Development needs acceptable risks

In summary, the proposal of an appropriate definition of the residue is not a process which follows simple and unambiguous rules in each case. The differences between residue definitions of some European MRLs and US tolerances illustrate the importance of harmonization. However, the great effort sometimes necessary to reach a suitable and accepted residue definition, which considers the needs of risk assessors (toxicologists) and the feasibility aspects of residue analysts, is clearly a vital prerequisite for any method development and validation. 

With the plant interview information, verification of the data, and the completion of the simple calculations, an experienced troubleshooter will develop a set of hypotheses for the root cause of the defect. After the hypotheses are established, a series of experiments need to be developed that accept or reject the hypotheses. Once a hypothesis is accepted via experimentation, then the next step is to develop a technical solution to remove the defect. Often more than one technical solution Is possible. The best technical solution will depend on the cost and time to implement the solution, machine owner acceptance, and the risk associated with the modified process. An accepted hypothesis must drive the technical solution. If a hypothesis is not accepted prior to developing a technical solution, then the troubleshooter may be working on the wrong problem and the defect may not be eliminated from the process. 

The risk-based waste classification system developed in this Report is based fundamentally on the concepts of negligible (de minimis) and acceptable (barely tolerable) risks from exposure to radionuclides and hazardous chemicals, with the crucial distinction that acceptable risks generally can be considerably higher than negligible risks. Therefore, in implementing the waste classification system, decisions would need to be made by regulatory authorities about... 

In military operations, it is impossible to have zero risk, and indeed, the acceptable risk level in most cases may well be higher than that set for civilian operations. Determining the appropriate level of decontamination for a situation is the result of assessment and decision making based on all of the risks. Setting the appropriate risk levels and decontamination specifications is an area in need of Navy doctrine. Once established, that doctrine could then lead to the development of testing and performance standards to be used for field decontamination, as well as to base and long-term equipment decontamination procedures. The Navy must be able to provide doctrine, guidelines, and expertise in this area. 

There are branches and application fields where flammability regulations have not reached even an initial level. Protracted and persistent efforts are needed in order to develop internationally accepted regulations for all sectors of life and industry that would contribute effectively to a reduction in fire risks of plastics applications. 

In recognition of the educational need those beliefs presented, I tried to develop a definition of acceptable risk that was precise, terse, and possibly numerical, which could be universally applicable to all risk situations. I failed. Bruce Main, president of design safety engineering, joined me in researching and authoring a paper titled... 

Radon in indoor air may cause 14,000 cancer cases and secondary tobacco smoke may cause 3,000 cancer cases each year (USEPA 1993b). USEPA has developed effective methods to monitor and manage radon. They recommend that every home purchase a low-cost monitor to assess exposure and determine what control steps if any are needed. The risk from radon is increased by the presence of secondary tobacco smoke, which contains many toxic compounds such as PAHs and benzene (USEPA 1993b Wallace 1991). Thanks to public education about risks from radon and tobacco in the home, many families will no longer accept smoking inside the home. 

Arrester Testing and Standards Regulatory and approval agencies and insurers impose acceptance testing requirements, sometimes as part of certification standards. The user may also request testing to demonstrate specific performance needs, just as the manufacturer can help develop standards. These interrelationships have resulted in several new and updated performance test procedures. Listing of an arrester by a testing laboratoiy refers only to performance under a defined set of test conditions. The flame arrester user should develop specific application requirements based on the service involved and the safety and risk criteria adopted. 

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