ALARP process

Vinnem, J.E. (2006) ALARP prosesser. Utredning for Petroleumstilsynet. Sluttrapport fuse 2. Cjennomgang av selskapenes dokumentasjon og praksis (ALARP Processes. Review of Documentation and Practices in the Companies). Preventor Stavanger... 

The following risk reduction measures were identified and decided implemented in the ALARP process ... 

The safety case concept requires that operators demonstrate that the systems and processes they have adopted ensure that their facility is sufficiently safe for all those people who are possibly impacted by their activities (workers and contractors at their facility, passengers and customers, people who live and work in surrounding areas). Most safety case regulations require the demonstration to take the general form of showing that risk is as low as reasonably practicable, or ALARP (or that risk has been reduced so far as practicable - SFAP). Clearly, safety cases are an example of the broad trend towards risk-based regulation (Hood et al. 2004). 

The process of determining what level of protection and safety makes exposures, and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures, as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic (e.g., cost, effect on production) and social factors. It is typically utilized in the nuclear industry. See also Acceptable Level of Risk As Low as Reasonably Practical (ALARP). 

A safety management risk assessment techniqne that is used to define and control the hazards associated with a process, job, or procedure. The Job Safety Analysis ensures that the hazards involved in each step of a task are reduced to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP). The assessment starts with a summary of the entire job process. The job is broken into smaller steps and listed in a tabular form. The hazards for each step are then identified and listed. This is repeated for each step in the process and a method of safe work is identified. It may be also called a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA). See also As Low As Reasonabfy Practical (ALARP). 

Contemporary risk management follows a maturing path to the establishment, acceptance and management of a level of risk that is deemed tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The recent issue of military standards [MoD 2004] describes six processes for risk management hazard identification, hazard analysis, risk estimation, risk and ALARP evaluation, risk reduction and risk acceptance. Whilst these are not the universal descriptions of the processes involved, the underlying principles are consistent with other procedures and handbooks, for example lEC 61 SOS, JSP 4S4 and Mil Stan 882D. 

Enable ALARP assessments and cost benefit analyses to be carried out (i) to assist in the decision making process regarding the merits of technical changes or modifications, and new infrastructure investment and (ii) to assist in the development of safety justifications for proposed changes to RGS. 

The aim of risk management in medical devices is to ensure patients, operators and the environment are not harmed by the device. Additionally, it shall also ensure that the medical device is effective for its intended use. To this end and according to most common approaches to risk management (AAMl 2004, 2001, ISO 2000), all phases of the design and manufacturing processes shall be covered. Thus, fi om the very first stages of the project, risk is analyzed and controlled to bring it to levels ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). 

A PRA aims to quantify Equation (9.1). The identification of hazards will always be a qualitative process, but numerical values can be assigned to the consequence and frequency terms. For example, the hazard of overfilling an on-board methanol tank could result in a fire leading to a fatality. If this event occurs maybe once every 5000 years then the risk associated with overflowing a methanol tank is 0.0002 fatalities per year. If the Acceptable Risk Level (ALARP) states that a fatality rate of more than 1 in 10,000 years is unacceptable (the ALARP value discussed in Chapter 1), then the methanol overflow hazard needs to be ameliorated. If the hazard cannot be removed altogether, then the consequence term can be reduced, say by reducing the size of the spill or by using a... 

The next stage is the implementation and reassessment stage, when it is check to see if there is any risk in ALARP region. If no, it is ALARP if yes then process is repeated. 

With the knowledge on overall process of ALARP procedure (Clause 43.3), it will be... 

Fig. V/4.0.1-1B shows how one after another, IPL reduces the chances of risk and the system is brought back to ALARP region. A typical actual process example has been presented in Clause 1.1.2 (Fig. Vll/1.1-3) of Chapter Vll.

With initial assessment, all risks are listed and suitable IPLs are deployed. After this the entire system is reassessed. Because we are interested in SIS, in the final assessment only SIS is shown. After each assessment the IPLs and SIS are validated. After final assessment of overall safety requirements it is ensured that the risk level is at an acceptable level, as shown in the figure. This shall be a level equal to or below the ALARP level. In principle, what has been discussed here is more or less the same as discussed earlier, the only difference is that here the basic implementation process is shown. Similarly, SIS in the design phase is shown in Fig. XII/1.0-3. The reason for showing the figure is to recapitulate further details about SIS design. 

It all started with the 1988 Piper Alpha North Sea Oil Platform accident, killing 167 people and causing over 3.6B in insurance claims. The subsequent Cullen Inquiry led to the development and promulgation in 1992 of the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) 1992, later updated in 2005 (United Kingdom, 2005). Now many industries (especially in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe), in addition to petroleum, use the safety case process including aviation, nuclear, rail, and military hardware. See Chapter 2 for more on ALARP. 

Central to the safety case is the hazard control and risk manag ent process, ensuring that risks are well managed. ALARP is used to determine how far you should go to control the hazard. The safety case process is very thorough and highly labor intensive and, if you are not careful, could become overly bureaucratic. It is just a snapshot in time of the safety of the system, so that means that it must be maintained to still be relevant. This is where bureauCTacy can take over if not careful. 

The first APIOOO plant is already under construction in China. The design has also undergone design certification by the United States (US) Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission (NRC), albeit with some work still ongoing. This assessment shows that the design and development process of the APIOOO led to outcomes that are consistent with UK ALARP expectations. 

Following analysis and tests of the mechanisms for movement of isotopes within contaimnent, the designers were able to use a simple natural isotope removal process, and not to require an additional claim on a containment spray system. A passive, gravity fed containment spray system was also considered, but this was found not to be ALARP (see Section A4.10 Appendix 8.4 of this chapter). 

The problems arising from small amounts of solid intermediate level waste are far less than handling large volumes low level liquid waste. The capture of radioactive isotopes in ion exchange resins is the simplest process, and uses proven technology with the lowest initial and operational costs. It is the ALARP option. 

The use of PRA during the AP 1000 design process has led to a further reduction in the level of risk and an ALARP design. 

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