Natural kinds

Of course it is important to distinguish between the shape of the periodic table, which is admittedly a matter of choice or convention, from tables that actually place certain elements in different groups. The point is not whether one should favor a tabular form, in which periods end abruptly, over circular displays which emphasize the continuity of the sequence of the elements for example. The question is rather whether to favor a table that places the element helium among the noble gases, when compared with tables that place this element among the alkaline earths. The wider question is whether elemental classification is an objective matter of fact or whether it is a matter of convention. It is the question of whether helium, for example, has a natural kinship with the noble gases or with the alkaline earths. Or as philosophers of science are apt to say, it is the question of whether or not groups, or families of elements, represent natural kinds. 

Arguing against the causal efficacy of some disjunctive properties, Sober has held that disjunctive properties will appear to be causally efficacious only to the degree that their disjuncts strike us as subsuming similar sorts of possible causal processes (Sober, 1984, p. 94). Suppose we drop out the qualifications will appear to be and strike us as unsuited to a question about whether disjunctive properties really are causally efficacious as opposed to seeming to us to be causally efficacious. If we adopt this principle, the question at issue becomes one of whether the disjunction of Pi, v P2v... v P,, v... v Pm subsumes similar sorts of causal processes, to which the answer seems to be that the disjunction shares in common the features of having been selected for resulting in the same outcome, i.e. PS-processes. Thus, the disjunctive predicate names a causal property, a natural kind. Antireductionists are hard pressed to deny the truth and the explanatory power of (R). 

Lacking a gold standard criterion, the only rational basis for inferring the existence of a taxonic entity, a real class, a nonarbitrary natural kind, must lie within the pattern displayed by the presumed indicators of the conjectured taxon. 

My family helped me to get through it I wasn t dealing with it by myself. It took a while for my dad to understand, because he s a big healthy-like-a-horse kind of guy. He s a natural kind of guy, though, too. Even before we knew about chemical sensitivity our family never used products with a lot of fragrance or perfume. It s been Dr. Bronner s all the way. We re brown rice and broccoli people. My family is very supportive and has helped me all the way. It s a family commitment. 

Per-Olov was not only an outstanding scholar who made lasting contributions to science, but also an exceptionally warm person, full of natural kindness and goodwill. We cherish his scientific achievements as well as his memory. 

Now, thesis III does not specify the domain of the variable x. But Aristode clearly thinks that composite substances are those entities that are members of species, at least if those species ate natural kinds. This is such a basic presupposition of Aristodes physical-metaphysical treatises that it hardly needs corroboration. But whatever evidence... 

With the view that it is composite substances that are members of natural kinds in hand, the connections between form-m, species and form-c become clear. If members of species are composites, a species, because it is the composites form, is form-c. Hence, we have an argument for the identity of form-c and species. Moreover, according to III any composite substance, x, will have a form-c, i.e. be a member of a species F, if and only if x has some matter enformed by a form-m that orders x towards F-ness. In this way, the two notions of form coalesce into the following relations form-m is the form of the matter of a composite, c, and as such is necessary and sufficient for c s being a member of its species, i.e. for c s having a form-c. Furthermore, the form-m that enforms cs matter is a particular—for instance Socrates s soul is a this-soul—while cs form-c is a universal—for instance Socrates s species, i.e. human, is universal. 

A less valuable sort also with an element of gold is also found in lead mines. In all these mines however an artificial variety is produced that is much inferior to the natural kind referred to the method is to introduce a gentle flow of water into the vein all winter and go on till the beginning of June and then to dry it off in June and July, clearly showing that gold solder is nothing else than the putrefaction of a vein of metal... 

In the chapter entitled "Chemical Synthesis Complexity, Similarity, Natural Kinds and the Evolution of a Logic, " Stuart Rosenfeld and Nalini Bhushan open up the field of chemical synthesis to philosophical investigation. We argue that the philosopher s conception of the science of chemistry has, in effect, blocked the development of a philosophy for the science. We expose some of these misconceptions as they play out in the area of chemical synthesis and show that, when rectified, the conceptual framework that sustains this field is ripe for philosophical scrutiny. 

