Transportation security example

R D efforts at the US Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, R D Division include near- and long-range programs for the development of novel MEMS/NEMS based trace explosives detection systems. These efforts include the development of novel miniaturized front-end collection systems, for the collection of explosive particles and/or vapour, followed by preconcentration and delivery to several MEMS/NEMS based sensors. A few examples of sensor projects currently under development include ... 

This chapter provides a discussion of current security guidelines and regulations (Section 6.2) and a methodology for adapting and applying security vulnerability assessment (SVA) techniques designed for fixed chemical facilities to account for the differences specific to transportation (Sections 6.3 and 6.4). Practical transportation security elements are provided in Section 6.5. Finally, at the end of the chapter, the XYZ Chemical example highlights the unique issues of a security vulnerabiUty assessment as compared to a safety risk analysis. 

Most near term hydrogen will likely be made from natural gas. A domestically secure alternative is coal. Every component of coal-to-hydrogen production processes is not only demonstrated on a commercial scale but is in commercial operation outside the United States, for example, to produce ammonia in China. The economics of large scale coal-to-hydrogen looks favorable if the 2003 prices for natural gas remain the norm. The largest challenges will be the transport of carbon dioxide and the availability of carbon dioxide sequestration reservoirs. Here the regulatory landscape is still not fully formed. 

Finally, a note of caution is needed to secure proper handling of biological specimens for GC analysis. Many of the recommendations as well as the rules for GC analysis are similar to the requirements for other clinical determinations (collection rules, sample storage, transportation, etc.), but special needs for GC may sometimes arise. For example, while certain foreign compounds (preservatives, dietary artifacts, therapeutic drugs, etc.) may not matter in conventional determination, they may be a problem in GC analysis. A publication by Jellum [15] discusses this matter in some detail. 

The hazards of the chemicals that may be transported are discussed in regulations, defined by the hazard class, and presented in Section 3.2.1 of this chapter. In addition, there are other published lists of chemicals of concern from a worker safety, public safety, environmental, and security perspective. For example, a material may not be a regulated toxic, but may have certain characteristics such as chronic toxicity or reproductive effects that may warrant a more detailed risk evaluation. This step is not limited to chemical hazards, and may also include ... 

Since this is a high-level corporate review at this point, the prioritization activity is limited to the chemicals, their physical properties, and the potential consequences and impact that could result from an accidental release while in transport to or from an XYZ Chemical plant. During the risk analyses presented in the continuing example in Chapters 4 and 5 (which focus on a specific facility s transportation activities), the other operational factors above are reviewed in greater detail. The prioritization process at this point, therefore, will be hazard- and consequence-based with additional detail on conseqnence, likelihood, and risk addressed for those chemicals and modes of transportation identified for escalation. Additionally, the review is limited to safety, since the focns of Chapter 6 is exclusively on security. In practice, safety and secnrity can be completed together, but have been separated in this book and example for clarity. 

At this point in the example, the eompany-wide reviews eompleted in Chapters 2 and 3 are replaeed with a first-level qualitative risk analysis foeused on the transportation aetivities of a single XYZ Cheinieal faeihty. To eontinue the example, a single XYZ Chemical facility is selected. This facility will continue to be evaluated as the level of analysis detail increases from qualitative to semi-quantitative in this chapter to quantitative risk analysis (Chapter 5). As the level of detail increases, the analysis will be directed at specific questions that remain following each level of analysis. This facility will continue to be the focus of Chapter 6 where the security vulnerabihty of the hazardous materials in transit is evaluated. Chapter 7 where risk reduction options are evaluated, and Chapter 8 where the ongoing management of risk continues in the future. 

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