Organizational provisions

The operating organization shall establish an appropriate management structure for the research reactor and shall provide for all necessary infrastructures for the conduct of reactor operations. The organization for reactor operation (the reactor management ) shall include the reactor 

Operation includes all activities performed to achieve the purpose for which the nuclear research reactor was designed and constructed or modified. This covers maintenance, testing and inspection fuel handling and handhng of radioactive material, including the production of radioisotopes installation, testing and operation of experimental devices the use of neutron beams use of the research reactor systems for the purposes of research and development and education and training and other associated activities. 

The operating organization shall determine the staff positions that require a licence or certificate and shall provide for adequate training in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory body (see also paras 7.11-7.27). In particular, the reactor manager, the shift supervisors and the reactor operators shall hold a licence or certification issued by an appropriate authority. 

The operating organization shall have overall responsibility for the preparation and satisfactory completion of the commissioning programme (see paras 7.42-7.50). 

The operating organization shall prepare periodic summary reports on matters relating to safety as required by the regulatory body and shall submit these reports to the safety committee and to the regulatory body if so required. 

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Provisions made to prevent failure to satisfy customer needs and expectations and organizational goals. 

On December 3, 1984, a toxic gas release from a pesticide plant in India killed nearly 3000 people and injured at least 100,000 others. The chemical that leaked was methyl isocyanate, a chemical intermediate that was supposed to be stored in a cooled bunker near the plant s outer boundary. The vapor is highly toxic and causes cellular asphyxiation and rapid death. Despite engineering and procedural provisions to prevent its release, a total system breakdown resulted in the release of 40 tons of the deadly material into the densely populated community of Bhopal. Because of this incident, the plant was dismantled and ultimately the parent corporation. Union Carbide, was forced to make a number of organizational changes. The occurrence is considered by many to have been the most tragic chemical accident in history. 

Managed care is the complex mix of organizational, clinical, and financial activities that ensure the provision of appropriate health care services in a cost-effective manner. The term has taken on many meaning to patients. 

The term pharmacy and hospital services refers to departmental and institutional/organizational components of the infrastructure that support the pharmacist s activities. They consist of systems, operations, and personnel who facilitate and support the provision of patient care, teaching, and research to optimize safe and effective pharmaceutical care of the critically ill. 

A number of variations and permutations are possible in the provision of group and organizational decision support. These are associated with specific realization or arcMtectuial formed for a GDSS to support a set of GDSS performance objectives for a particular task in a particular environment. 

Wherever possible, there should be a continuous secondary barrier for the entire pipeline system, in the form of jacket pipes, collecting basins, and channels. In some cases, this is not possible because it would impede cathodic corrosion protection or because differential expansion of the pipe and outer jacket threaten the systan. The secondary barrier can then only consist of intensive organizational and operative backup measures shorter inspection periods, shorter distances between shutoff points to limit possible losses, more elaborate provisions for leak detection, continual ronote monitoring of the pipeline systan, both internally and externally, equipment for tackling anergency events and catastrophes, contingency plans, and so forth. 

Organizational measures include emergency and contingency plans, guidelines for daily operations and safety checks, monitoring requirements, and provisions for assuring accountability and competence. 

As a rule certain engineering provisions must be made in order to make the organizational intervention possible. An example is given in Fig. 4.10. If an alarm sounds because the temperature in a reactor for an exothermic reaction is too high the operating instruction is to fully open the valve of the bypass. If the reason for the increasing temperature is a failure of the temperature control or of the automatic control valve a runaway reaction would be prevented in this way. 

The use of prevention as a basis of safety requires the early identification of process hazards and the conditions under which they can occur. This allows the specification of boundary conditions, or an envelope within which the process must be maintained if it is to be operated safely, and the provision of measures to ensure that the process remains within the envelope. Where possible this should be achieved by the design of the process and plant, but it may also depend on instruments, trips, alarms and control systems. In addition, organizational procedures such as rigorous instruction, strict enforcement of operating conditions and the provision of adequate maintenance are required. 

Incidents with significant failure in safety provisions but with sufficient defence in depth remaining to cope with additional failures. These include events where the actual failures would be rated at level 1 but which reveal additional organizational inadequacies or safety culture deficiencies. 

In the practice of modem system safety analysis, the system safety engineer attempts to provide a sufficient level of information to organizational management so that informed decisions may be made regarding hazard risk acceptance or rejection. In the safety and health arena, the provision of such choices often requires ample substantiation in order to justify decisions to accept a hazard risk. The system safety practitioner can utilize a wide variety of techniques and methods to determine risk levels and, through preestablished acceptance criteria, make recommendations to management. These analytical tools serve to qualify the risk in relation to some existing level and/or standard of operation. Some of the more common of these tools are discussed in detail in Part II of this text. When acmal failure rate data are known or can be determined or deduced, the system safety effort can take the analysis process further and actually quantify the risk of hazard in terms of these known or expected failure rates. 

Typically, the organizational safety official is responsible for implementing and managing the hot work permitting procedure. The primary elements required to be incorporated into a viable hot work permit system include a standard operating procedure consisting of (1) a written procedure, (2) a permit, (3) worker training, and (4) fire watch provisions. 

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