Safety skepticism

For scales to measure other safety-related factors, the reader can consult Costa and Anderson (2011) for trust measures Zohar (2000) for safety climate measures Barling et al. (2002) for safety consciousness Sneddon et al. (2013) for situational awareness Neal and Griffin (2006) for safety participation and compliance Chmiel (2005) for bending the rules Cox and Cox (1991) for safety skepticism Neal et al. (2000) for safety knowledge and safety motivation Tucker et al. (2008) for employee safety voicing Tucker et al. (2008) for perceived organizational and perceived co-worker support for safety and Diaz-cabera et al. (2007) for safety culture. Another good source of information on safety measures are meta-analyses (e.g., Christian et al. 2009 Clarke 2006). 

Not-for-proht organizations, including universities and research institutes, have a natural affinity for such partnership arrangements since they avoid the natural skepticism that comes from a profit motivation. But, even for profit, companies can create a virtual partnership by communicating clearly to the FDA—in action as well as words—a willingness to put public health and safety above short-term revenue goals. 

While the FDA is under intense congressional and public pressure to shorten the approval process, however, more profound responsibilities and pressures assure that an abbreviated process does not compromise safety and quality. Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between the amount of outside referral in a 505(b)2 and the skepticism it engenders. Subjectively viewing the process, a 505(b)2 that relies entirely on published studies and Agency findings would face maximum opposition (and, without at least a BE/ BA study, no real patent projection). A 505(b)2 that represents a combination of outside published studies and/or FDA findings with applicant-conducted studies can reduce costs, shorten the research process, and stand an excellent chance in the NDA review. 

The important points in this story are that it is best to stick to products from known manufacturers who have a reputation for carefully screening their ingredients to be skeptical of claims made in advertising and on the Internet and to keep yourself educated about substances that are suspected of being harmful. When in doubt, ask your doctor. It s part of his or her job to know about the safety and effectiveness of health products. 

For employees, the policy statement is the declaration of an intent to achieve a goal. However, employees are skeptical of bureaucratic policies and look for more solid evidence of management commitment. Thus, the timing and sequence of health- and safety-related decisions demonstrate how the policy will be implemented and the importance of health and safety considerations. A health and safety pohcy with no follow-through is worthless and in fact may be damaging to employee morale by showing employees a lack of management commitment. This can backfire and can lead to poor employee safety attitudes and behaviors. Thus, an employer has to put the money where the mouth is to demonstrate commitment. If not, a policy is an empty promise. 

Your employees are one of greatest sources of creativity and innovative ideas in the area of safety, health, environmental, and related areas if their creativity can be tapped. A strategy to entice employees to express their creativity and ideas must be developed in conjunction with an overall plan that takes into consideration the nature of the employer-employee relationship. Employees are often skeptical about expressing their wild ideas or discussing blue-sky concepts with management because of potential repercussions regarding their jobs, or they may even fear that the boss will think I m dumb. An atmosphere should be created in which employees are encouraged to express their ideas, no matter how far-fetched. 

Industrial facilities do not operate in isolation they are part of a larger community—a community that is often skeptical about their polluting, dangerous neighbor. Even remotely located facilities such as offshore oil and gas platforms have to be sensitive to public concerns. Therefore, effective public outreach and communications are an important and essential component of any safety management program. 

Vernon L. Grose in Managing Risk Systematic Loss Prevention for Executives appropriately cautioned on several occasions against an overreliance on numbers in determining risk when the numbers may not be sound. A reasoned skepticism would serve safety professionals well concerning the validity of the numbers used in what appear to be precise determinations of both the probabihty of an incident occurring and an assessment of its consequences. 

The introduction of a structured safety management system will normally be met with resistance and skepticism by the workforce. Changing existing embedded safety habits, rituals, and perceptions will be met with reaction and resistance to change. 

Employees are generally skeptical of change, and more so of safety system change. The initial reaction will be, Oh, but we ve tried that before and it didn t work. Or, I wonder how long this new safety fad will last. Once committed to safety improvements, management will be tested as to its capacity to maintain the drive and carry out the actions required by the demands of a structured safety system. If safety reports are not acted on within a reasonable amount of time, employees will start to question management s integrity. 

After a few months 1 managed to persuade the leadership to form the executive safety committee (the safety leadership team) chaired by the CEO and attended by all the general managers. A start was made on developing safety standards and policies, and the committee reviewed my restructuring proposals of the SHE department with skepticism (Figure 16.1). 

While the technical and scientific cormnunities may agree that deep geologic disposal is safe and ethical, the pubhc seems much more skeptical. The main hurdle now is gaining public and political confidence in the safety of a deep geological disposal program and of the sites selected by that program. 

OSHA s infrequent inspections and low fines make noncompliance with OSH A standards widespread. Econometric evidence we reviewed shows that OSHA had no effect on safety levels in the United States during the 1970s and reduced lost workday injuries by two to seven percent during the 1980s. A two to seven percent injury reduction is much less than the 50 percent injury reduction the framers of OSHA had intended. OSHA is not cost effective in raising workplace safety levels in the United States, and even unionized workers are now becoming skeptical of the value of OSHA s regulatory approach to safety (Nomani 1994). 

Nomani, A.Q. (1994). "Muffed Mission, Labor Secretary s Bid to Push Plant Safety Runs Into Skepticism," Wall Street Journal, August 19 Al. 

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