Tanks amphibious

Amphibious Devices for Tanks. During landing operations troops and their equipment are... 

An improved amphibious device was developed in the USA. It consisted of metal boxes filled with plastic foam and attached to the front, rear and sides of the tank in such a manner that they could be detached from the tank by the crew without getting out. The tank was propelled through the water at speeds up to 6 mph by simply driving the tanks in the normal manner. The advantages of this- system were that the tank turret was above water and the weapons could be fired if necessary on approaching the enemy shore. This device was used for light and medium tanks... 

Amphibious devices for tanks 1 A392 DD device 1 A392... 

Davy Crocket (Atomic Rifle) A504-R DD Device. See under Amphibious Devices for Tanks A392-R Destruction of Amatol A162-L Destruction (Disposal) of Lead Azide A574 A575... 

DD Device. See Vol 1, p A392-R under Amphibious Devices for Tanks... 

Bohr stayed on in London for several more weeks. He was thus on hand for D-Day, Tuesday, June 6, 1944. The greatest amphibious assault ever attempted, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, called that invasion of Europe across the English Channel with an initial force of 156,000 British, Canadian and American soldiers supported by 1,200 warships, 1,500 tanks and 12,000 aircraft. By the time Bohr and his son left England at the end of the week to return to the United States the Allies had secured the invasion beaches and begun advancing inland with a force bolstered now to 326,000 men. The way home, Eisenhower instructed his armies, is via Berlin. ... 

As the combat period approached, Colonel Unmacht and his stafiF turned their attention from numerous projects in gas warfare defense and decontamination to the nontoxic chemical weapons and munitions. Their work on the flame thrower tank, and later on stabilized flame thrower fuels, was the outstanding overseas development work of the worldwide CWS. Unmacht was a strong proponent of the use of the 4.2-inch chemical mortar with high-explosive shell, and the development, testing, and combat supply of a landing craft mortar mounting for Pacific amphibious operations represented one of his achievements in the field of combat support. The mortar gun boat development was also a noteworthy example of Army-Navy co-operation. 

The smoke detail on the left flank of Red Beach was led by Lt. Frank J. Thomas, commanding the ist Platoon, aist Company. According to plan, four amphibious tanks carried the men across the beach to the railroad about 150 yards beyond. Fanning out to four positions at 100-yard intervals, the detail began operations within ten minutes of landing. The smoke line was gradually pushed inland to a road 250 yards from the beach. Until this time the smoke troops had not received enemy fire, but now mortar and small arms fire caused one casualty. No casualties were suffered in the heavily mined woods through which the smoke troops passed to reach the road. 

The detachment from the ist Platoon, which landed on the right flank of Red Beach, was led by Capt. Sam Kesner, assistant chemical officer of the 3d Division. For some reason the landing craft dropped its amphibious tanks some 1,000 yards from shore. Consequently, Kesner s party, which remained in the LCT, had to unload its pots the hard way. Some were thrown into two 6-man rubber boats and towed to the beach. The rest of the smoke munitions were tossed overboard and floated ashore in their crates, an expedient made necessary by the pressure of enemy small arms fire. The situation was made more difficult because the LCT had landed 400 yards to the right of its assigned area in order to avoid mines. The smoke plan called for four positions on the beach, a number soon increased to twelve because of the adverse winds. The smoke detail soon pushed inland about loo yards, suffering four casualties in the early hours. 

Okinawa was the last battle of the war and one of the hardest. Conducted by Tenth Army on the very doorstep of Japan, it was to involve more CWS equipment than any other Pacific campaign. Each of the four Army divisions of XXIV Corps had 141 portable flame throwers each of the three Marine divisions of III Amphibious Corps had 243, the same number as had been taken to Iwo Jima. The 713 th Tank Battalion, converted to a provisional flame thrower unit for the operation, received a complement of 34 POA main armament flame throwers. ... 

Tank crews developed a fear of the periscope type after the fuel container of one burst and ignited upon being struck by an enemy shell, burning the tank crew to death. This type of auxiliary flame thrower, therefore, was never fully tested in battle. Nor was the bow gun type, with which the III Amphibious Corps was equipped, put to much use, for main armament flame tanks of the 713th Tank Battalion were preferred by Marine as well as Army units. ... 

American troops did not see Japanese flame throwing vehicles until they captured eight on Luzon in 1945. The weapons were placed on amphibious tractors, similar to American DUKW s. The Japanese did not have fuel thickeners comparable to American napalm, and had to use mixtures of crude oil, gasoline, and kerosene. Since Japanese troops employed portable flame throwers against Americans from early 1942 onward, it is difficult to explain why they did not use mechanized flame throwers. American troops learned by trial and error of the value of flame tanks, and perhaps the Japanese never threw off their conservatism sufficiently to give the tanks full-scale battle tests. ... 

Airplane spray tanks were not as widely or as frequently employed as smoke pots, grenades, mechanical generators, and other ground smoke munitions. In amphibious landings, paratroop drops, and situations where a wall of protective smoke had to be erected quickly between American and enemy forces, smoke tanks nonetheless proved to be valuable, efficient devices. 

---