Proliferation concerns

I know that there are advocates of reprocessing here today. We have concluded, however, that reprocessing is uneconomic and causes proliferation concerns. According to an Energy Resources International study, reprocessing will add about 40 percent to the price of fuel. But whether or not you share our views on reprocessing, geologic disposal of waste - for hundreds or thousands of years - is an issue that we all must face. 

Proliferation concerns have been and continue to be the basic cause ofthe official US. opposition to reprocessing and plutonium recycle, and have thus led to the official U.S. categorization of spent fuel as nuclear waste which should be permanently buried in geologic repositories. 

The entry into force of the 1993 CWC on 29 April 1997 was unique in the history of arms control. This agreement both banned an entire class of weapons and simultaneously addressed chemical proliferation concerns. It was not, however, the attention to non-proliferation that made the Convention unique, rather that the CWC incorporated an elaborate international system for verification of compliance.1... 

When the CWC entered into force, more than 20 countries were thought to possess offensive chemical weapons capabilities. The countries thought to be of proliferation concern in the late 1990s were China,... 

GWye), development is now centered on (1) reducing plutonium in the waste, (2) the liquid metal benefit to safety, and (3) electrometallurgical reprocessing at each reactor site, thereby reducing proliferation concern. 

The approach we derived for this analysis offers some important insights on the supply issues associated with the former Soviet NBC workforce regarding both the types of personnel of proliferation concern and the challenge of identifying facilities where the risk of illicit knowledge transfer is greatest. 

Bureau of Industry and Security, U S. Department of Commerce, The Entity List Entities of Proliferation Concern Listed in Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, January 9, 2004, http //www.bxa.doc.gov/ Entities/Default.htm (as of April 6, 2004). 

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Research Council, Proliferation Concerns Assessing US. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union, Washington,... 

From a non-proliferation perspective, the proper functioning of national control systems for chemicals is as important as the application of international verification measures under the CWC. The CWC was designed to address state-to-state relations, and any proliferation concerns in this context need to be addressed through the provisions of Article VI (and, if need be. Article IX). But proliferation concerns relating to nonstate actors cannot easily be addressed in this manner, and the CWC relies heavily on the implementation work of the States Parties within their jurisdiction to prevent such acts of CW proliferation. It is in this context that the Review Conference called for the Action Plan on Article VII implementation. 

Proliferation concerns and export controls on dual-use goods and technologies... 

Not transport or assist in the transport of any cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems or related materials to or from countries or groups of proliferation concern. 

High Risk (Personal) Property property that, because of its potential impact on public health and safety, the environment, national security interests, or proliferation concerns, must be controlled, and dispositioned in other than the routine manner. The categories of high risk property are (1) Especially designed or prepared property, (2) Export controlled property, (3) Proliferation-sensitive property, (4) Nuclear weapon components or weapon-like components, (5) Hazardous property, (6) Automatic data processing equipment, (7) Export controlled information, (8) Radioactive property, (9) Special nuclear material, and (10) Unclassified controlled nuclear information. 

Table A-2 in Appendix A displays disposition options for chemicals that are subject to abandonment or destruction (Section 4.7). Such non-t5 ical disposition methods, which require prior DOE authorization, may be appropriate for chemicals identified as High Risk property (see definition also Section 4.1.2) that have the potential to adversely impact national security interests, proliferation concerns, public health and safety, or the environment.

However, these apphcations must be realized in the presence of the unique disadvantages of nuclear pumping Low pump power per unit volume (for RPLs, not NDPLs) intense radiation fields extraction of the laser beam from the complex reactor stracture (for substrate pumping) and the health, safety, and proliferation concerns of nuclear technology in general. 

The two exchange processes discussed here are representative of alternative enrichment processes that have been under study in several countries. At present, however, no country has built or operated a full-scale uranium enrichment plant based on an exchange process. The CHEMEX process has, however, been tested in pilot scale. The primary proliferation concern is that these processes are based on standard chemical engineering technology. 

The GT-MHR produces less heavy metal radioactive waste per unit energy produced because of the plant s high thermal efficiency and high fuel burnup. Similarly, the GT-MHR produces less total plutonium and Pu-239 (materials of proliferation concern) per unit of energy produced. 

The GT-MHR spent fuel plutonium content, the material of most proliferation concern, is exceedingly low in quantity per spent fuel block and quality because of high fuel burnup. The discharged plutonium isotopic mixture is degraded well beyond LWR spent fuel, making it particularly unattractive for use in weapons. 

The United States may have considerable reprocessing experience, but the application of this to civilian-used fuel has been frustrated by political sensitivities motivated by proliferation concerns based on an understanding that reactor-grade plutonium is usable for weapons. Civil reprocessing was stopped in 1977. 

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