Schwartz, Stephen P., ed. 1977. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press. 

Third, many more than two discourses (apart from chemical and physical) need to be distinguished there is manifest water, the physical, physico-chemical, chemical, and biochemical macroproperties of water, the (chemical) molecular microdiscourse, and the (physical) quantum mechanical discourse, and that s only the beginning. Fourth, the notion of reduction has to be spelled out (a) What is it that is being reduced (theories, concepts, properties, natural kinds, laws, explanations) (b) How does it differ from related notions such as replacement, elimination, integration, supervenience, and emergence (c) What sort of relation is it (dependence, identity,. . . ) ... 

Epistemological reduction concerns whether the concepts (properties, natural kinds) necessary for the description of S can be redefined in an extensionaUy equivalent way by the concepts of B and whether the laws governing S can be derived from those of B. 

Timmermans, J. 1963. The Concept of Species in Chemistry. New York Chemical Publishing, van Brakel, J. 1986. "The Chemistry of Substances and the Philosophy of Natural Kinds." Synthese, 69 291 324. 

Complexity, Similarity Natural Kinds, and the Evolution of a "Logic"... 

The goal of this chapter is to extract some of the conceptual underpinnings of the idea of synthesis and of the different aspects that constitute its practice. In so doing, we show why chemical synthesis should be of interest to metaphysicians and philosophers of science. To this end we (1) provide a provisional characterization of synthesis (2) describe what chemists have understood to be the "logical" structure that underlies the modern practice of multistep synthesis (3) explore the notions of molecular and synthetic complexity and the relationship between them (4) analyze the use of similarity judgments in the categorization of compounds and, related to this, (5) undertake a scrutiny of the notion of a natural kind in the context of the possibility of chemical synthesis. 

In modern chemical synthesis, the creations and our knowledge of them are special in that they are arguably creations and knowledge of the very fabric/furniture/ stuff of the universe this epistemological perspective is unique and could benefit from further philosophical commentary on the different ways, kinds, and objects of human making. We take up one implication of "making" at this fundamental level in the section entitled Natural Kinds. 

We offer the following as prima facie evidence in support of the stronger (and, of course, more provocative ) position. If one takes H2O to be in the class of entities that constitute the essential features of our world, then here is its relative—another molecule, but newly created One might respond that molecules like water and the air (oxygen/nitrogen) we breathe, the chlorophyll that makes leaves green, and so on, are different—that they have a special place in the way we view the fabric of our universe. But what justifies this treatment At the very least, it is significant that these are tokens of the same broad "type," namely molecules. We will take up a somewhat different but related issue in the section entitled Natural Kinds. 

The concept of a "natural kind" is often invoked to settle debates in the philosophy of science and in metaphysics, debates that raise skepticism about a variety of our practices the justifiability of inductive reasoning, the projectibility of predicates, the correct meaning of some of our terms. Thus, for example, the predicates that are pro-jectible are just the ones that are true of natural kind terms. 

Not surprisingly, a belief in natural kinds tends to go hand in hand with a belief in a robust form of Realism. Here again is Guttenplan "what is crucial to the notion [of a natural kind] is that the shared properties have an independence from any particular human way of conceiving of the members of the kind" (1994, p. 450). This tight connection between natural kinds and realism is relatively uncontroversial. For if the grouping is "natural," then it is reasonable to infer that there are underlying properties that are shared, even if we do not yet know what they are. 

Might a closer look at the implications of the possibility of chemical synthesis bring fresh insights into the discussion regarding natural kinds We think so. Natural kinds research has historically proceeded independently of a consideration of the implications of the possibility of synthesis. Ruminating on what it means to create entities at... 

In all of these cases, what is the relationship between the synthesized molecules and their naturally occurring counterparts This is a discussion yet to take place in the philosophical literature, presumably because the answer has been taken to be obvious they are all of a kind, synthesized or not, because the synthesized ones are indistinguishable from the "natural" ones. But it seems far from obvious that this is the case, once one thinks through, on the one hand, the notion of natural kind that is at work and, on the other, the extent of the "making" that is involved in synthesis and the level at which this occurs. So what is the basis for categorization ... 

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