Safety case regime

Realistically, it has to be concluded that the term ALARP really does not provide much help to risk management professionals and facility managers in defining what levels of risk are acceptable. It may be for this reason that the U.K. HSE chose in the year 2006 to minimize its emphasis to do with ALARP requirements from the Safety Case Regime for offshore facilities. Other major companies have also elected to move away from ALARP toward a continuous risk reduction model (Broadribb, 2008). 

The first safety cases prepared for the process industries were those developed for North Sea offshore oil and gas operations following the Piper Alpha disaster that occurred in the year 1988. The Cullen report (Cullen, 1990) that was written following that accident was highly critical of offshore operating practices and recommended that a safety case approach be implemented. The Seveso incident that occurred in Italy further prompted the increased use of safety cases. Since that time the use of safety cases has spread to other industries (such as mining and railway operations) and to other nations, primarily in Europe and Australasia. (It is notable that the safety case regime approach has not been taken up for offshore oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico—instead a more prescriptive approach based on industry consensus standards is used.)... 

The effectiveness with which the commitments in the safety case are being implemented Monitoring the effectiveness of SMS and operator audits of them The degree to which the work force is involved in implementing the Safety Case Regime. 

HSE (2003) Literature Review on the Perceived Benefits and Disadvantages of UK Safety Case Regimes. UK Health and Safety Executive Norwich. 

The UK safety case regime is the clearest manifestation of Ee engineering frame. It requires quantitative risk analysis (QRA) in order to prioritise risks. An extension... 

The safety case regime of the United Kingdom and Australia is lypieal of the midpoint of the dimension whereby a process (risk assessment) is specified by which the goal of risk control is to be met, and acceptable methods of risk analysis are prescribed, but it is then left to the regulated company to convince the regulator of the way it is led to control risk by that risk assessment process. Further guidance is in the form of codes which have the status of acceptable translations of the goals, but leave the choice open to the company to comply in other ways. 

Robin Pitblado. The Potential Value of a Safety Case Regime in the USA. Mary Kay O Connor Process Safety Center 17th Annual International Symposium, 2014 Proceedings, College Station, Texas 2014. p. 558-568. 

Safety cases were subsequently extended to other sectors, particularly those in which there is the potential for major loss of life such as rail, nuclear and defence. While the scope, content, structure, regulation and organisational aspects of safety cases and safety case regimes necessarily varies among the different sectors, the overall purpose and nature of a safety case remains the same to demonstrate by argument and evidence that a system is safe. 

It may be for reasons such as these that the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 2006 decided to minimize its emphasis of ALARP requirements from the Safety Case Regime for offshore facilities. Some... 

Regulators who work in a Safety Case regime (Chapter 8) face the same dilemma because, if there were to be an accident, the company involved can claim that some of the responsibility for the event lies with the regulator. To get around this quandary the UK HSE (HSE 2005) states that ... 

A safety case regime is an objective-based regime whereby legislation sets broad safety objectives and the operator, who accepts direct responsibility for the ongoing management of safety, develops the most appropriate methods to... 

Arguably, then, the question is not what is a safety case regime—but rather what kind of safety case regime is being contemplated... 

The degree to which the work force is involved in implementing the Safety Case Regime. 

Heiler, K., 2005. Is the Australian mining industry ready for a safety case regime 31st International Conference of Safety In Mines Research Institutes. 

Recent disasters in Australia in different industries have prompted different regulatory responses. In the state of Victoria, a gas plant accident which disrupted supplies to the state for two weeks (Hopkins, 2000) has led to the introduction of a safety case regime, while in the state of Queensland, a coal mine explosion which killed eleven men (Hopkins, 1999) led to a requirement that mines develop principle hazard management plans. This paper looks at the characteristics of the two different styles of regulation, explores reasons for these different responses, and draws some tentative policy conclusions. 

Safety case regulation modelled on the Seveso directives has been developing in Australia in recent years. From about 1995 Australian offshore petroleum production has been subject to a safety case requirement, while on shore, a major federal government report in 1996 recommended that the Australian states should introduce safety case requirements for major hazard facilities (NOHSC, 1996). Little progress had been made in implementing this recommendation by the time of the accident at the Esso Longford gas plant in Victoria in 1998. A Royal Commission of inquiry into this accident recommended the implementation of a safety case regime for major hazard... 

Consider how a safety case regime would have prevented this accident. The standard hazard identification procedure in the industry is a HAZOP (hazard and operability study). Two other gas plants at the Longford site had been HAZOPed but a planned HAZOP of the plant where the... 

It is clear, therefore, that both styles of major hazard regulation would have averted the accident, had they been in place. A safety case regime would have mandated a systematic hazard identification procedure which would have identified and controlled the hazard of cold temperature embrittlement. An incident report system which required the reporting and investigation of abnormal temperature events and leaks would also have resulted the discovery and control of the danger of embrittlement. 

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