Montara

Montara RA, Quina FH, Chaimovich H (1978) Biochem Biophys Res Commun 81 1080 23 Lukac S (1983) J Phys Chem 87 5045... 

Indications that deepwater activities posed new technical problems were ignored, such as the difficulties experienced by Chevron at its Tahiti site in 4,000 feet of GOM seawater and the Montara accident and spill off the Australian coast. Many assurances were given that the risks were minimal for example, that drilling within 200 miles of the U.S. coast had a 99% safety record, that only. 001% of the oil produced had been spilled, and that natural seeping, shipping, and runoff from land caused more contamination of the oceans than oil spill incidents. Complacency about deepwater risks had set in, and on March 31,2010, President Obama announced his plan to open up, lease, and exploit the closed regions of the GOM, the Atlantic OCS, and the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas off the northern Alaska coast. ... 

The continental shelf off the north-west coast of Australia holds rich reserves of oil and gas, with hydrocarbon exploration and production activities in the area stretching back over deeades. On 21 August 2009, those in charge of drilling the Montara Hi oil and gas well in this area lost control of the well, resulting in uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons to the environment. This type of event is known in the oil industry as a blowout. The incident has been the subject of a statutory inquiry (Borthwick 2010). 

Whilst the environmental impact of the Montara blowout is limited compared to the Deepwater... 

Horizon incident, there have been impacts felt in West Timor, and the Commission of Inquiry has highlighted that the lack of baseline data and the slow response in putting a monitoring plan in place mean that the full extent of the impact of the Montara spill will never be known. 

In the case of Montara, the drilling rig was leaving the site, but there was no plan to abandon the wells, so the company argued that it was reasonable to use the standards applicable to temporary suspension, even for the period when the drilling rig was elsewhere (Duncan 2009, 159 Wilson 2009, 152). Their point seems to be that the WCS does not allow for batch drilling, that is the case where wells are suspended and the rig departs, knowing that it will return for more planned work. This is indeed a case where the rules may not be applicable and a risk assessment of the... 

Hopkins (2010) has highlighted the interrelationship between risk assessment and rule compliance. He points out that rules are often based on risk assessments and that, as far as possible, risk assessments should be formulated into rules to assist end point decision makers such as those involved in operational drilling activities. He highlights other accidents where the temptation to risk assess one s way out of specific safety requirements has contributed to accidents, as appears to have been the case with Montara. 

This section moves from the specifics of the events snrronnding Montara to a summary of how both academia and government have songht to address the potential for... 

If the operating eompany of the Montara development had been required to make a regulatory submission about relevant failures in industry and in their own operations - how they are identified and what lessons ean be learned - would the blowout have been less likely to oeeur ... 

Operator competence and capacity - Lessons from the Montara blowont . Safety Science, doi io.ioi6/j.ssci.2oii.io.oo9. 

PTT. 2009. Email - Montara Platform Wells Morning Update, dated 16 April 2009. http // www.montarainquiry.gov.au/exhibits.html. 

Montara 2009 Australia Drilling Blowout Substantial spill of oil and extensive fire damage to the relief drill rig 0... 

In 2009, the Montara Wellhead Platform (WHP) suffered a blowout that led to the release of a large oil slick there were no injuries. The spill continued for... 

The official report to do with the event, the Montara Commission of Inquiry (2010), provided the following summary of the event ... 

In the early hours of 21 August 2009, a small burp of oil and gas was reported as having escaped from the HI Well at the Montara WHP. The oil and gas had travelled a distance of over four kilometers from the reservoir beneath the sea bed. Whilst the initial burp subsided, approximately two hours later the HI Well kicked with such force that a column of oil, fluid and gas was expelled from the top of the well, through the hatch on the top deck of the WHP, hitting the underside of the West Atlas drilling rig and cascading into the sea. 

The Inquiry has concluded that PTTEPAA [the operator] did rwt observe sensible oilfield practices at the Montara Oilfield. Major shortcomings in the company s procedures were widespread and systemic, directly leading to the Blowout. 

The causes of the Montara incident are reminiscent of the causes of the Santa Barbara spill in that both could have been avoided had the drilling team simply followed standard rules and procedures. The event was not caused by technical limitations or the use of new technology. Related to the failure to follow rules was a failure of the regulatory to fully apply those rules. 

Table 2.12 highlights the elements of SEMS that are particularly pertinent to the Montara event. 

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