Reduction ontological

Responses to this further question appear to fall into two camps. One prominent metaphysician believes that the question needs to be approached independently of any theories of chemistry and of physics. Robin Le Poidevin has published an extensive article in which he argues in favor of the ontological reduction of chemistry to physics. He does this through what he has termed a combinatorial approach. 

Le Poidevin writes that because the thesis of ontological reduction is about properties, we do have to have a clear conception of what is to count as a chemical property. He then takes the identity of an element, as defined by its position in a periodic ordering, and its associated macroscopic properties to be paradigmatically chemical properties. About these properties we can be unapologetic realists. He also claims that a periodic ordering is a classification rather than a theory, so this conception of chemical properties is as theory-neutral as it can be.v He believes that the question of the ontological reduction of chemistry is the question of whether these paradigmatically chemical properties reduce to more fundamental properties. He then adds,... 

Finally there is a somewhat general objection to the use of combinatorialism in order to ground the ontological reduction of chemistry. Surely the assumption of that fundamental entities combine together to form macroscopic chemical entities ensures from the start that the hoped for asymmetry is present. But it seems to do so in a circular manner. If one assumes that macroscopic chemical entities like elements are comprised of sub-atomic particles then of course it follows that the reverse is not true. The hoped for asymmetry appears to have been written directly into the account, or so it would seem. 

No strict separation between ontology and ideology, i.e., between things and, properties no strict distinction between ontological, epistemological, and explanatory reduction, and no strict distinction between ontological reduction and conceptual autonomy... 

Scerri McIntyre (1997) make a distinction between ontological and epistemological reduction of chemistry to physics. The authors argue that ontological reduction of chemistry to physics is a foregone conclusion. The question then becomes whether or not chemistry can be reduced to our current descriptions of physics, in other words epistemological reduction of chemistry to physics. 

AM holds that mental entities (particular time-and space-bound objects and events) are physical entities, but that mental concepts are not reducible by definition or natural law to physical concepts. The position. .. endorses ontological reduction, but eschews conceptual reduction (1993 3). 

But if Kim is correct, these twin goals cannot be jointly satisfied autonomy can be secured only at the price of nomicity. According to MR, ontological reduction is blocked only if the properties that realize mental... 

These are only some of the many examples which show that the concepts of ontological reduction and of ontological dependence are completely meaningful and have a venerable tradition in the history of philosophy and of science. On the basis of this tradition we, as philosophers of science, are entitled to use them, even with the purpose of rejecting ontological reductionism. 

What is more, in the case of the relationship between chemistry and physics, the claim of ontological reduction is even weaker due to the epistemological irreduc-ibility of the theories of chemistry to the descriptions supplied by physics. In this scenario, the insistence on the ontological dependence of chemical entities and regularities upon the physical domain is not justified the burden of proof lies on the non-pluralist realist. 

Mulder P (2010) On the alleged non-existence of orbitals. Stud Hist Philos Mod Phys 41 178-182 Mulder P (2011) Are orbitals observable Hyle-Int J Philos Chem 17 24-35 Nagel E (1961) The structure of science. Harcourt, Brace World, New York Needham P (2006) Ontological reduction a comment on Lombardi-Labarca. Foimd Chem 8 73-80... 

Hendry RF (2006) Is there downward causation in chemistry In Baird D, Scerri E, McIntyre L (eds) Philosophy of chemistry. Synthesis of a new discipline. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 173-189 Hendry RF (2010a) Chemistry emergence vs. reduction. In Macdonald C, Macdonald G (eds) Emergence in mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 205-221 Hendry RF (2010b) Ontological reduction and molecular structure. Stud Hist Philos Mod Phys 41 183-191... 

This is the concept this book is about. Now, should we, in the light of what was said so far, assume that this concept applies to theories, rather than properties, processes or individuals This way, we could easily eschew the problem just sketched. A large part of this book deals with this question, and it wiU be argued that notions of theory-reduction are parasitic on a notion of ontological reduction, or a notion of reduction that applies primarily to properties, facts, kinds, individuals, or processes. If this is correct, it seems that there is no easy way out of the problem sketched above. A careful investigation of this problem will, however, lead to a detailed and fruitful explication of the notion of reduction. So, let me state it more precisely. 

Reduction in the philosophy of science is usually regarded as being a relation instantiated by pairs of theories, or scientific models, rather than by pairs of properties, event-types or states of affairs. It is thus time to distinguish between two versions of reduction - theory reduction and ontological reduction ... 

The predicate reduces to expresses a relation of ontological reduction only if its arguments in true sentences refer to things such as kinds, types, properties, events, substances, or individuals. 

Let me add this proviso In contexts of explication, one may feel free to drop one criterion in favor of another. One case in point is this As already mentioned, in the philosophy of science, it is common to drop an assumption imposed by the paradigmatic cases, namely, that reduction should connect kinds or phenomena or events (in any primary sense of the term reduction ). Approaches to reduction that take theories to be the primary relata of the reduction relation follow this idea. This is usually justified by arguing that the idea of ontological reduction is just confused. We will turn back to this assumption later on. Let me close this introduction with a few terminological remarks. 

Moulines, C. Ulises. 1984. Ontological reduction in the natural sciences. In Reduction in science Structure, examples, philosophical problems, ed. Wolfgang Balzer, David A. Pearce, and Heinz-Jflrgen Schmidt, 51-70. Dordrecht Reidel. 

Principle Identity-Based Ontological-Reduction) If a reduces to b, then a = b. 

In accordance with the tradition, the relata of the reduction relation are taken to be theories (Hooker 1981 Patricia Churchland 1986 278 Bickle 1998, 2003). Churchland explicitly states that theory-reduction is prior to ontological reduction ... 

This idea is tied to the hope that we can avoid ontological confusion by rephrasing ontological reduction talk in terms of theory-reduction (Patricia Churchland 1986, 219) The notion of a theory is, however, more liberal than the classical one. 

We have thus sketched the four most prominent suggestions for defining reduction in the philosophy of science. All these characterizations at least cover a case of identity-based reduction. However, it is not obvious how they should fit the explication proposed in Chaps. 4 and 5 all these characterizations are characterizations of a relation the primary relata of which are theories, or other scientific representational devices, rather than properties or other non-representational worldly objects. The next section offers a notion of theory reduction that is derivative on the notion explicated above. In Chap. 8 it will be argued that in fact, notions of theory reduction are derivative on notions of property reduction, that is it will be shown that the procedure to obtain a notion of theory reduction from a notion of ontological reduction proposed in the next section is in fact adequate. 

---