us to support our argument with direct and indirect evidence. Essentially the text provides the necessary inference between the hazards, causes, controls and evidence that is needed to justify the argument. 

According to the modem accident-causation (G. and B. et al., 2005), from the point of individual behavior-safety control, hazard is embodied unsafe act (behavior) and unsafe condition meanwhile, under certain situation, unsafe act (behavior) can transform and result in unsafe condition. The unsafe act and unsafe condition is the direct cause of accident, deeper analysis comes to the indirect (common) cause, which include three elements inadequate safety knowledge, inadequate safety awareness, and inadequate safety habit. 

The indirect methods cover the incident and accident analysis. The criterion of hazard is the damage or injury caused by an incident or accident, respectively. Accident analysis methods include in-depth-studies and statistical analyses. Incident techniques extend the accident analysis to more frequent cases of damages. According to the ratio principle of near misses, damages, and injuries the prevention of damage incidents may simultaneously reduce the probability of injuries to appear, provided that a common source of hazards for both types of incidents exists. 

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